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Abstract 
Purpose 
 This study is designed to determine whether managed care selective contracting 
arrangements have had an influence on the number and distribution of procedures with 
demonstrated volume and outcome endogeneity in Florida healthcare markets; in 
addition, methods are developed to determine which measures of managed care activity 
best predict the impact of managed care in health care markets.  
Rationale 
 A shift in surgical procedure volume to hospitals on the basis of preferred 
provider arrangements has the potential to redistribute surgical procedures within 
competitive markets, moving cases from one hospital to another.  The surgical 
procedures for which such a distribution could have the greatest impact on population 
health are those for which the volume of cases performed has a strong inverse influence 
on the outcomes observed.   A shift in high risk surgical procedures to low volume 
hospitals could potentially reduce the number of cases performed at high volume centers 
and increase cases at low volume centers, adversely impacting quality in both.  
Methods 
A retrospective population based cohort design is used capitalizing on the 
variability among Florida markets between 1995 and 1999, a period which captured the 
full business life cycle of managed care plans statistical areas and competing hospitals 
(market share) over time.   
xi 
 
         Multiple regression models were used to measure the impact of managed care 
activity (penetration, competition and concentration) on both the number of the selected 
procedures (volume) at the market and hospital level and the distribution of those 
procedures (hospital market share) controlling for socio-demographic and market factors 
known to influence surgical procedure utilization.  Post hoc analysis of the procedure 
volume model was conducted using a log linear generalized estimating equation which 
permitted the use of all of the volume data over the study period to provide validation for 
the difference score methodology.  
 Key Findings 
Procedures with demonstrated volume and outcome endogeneity increased over 
the period, and remained a consistent proportion of the total procedure volume. The 
procedure rate remained stable over the study period with substantial small area 
variation. Change in managed care concentration was consistently and negatively 
associated with procedure volume at both the MSA (β = -19.67; p = 0.0489) and hospital 
level (β = -4.088; p = 0.0027).Change in the total population and the number of specialty 
surgeons had a substantial, consistent and positive relationship to change in procedure 
volume at both the market and hospital level. The change in the index of competition 
was positively associated with change in hospital market share (β = 0.1005; p = 0.05); 
whereas, neither change in managed care penetration nor change in managed care IOC 
was predictive of change in procedure volume at the market level.  The managed care 
variables were not correlated when difference scores were utilized providing evidence 
that the managed care variables measure different constructs and behave differently. 
Implications 
As markets for managed care become more concentrated, the number of 
surgical procedures with volume and outcome endogeneity declines; the specific 
xii 
 
reasons for the observed decline require additional study.  Hospitals experience 
increases in market share for these procedures when the managed care markets are 
more competitive.  Studies of managed care require consideration of the stage of 
managed care development in order to understand its influence and the use of 
difference scores as a method to measure change over time has substantial potential for 
the study of health care markets that are continually changing.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction and Purpose 
Since its inception in 1910 as a simple prepaid health plan for lumber mill 
employees in Seattle, managed care has evolved and expanded to become the 
predominant form of health insurance in the United States. As recently as 1988, seventy 
percent of insured workers were covered by indemnity insurance utilizing the fee for 
service payment methodology. The health care insurance market evolved quickly such 
that by the end of 2000, 92% of workers were covered by some form of managed care 
plan. In addition to those covered privately or by their employers, approximately 30% of 
Medicaid recipients and 14% of the Medicare beneficiaries were enrolled in managed 
care plans (Morrisey, 2001). Despite the size and influence of managed care on health 
care markets and access to health care services there has been little population based 
research reported and the results have been inconsistent.  
The Scope of Managed Care 
The 1990’s have been termed the golden era for managed care, as it was the 
period of most rapid adoption and market penetration.  Barriers created by prior 
managed care legislation were removed and government incentives were offered to 
encourage market entry for new managed care plans. The development of alternative 
care delivery models like managed care was an effort to curb the exponential growth in 
national health care expenditures which had continued to increase 2.4 % faster than the 
gross domestic product (GDP) each year since 1970 (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2008).  
Marquis and Long studied the impact of insurance changes during the period from 1993 
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to 1997, calling this time a”managed care revolution”.  By 1998 only 14% of employees 
in large firms (those with more than 200 employees) were enrolled in conventional 
indemnity plans and enrollment in traditional indemnity plans in small firms dropped from 
78% to 31% (Marquis & Long, 1999).  
By 2001, managed care enrollment approached 178 million, with 79.5 million 
Americans participating in health maintenance organizations (HMOs) and another 98.4 
million were enrolled in preferred provider organizations (PPOs). Sixty one percent of 
these plans were organized as for-profit entities. For the period 1993 to 1998 the rate of 
increase in for- profit managed care plans was nearly three times that of the not-for- 
profit sector (Pauli, Hillman, Kim, & Brown, 2002).  
Contemporary Definitions and Boundaries of Managed Care 
The concept of managed care has evolved to encompass a broad spectrum of 
techniques, products and organizational models used to control the cost of health care 
services; however, classic managed care plans are differentiated from other insurance 
programs with similar aims in that they offer a package of health care benefits to their 
enrollees on a pre-paid basis, assuming financial risk for the covered services.  
Managed care integrates the functions of health insurance, delivery of health care 
services and payment for those services in one organizational entity (Shi & Singh, 2008). 
Definitions 
The managed care organization (MCO) either employs or contracts with a network of 
service providers to care for its members at a pre-negotiated and discounted price. 
These contractual arrangements create predictability for both the managed care 
purchasers of health services and the providers of the services, but do so by shifting the 
financial risk of the cost of care to the MCO.  The original intent of managed care 
innovators was to assure affordable access to health care services for enrollees while 
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reducing the cost of care. By providing programs and incentives to both primary care 
providers and enrollees designed to maintain wellness, prevent disease and detect 
disease early in its progression, expensive tertiary care would be avoided or minimized, 
thereby reducing aggregate cost to the system.   
Given the ubiquitous use of the term managed care in colloquial applications, 
even the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has had difficulty defining its many forms 
and boundaries as it continually evolves from its original intent. The definition utilized for 
federal planning purposes and for purposes this study is: 
“Health insurance plans intended to reduce unnecessary health 
care costs through a variety of mechanisms, including: economic 
incentives for physicians and patients to select less costly forms of care; 
programs for reviewing the medical necessity of specific services; 
increased beneficiary cost sharing; controls on inpatient admissions and 
lengths of stay; the establishment of cost sharing incentives for outpatient 
surgery; selective contracting with health care providers; the intensive 
management of high cost health care cases. The programs may be 
provided in a variety of settings, such as health maintenance 
organizations and preferred provider organizations” (National Library of 
Medicine, 2010). 
 Scope of managed care plans 
Based on this definition, the Kaiser Family Foundation database identifies 577 
managed care organizations in the United States in 2010 (Kaiser Family Foundation, 
2010). The National Directory of Managed Care Organizations, Sixth Edition profiles 
more than 1,500 managed care organizations, representing 5,279 managed care plans 
(Lewis, 2007).  The Florida Bureau of Managed Care counts 39 commercial HMOs and 
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16 Medicaid HMOs based in the state. (Florida Agency for Health Care Administration, 
2010).The  National Committee for Quality Assurance, which establishes standards and 
accredits managed care plans, reviewed more than 700 different corporate managed 
care plans in 2008, some of which included indemnity plans with managed care 
components  (National Committee for Quality Assurance, 2009).  
 Models of managed care 
Although the programs and services vary among plans, the business model for 
contemporary managed care plans is predicated on the reduction and control of costs 
associated with patient care services through the management of utilization. Utilization 
management is the managed in managed care.  The types and forms of managed care 
plans continue to evolve in response to market demand and regulatory changes. The 
simplest form is found in managed indemnity plans which are traditional fee-for-service 
indemnity plans that have adopted managed care techniques of pre-certification for 
elective procedures and case management of high cost cases or conditions. There is 
typically no cost or risk sharing with providers at this level. 
On the opposite end of the managed care continuum is the closed panel or staff 
model HMO, which was envisioned by the original advocates of managed care. Each 
enrollee is assigned a primary care provider to act as their advocate, care coordinator 
and the gateway through which the member must access other specialists, tests or 
procedures.  Because the closed staff model employs or contracts with a select panel of 
providers, the plan can exercise greater influence over provider specific practice patterns 
and resource utilization through company wide application of practice standards and 
careful monitoring of financial and clinical outcomes (Shi & Singh, 2008). The other 
forms of managed care delivery models operate on a continuum characterized by the 
degree of operational control they exert over the patient/physician relationship.  
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Managed Care Control of Utilization 
Irrespective of the managed care model utilized, plans and their enrollees will 
require access to inpatient hospital services. Although a few large MCOs like Kaiser 
Permanente have opted to own and operate their own hospitals, most must utilize 
hospitals in the private sector to provide services that require inpatient care.  Since 30 
cents of each premium dollar is consumed by hospital services, control of hospital 
utilization is essential for the managed care plan (Shi & Singh, 2008). The key strategies 
utilized to control hospital utilization include: 
1. Selective contracting, in which the payers (MCOs) negotiate contracts with 
providers (physicians, ancillary providers and hospitals) based on the 
provider's willingness to accept discounts and innovative payment methods 
for inducement of cost effective patient care practices. These contracts create 
a panel of providers within the plan network. Managed care plans introduced 
selective contracting into the hospital market (Freeland, Hunt, & Luft, 1987).  
2. Steering, in which financial and non-financial incentives are used to steer 
enrollees to selected providers, exacting penalties to discourage the use of 
providers who are not approved through the MCO. Whether the enrollee is 
participating in a traditional HMO plan with a primary care gatekeeper or a 
PPO that allows enrollees to select a provider from an approved panel, 
patients are provided incentives to use the network providers or they will incur 
additional cost, which in many cases is substantial. Managed care plan 
executives may deny or delay requests for approval of elective procedures on 
the basis of contractual coverage or lack of medical necessity. (America’s 
Health Insurance Plans, 2009). 
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3. Utilization review, in which reimbursement and continuing responsibility for 
the care of plan members is contingent upon review of that care for 
appropriateness. The techniques include the use of pre-approval for elective 
services and procedures, concurrent review of hospital care and retrospective 
audits of care patterns for financial and quality outcomes. (Dranove, Simon, & 
White, 1998).  
 The impact of these strategies has not been well reported and where they have 
been reported the results have been inconsistent as the review of the research 
demonstrates. (Reschovsky, Kemper, 2000; Baker, 2001; Bamezai, Melnick, Mann, 
Zwanziger, 2003; Cohen, Weinick, 2000; Dhanani, O'Leary, Keeler, Bamezai A, Melnick, 
2004 ).  Whether these strategies have limited patient access to hospital services, or 
whether selective contracting arrangements have changed referral patterns and 
distribution of inpatient admissions are of major significance for hospitals, patients and 
policy makers. The reasons follow.   
The Problem for Hospitals 
A great deal of speculation and conventional wisdom has evolved about the 
scope and frequency of managed care denials, especially for high cost surgical 
procedures which are responsible for the hospital’s bottom line profitability.  Traditional 
insurance plans reviewed cases simply for the determination of coverage. If the 
coverage was included in the policy, it was approved. Managed care plans reviewed a 
case not only for benefit determination, but for medical necessity (Kongstvedt, 2001). 
The MCO controls the utilization and cost of surgical procedures by shifting procedures 
to the lower cost ambulatory setting whenever possible and by aggressively managing 
the pre-approval of elective procedures. When major surgery is deemed medically 
necessary, the MCO utilizes hospitals with which it has entered into a contractual 
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agreement stipulating a pre-negotiated and discounted price. The potential benefit to the 
MCO of selective contracting for surgical care is the reduction of financial risk associated 
with open ended fee for service arrangements by bundling and capping the price for 
each procedure. Likewise, benefit could potentially accrue to hospitals entering into 
selective contracting arrangements through the generation of additional patient volume 
and the competitive advantage created by capturing the managed care patient 
(Kongstvedt, 2001). Hospitals unable or unwilling to compete on the basis of price and/or 
outcomes would potentially lose access to patients enrolled in the managed care plan, 
and the substantial revenue these admissions bring (Anderson, Worzola & Zhang, 
1998).   
For many hospitals, peri-operative services account for 55 to 65 % of 
operating margin. The Towers Perrin comprehensive study of the contribution of surgical 
procedures demonstrated that cardiac surgery, on average, adds $12,000 in hospital 
contribution margin per case and neurosurgical procedures, vascular and orthopedic 
procedures add $8,000, $7,000 and $6,000 respectively. This compares with an 
estimated $1,500 for the average medical admission (Blasco & Peters, 2004). This 
places managed care efficiency at odds with the hospital‘s requirement to grow 
procedural admissions.   
Hospitals actively market and recruit new specialty physicians and surgeons 
to increase demand for these high cost services, while managed care plans work equally 
hard to constrain payments for them. The research to date is not sufficient to isolate the 
independent impact of managed care practices from other potential drivers of demand 
for surgical procedures. What is clear is that during the two decades of strong managed 
care growth between 1980 and 2000, hospital operating margins decreased significantly 
and 1,200 American hospitals closed, which was the highest rate of closure in U.S. 
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history. From 1991 to 2006 hospitals experienced negative patient margins ranging from 
-1.0% to -4.5%. (Patient margin is defined as the difference between net patient revenue 
and total expenses, divided by net patient revenue). Operating margins are extremely 
narrow at approximately 2.0% to 6.0% with the number of hospitals experiencing 
negative total operating margins peaking at 30% in 1999  (American Hospital 
Association, 2009). The steady decline in length of hospital stay attributed to concurrent 
utilization review and an increasing case mix index, demonstrating an increased intensity 
of care over time, placed additional pressure on hospitals’ financial performance during 
this time (Healthcare Financial Management, 2006).  A seminal study by James 
Robinson summarized the impact of managed care on hospital utilization in California 
during a period of maximum managed care market penetration. He concluded that 
“managed care is shifting the acute care hospital from the center to the periphery of the 
health care system” (1996. p.1063). 
The Problem for Patients 
The net reduction in hospital admissions that has occurred over time is 
attributable to market forces, only one of which is selective managed care contracting; 
however, many health care providers and policy makers believe that these contracting 
decisions have been based on price rather than on a provider’s ability to produce high 
quality outcomes. This assumption has been supported by a very small number of 
regional studies, primarily of coronary artery bypass procedures (Zelen, Bilfinger, 
Agnanostopoulis, 1991; Escarce, Shea & Chen, 1997; Chernew, Hayward, & Scanlon, 
1996.  It has been further speculated that those hospitals that offer managed care plans 
the lowest price are able to so because they have lower cost structures, resulting from a 
lesser investment in the staff and infrastructure necessary to support the highest quality 
care.  This is of particular concern for academic hospitals where high risk procedures are 
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often performed. Teaching hospitals cannot typically compete on the basis of price alone 
because of the higher cost of their education and research missions. In Florida the 
occupancy rates for teaching hospitals have declined precipitously. Jackson Memorial 
Hospital, a major teaching hospital system in an area with heavy managed care 
penetration, experienced a change in occupancy from 93% in 1988 to 69% in 1997, a 
pattern seen in the other Florida teaching hospitals.  The reduction in the number of 
admissions to teaching hospitals has the potential to impact those patients who may 
benefit from that level of care, as well as to reduce the quality of the education of health 
care professionals.   
The reasons for the observed changes in admission rates have not been 
sufficiently isolated or reported in the literature, with substantial change in healthcare 
markets like prospective payment occurring contemporaneously with the growth of 
managed care. In addition to the potential impact of price based selective contracting on 
hospitals, it has been reported that the competitive pressures on hospitals to offer 
managed care plan administrators the full range of tertiary services has resulted in 
smaller community hospitals opting to perform complex procedures that they would not 
previously have attempted, and therefore performing them infrequently (Schulman, 
Rubenstien, Seils, Hadley & Escarce, 1997). Consequently, hospitals successfully 
competing for managed care contracts on the basis of price are thought to perform fewer 
surgical cases and therefore to have less collective experience. For those procedures 
with volume and outcome endogeneity, such as cardiac surgery and neurosurgery, 
performance of cases in a hospital with low volume has the real potential to adversely 
impact patient outcomes (Dudley, Johansen, Brand, Rennie, & Milstein, 2000).  A shift in 
high risk surgical procedures to low volume hospitals could potentially reduce the 
number of cases performed at high volume centers and increase cases at low volume 
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centers, adversely impacting quality in both. If this were to be the case, patients would 
be disadvantaged.  Whether hospitals with good outcomes attract more patients, or 
whether a larger pool of patients provides the experience sufficient to create outstanding 
outcomes, is at the core of the debate about the relationship of procedure volume to 
procedure outcome (Birkmeyer, 2000).  
Finally, should managed care enrollees face denials for necessary care, delays 
in admission or a requirement to use hospitals with sub standard quality the impact on 
enrollees would be substantial. This is particularly true for those procedures with volume 
and outcome endogeneity. Since these procedures are the most costly to the managed 
care plan, non emergency cases would potentially be most vulnerable to extensive 
scrutiny prior to approval.  Quality could therefore be adversely affected both by 
constraint of access and by steering patients to lesser quality hospitals.  
Study Purpose   
Although there is a large, and increasing body of literature providing support for 
the idea that the volume of surgical procedures performed in a given hospital has 
substantial impact on the outcomes observed, the basic premise that managed care 
enrollment has redistributed patients or surgical procedure volume has not been 
demonstrated. Should such redistribution be demonstrated, it has not been shown that 
an associated difference in procedure specific outcomes has been observed as a result.  
This study will first attempt to determine if the number of high-risk inpatient 
surgical procedures, with demonstrated volume and outcome endogeneity changed 
during a period of maximum managed care activity in the state of Florida. Second, these 
procedures will be examined to determine if there has been a change in their distribution 
among competing hospitals; and finally whether that redistribution is associated with 
managed care activity within the market as defined by the metropolitan statistical area 
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(MSA). Perhaps the most critical policy concern associated with increased managed 
care penetration is its impact on the aggregate health outcomes of the population 
served. This study will serve to inform the debate on the impact of managed care on a 
very selective population: those undergoing high-risk, high cost inpatient surgical 
procedures. 
Review of the managed care and volume literature demonstrates the uncertainty 
of the science in informing public policy on the influence of managed care on hospital 
based care in general, and high cost/high risk procedures specifically. The ongoing 
tension between the hospital’s financial reliance on keeping and growing surgical volume 
and countervailing efforts to reduce cost by restraining hospital utilization continue to 
dominate the public policy debate. This requires that policy makers have additional data 
about the impact of financing arrangements designed to constrain patient access, the 
population based outcomes that result from those actions and their unintended 
consequences.  It is important to understand whether managed care plans have 
restricted access to essential surgical procedures for the purposes of cost control, or 
whether they have done a better job of prevention, education, application of evidence 
based guidelines and reduction of practice variations.  If managed care has had an 
impact on population health outcomes associated with high risk/high cost procedures for 
which volume is endogenous, we should first see a reduction in number of those 
procedures which varies with managed care activity.  If selective contracting has re-
distributed procedures with volume and outcome endogeneity within competitive 
markets, we should see variations in both the volume and market share for those 
procedures at the hospital level that can be explained by variations with managed care 
activity.  
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The overwhelming majority of empirical work in this area relies on managed care 
penetration as the sole independent variable measuring managed care activity. 
Managed care penetration has been defined two ways in the literature. Most commonly, 
market survey data on managed care enrollment is utilized. Dranove, Simon and White 
compared the percentage of revenue physicians received from managed care contracts 
as an alternate measure of penetration and found results to be similar in both (1997).    
  This is especially true in studies conducted during the “golden era” of managed 
care growth upon which much conventional wisdom is based. This singular variable of 
managed care activity is insufficient to understand the impact of complex market 
changes that occur over the life cycle of MCOs, given the frequency with which they 
enter, compete and exit the marketplace.  Additional measures that capture this activity 
in addition to penetration are needed, have been developed and are utilized in this 
study.  
Measuring competition and competitive forces in healthcare markets is a 
challenge. In his seminal paper on this issue, Laurence Baker found that the 
components of successful measurement are: identification of the specific products and 
markets to be studied; selection of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index or similar index of 
competition; consideration of econometric problems, like endogeneity with common 
measures; and, attention to the way in which market place changes like managed care 
affect performance, the traditional measures utilized in this body of research. He 
expresses concern that the data required for constructing the traditional and evolving 
measures of competition are “frequently scarce, insufficient, or both” (Baker, 2001). 
Baker further suggests that measurement and understanding would be improved if 
research on competitive managed care were to take into account geographic regions 
and time periods that have differing levels of managed care prevalence. 
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Research Questions 
A retrospective population based cohort design is used which  incorporates these 
recommendations and utilizes hospital procedure data and geographic variation in 
managed care activity over time to estimate its impact on both the number of procedures 
with volume and outcome endogeneity, and distribution of those procedures among 
competing hospitals. Models are developed and hypotheses tested to estimate the 
impact of managed care activity on volume at the level of the MSA and of the hospital, 
as well as market share at the hospital level, controlling for other factors known to 
influence procedure rates and hospital utilization.  Changes over time in three measures 
of managed care activity will be tested for their association with changes in procedure 
volume and market share over the same period. Managed care activity is measured for 
each of three explanatory variables: managed care penetration, index of competition and 
managed care concentration. 
In order to close the gap between conventional wisdom and empirical evidence 
related to managed care and procedures with demonstrated volume and outcome 
endogeneity, the following questions are addressed: 
1. Has the utilization of procedures with volume and outcome endogeniety 
changed in Florida over the study period?  
2. Has managed care activity in Florida influenced the volume of inpatient 
surgical procedures with demonstrated volume and outcome endogeneity? 
3. Has managed care activity redistributed inpatient surgical procedures with 
demonstrated volume and outcome endogeneity among competing 
hospitals? 
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4. Which measures of managed care activity best predict the impact of 
managed care business practices on the utilization of procedures with volume 
and outcome endogeneity over time?   
This study will contribute evidence for the support or rejection of conventional wisdom 
about the impact of managed care on member access to high risk/high margin surgical 
procedures in Florida and will inform the debate about the managed care organization’s 
role in future health care planning and reform efforts.  
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Chapter 2 
Review of the Literature 
Organizational Approach  
The premise of this research is that volume is important to the outcome of 
complex, high risk inpatient surgical procedures and that managed care may have an 
impact on both the number and distribution of these procedures within hospital markets.  
In order to characterize the complex issues involved, the supportive literature is 
reviewed in several related areas. First, the research that provides context for the role 
managed care plays in the provision of health care services is summarized. Conceptual 
models that capture the business life cycle of managed care are utilized to provide a 
logical conceptual framework and structure for this work and the research questions 
posed. In addition, this body of literature serves to focus the period of time that most 
effectively captures the impact of managed care market changes in Florida.  
The seminal studies of managed care were performed using data from the 
1990’s, as this was the period of maximum managed care growth and the public policy 
debate it created. Managed care market activity has been most concentrated in 
California and Minnesota where the model was adopted earlier than the remainder of the 
country; consequently, many of the early studies utilize the experience and data from 
these states as precursors of the national experience (Zwanziger & Melnick, 1996). In 
addition, many studies of the impact of managed care on patient distribution have 
focused on the coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) procedure, which is 
disproportionately represented in the literature. This is likely due to two reasons: 1) it is a 
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high cost and high risk operation for which the research has consistently demonstrated a 
volume and outcome relationship over time, and 2) managed care has been at the 
center of the public policy debate about regionalization for many years (Donabedian, 
1984; Maerki, Luft & Hunt, 1986).  
Secondly, studies that identify the direct and reactive influence of managed care 
market activity on inpatient utilization and procedure rates are examined. These studies 
describe and analyze the effect and direction of managed care selective contracting on 
the volume and distribution of inpatient surgical procedures. In addition, this body of 
work is useful in the identification of known factors that drive demand for inpatient 
surgical care and hospital utilization other than managed care activity. These factors 
must be controlled in the development of statistical models built to test the hypotheses 
proposed in this study. 
Finally, studies that address the relationship between surgical volume and patient 
outcomes are evaluated. These studies identify those procedures for which 
volume/outcome endogeneity has been demonstrated and provide background for the 
focus on those specific procedures in this study.  The literature consists of largely 
econometric studies using changes in cost structure, price and hospital consolidation as 
the primary dependent variables in studies of the market changes associated with 
managed care, with limited extrapolation to health outcomes that may result from those 
changes (Hellinger, 1998).  The redistribution of procedures on the basis of managed 
care activity is problematic from the perspective of patient and population health, if there 
is a negative impact on quality and outcomes as a result. Therefore, studies are 
analyzed that estimate the association between managed care and observed outcomes 
for high intensity surgical procedures known to have a volume relationship.  Studies that 
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adequately isolate the contribution of managed care organizations or practices on 
population health outcomes are rare in the peer reviewed literature.  
Managed Care Evolution 
 Prior to 1970, managed care organizations had a modest role in the health care 
delivery system with a significant presence in only a few urban markets. Contemporary 
managed care plans have their roots in a small number of prepaid healthcare 
arrangements in the early 20th century developed by employers seeking to finance and 
deliver health care services to their workers in a cost effective manner.   The earliest 
examples of large scale MCOs surviving today are the Kaiser Foundation and Health 
Plan started in 1937, the Health Insurance Plan of Greater New York licensed in 1944 
and the Group Cooperative of Puget Sound, which was initiated by consumers in 1947 
(Kongstvedt, 2001).  
Commercial managed care  
These plans were implemented as staff model HMOs meaning the companies 
own their own hospitals and clinics, employ physicians and staff, and per member/per 
month capitation was introduced as a method of financing.  It was not until the Nixon 
administration that the HMO model was seriously considered as a more global 
mechanism to halt the double digit annual increases in the Medicare budget. Fueled by 
the traditional fee-for-service reimbursement   approach to payment for healthcare 
services, demand, utilization and fragmentation became increasingly burdensome. The 
HMO Act of 1973 established federal qualification standards for HMOs provided start up 
grants and preempted state regulatory barriers. The Act required all but the smallest 
businesses to offer at least two qualified HMO plans if they offered indemnity insurance 
to their employees, a feature that expired in 1995. The premise for government support 
of the HMO movement was a belief that pre-paid medical care would stimulate 
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competition among health plans, improve market efficiency and reduce hospital 
utilization. The HMO Act did not result in substantial HMO growth largely because the 
constraints of the federal qualification process rendered potential HMOs non- 
competitive with indemnity plans that were not subject to the same regulations.  In 
addition, individuals who were covered by a first dollar insurance plan perceived little 
benefit in joining a plan that would restrict their access to physicians, specialists and 
hospitals of their choice (Shi & Singh, 2008).  Although the potential impact of managed 
care was not felt until later, the HMO Act paved the way for capitation of Medicare HMOs 
in 1982 (Mayer & Mayer, 1985).  
 In spite of the eventual growth spurt in managed care enrollment, it did not occur 
at the rates originally predicted. Early in the 1990's, during the HMO boom era experts 
projected that 75% to 90% of the United States population would be enrolled in 
managed care plans by 2000, with the predominant form of organization being the health 
maintenance organization (Balla, 1999). Nevertheless, by July 2001 HMO enrollment 
had begun to drop in metropolitan statistical areas by 1.3% and overall had declined 0.3 
% as more managed care options, especially preferred provider organizations emerged. 
The PPO provided greater choice of physician and was preferable to many consumers 
who found the constraints of the gatekeeper closed model HMO to limit freedom of 
choice, which is so valued in American culture (Inter Study Publications, 2001).   
This migration may also have been fueled by the backlash created with the rapid 
incursion of for- profit managed care plans in many previously untapped markets. The 
backlash period between 2000 and 2003 created a national dialog about whether the 
managed care incentives to providers and efforts to control utilization by denying or 
delaying tests was occurring, and whether managed care continued to be in the best 
interest of the public. Several cases received national attention and more than 30 state 
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governments responded by the creation of additional regulation, which served to 
increase cost to the provider and modify the development of the services and 
advantages originally envisioned (Hellinger, 1996). Contemporaneously, many of the 
cost control techniques introduced to the market by managed care were adopted by 
commercial indemnity plans and the government sector to provide some control of 
spending, while retaining more perceived choices for the consumer (Kongstvedt, 2001). 
By 2008 the decline in HMO enrollment in preference to PPO plans and their 
organizational variations resulted in a distribution of 20% HMO, 58% PPO and 12% point 
of service plan (POS) enrollment nationally by 2009 (National Conference of State 
Legislatures, 2009). The POS hybrid plan permits the patient to choose to use the plan 
approved network of providers for service, or a non network provider at an increased 
cost.        
Government Managed Care: Medicare 
As is consistent with other changes in health care financing, the growth in private 
sector plans followed the Medicare lead when the Medicare program adopted risk 
sharing programs in 1985. Although adoption was earlier than the commercial private 
sector, voluntary enrollment was initially slow, with only 3% of eligible elderly enrollees 
opting for the plan. In the late 1980s and early in the 1990s the number of HMOs 
contracting with Medicare declined as did the total number of managed care plans. 
Nationally the number of plans for Medicare managed care participants reached a high 
in 1987 with 161 plans, declining to 93 plans by 1991. Additionally, approximately seven 
percent of enrollees were affected by plan terminations. According to Zarabozo, the 
enrollment continued to rise in risk plans, such that 1.4 million beneficiaries were 
participating by the end of 1991 despite the number of contracts consolidating 
(Zarabozo, 2000).  
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The CBO published a report in 1990 recommending expansion of Medicare 
managed care enrollment, based on the cost savings experienced by several Medicare 
capitation demonstration projects and concerns about the increased demand anticipated 
by the aging of the baby boom population. The CBO recommendations included 
proposals to increase the proportion of Medicare services available for managed care, 
increase payments to Medicare HMOs to create incentives for plan development by the 
private sector, provide financial incentives to Medicare recipients to encourage 
enrollment and to develop Medigap supplemental plans. The trade-off for participation in 
managed care by the Medicare enrollee for controlled access and utilization of services 
was a lower cost for participation than the traditional supplemental insurance provision 
(Langwell, 1992).  Despite the sense of urgency underlying the CBO recommendations 
they were not fully implemented until the Balanced Budget Act of 1997. The Act opened 
the door for private health plan competition for the Medicare patient by making major 
changes in the method by which Medicare capitation payments were made to MCOs. 
Despite contrary intentions, for the 2001 contract year it was estimated that 15% of 
Medicare beneficiaries were affected by plan terminations or service reductions, 
resulting in an estimated 63% of Medicare beneficiaries with access to a fully integrated 
managed care plan (Zarabozo, 2000).  
Enrollment in managed care known as Medicare Choice or Medicare C  grew to 
16% of the total Medicare eligible population in a step wise fashion, with half a million in 
1994, increasing to 800,000 in 1995, and by more than a million annually since that time. 
Medicare Advantage is the contemporary moniker for the plan and according to the 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, the total Medicare eligible population in 
2009 was 44,831,390 of which 10,259,669 were enrolled in the managed care plan.  
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Government Managed Care: Medicaid 
Thirteen states have long standing experience with Medicaid managed care 
since its implementation as small demonstration projects in 1967 in New York. Adoption 
lagged behind commercial managed care largely due to difficulty enticing providers to 
participate in the program which traditionally has provided below market reimbursement. 
Many Medicaid agencies have had to actively encourage managed care development in 
order to offer full service plans, making the adoption of Medicaid managed care more 
feasible in states with high HMO penetration. Expansion nationally did not occur until the 
recession of the 1980’s, creating the pressure and motivation for state governments to 
expand the program (Hurley & Wallin, 1998). 
States moved aggressively to enroll Medicaid beneficiaries in managed care 
plans during the boom era. In fact, 17 million, or 50% of the eligible population had been 
enrolled in 316 full risk managed care plans by 1999.  In 2009 the Medicaid program, 
which serves the poor, covered 47,142,791 recipients nationwide with 33,427,582 or 
71% covered by a managed care plan nationally, and 63.34% covered in Florida. 
Massachusetts and Florida initially committed to a primary case management model 
(PCCM) as a competitive alternative to HMOs for the Medicaid population and to 
benchmark HMO performance for this population (Hurley & Wallin, 1998). The 
beneficiary group consists of 10% elderly individuals, 14% disabled, 28% poor adults 
and 50% children. One in four children is enrolled in the Medicaid Program which is 
funded through a cost sharing arrangement between state and federal governments. 
(Kaiser Family Foundation, 2009). The annual national survey of Medicaid managed 
care plans consistently demonstrates that these plans have lost money, which likely 
accounts for the mergers and consolidations observed. In 1997 only one third of 
Medicaid plans reported break even financials and the magnitude of losses experienced 
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by the money losing plans was greater than the surpluses of the plans that made money, 
with typical operating losses of $1.5 million. Those plans that did perform at a surplus 
and survived are larger and have been able to diversify to non-Medicaid enrollees (Gray 
& Rowe, 2000). The sheer volume of participation in these two government programs, 
termed “government activism” for purposes of this study, must be considered in any 
estimation of market changes associated with managed care. These programs may 
behave differently and exercise market power no other single purchaser can achieve. 
Models estimating managed care influence in the market for healthcare services must 
consider the effect of government activism as an explanatory variable.  
Managed care enrollment in each of the plan types in 2010 follows; 
 
Table 1. Summary of Managed Care Enrollment in the United States in 2010 
 
 
 
Plan Type 
 
 
Total U.S. 
(millions 
 
 
Percent 
U.S. 
 
Managed Care 
Enrollment 
(millions) 
 
 
 Managed Care  
Percent 
 
Commercial  
 
161.93 52.40% 86.89 53.65% 
Medicare 47.0 15.21% 11.40 24.2% 
Medicaid 46.87 15.17% 33.28 71.0% 
Source: Managed Care Fact Sheet 2010 from http://www.mcareol.com/factshts/factnati.htm 
 
Conceptual Models of Managed Care 
The history of managed care has seemed to ebb and flow with the tide of political 
will to tackle national health expenditures. As a result, the life cycle of managed care 
organizations within healthcare markets may on first examination seem random and 
unpredictable; however, on closer review some investigators have proposed models that 
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mirror the classic course of birth through maturity experienced by new entrants in other 
competitive markets.  
Early studies such as those by Dranove, Simon and White (1998), and by 
Robinson and Luft (1985) are based on the notion that as managed care penetration 
increases, its influence on provider behavior increases in a linear fashion.  It is difficult to 
locate discussion of a diminishing or curvilinear relationship between managed care 
penetration and its influence on market behavior cited in the literature. In addition, 
penetration is frequently the singular measure of managed care activity utilized as the 
primary independent variable in models designed to predict managed care impact on the 
efficiency, price and consolidation of hospital and physician markets. This was 
particularly true of studies conducted utilizing the data from the 1990-1999 period. 
Dranove et al., for example, dropped geographic areas of high managed care 
penetration from his study of the impact of managed care penetration on the 
consolidation in health care markets, citing them as introducing bias into the model, 
rather than considering that penetration may lose its utility as a measure of managed 
care impact in mature markets at advanced stages of market development. Given the 
dramatic variation in managed care development over time and over regions it is 
conceptually helpful for purposes of this study to characterize stages of development to 
organize the concepts. 
The UHC/APM Model  
One of the early efforts to create a model of managed care evolution was 
advanced by the University Health System Consortium known as the APM/UHC model 
in which stages of managed care market maturity were hypothesized.  Analyzing the 
data of their hospital members from 1992 through 1995 the Consortium utilized carefully 
selected market indicators to classify metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) into four 
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market stages. The indicators used each year of the analysis were: 1) HMO penetration 
(percentage of the population in HMOs), 2) HMO consolidation (number of HMOs with 
100,000 or more lives), 3) HMO concentration (percentage of HMO enrollment in the top 
three plans), 4) hospital use rates (MSA occupancy rates and days/1,000 population) 
and 5) hospital consolidation (percentage of beds in owned systems). Additional 
indicators were used in different years of the study but included PPO measures similar 
to the HMO measures and Medicare/Medicaid enrollees in managed care plans (APM & 
University Hospital Consortium, 1995).  
Burns and his associates suggested that the APM/UHC Model was not 
generalizable because the sample was limited to university hospitals in a small number 
of MSAs. He expanded the source population and utilized the managed care and 
hospital data from InterStudy Reports and the American Hospital Association in his 
analysis. Although Burn’s philosophy about the relative speed of change in heath care 
markets differed, he did conclude that “the APM/UHC classification scheme accurately 
distinguishes the markets of UHC member hospitals in terms of their HMO activity and 
the effects of managed care on hospital use.” (Burns, Bazzoli, Dynan, & Wholey, 1997). 
The APM/UHC model will therefore be utilized in this study to classify managed care 
activity across market stages and further test the generalizability to the managed care 
market experience in Florida. The market stages in the model have been descriptively 
labeled as "unstructured", "loose framework", "consolidation" and "hypercompetitive" 
(APM/UHC University Heath System Consortium, 1995; Burns, Bazzoli, Dynan, & 
Wholey, 1997). A summary of the stages and the hypothesized market responses at 
each stage follows in Figure 1 as a mechanism to organize the disparate managed care 
data into measurable constructs.  In the first stage there is very little managed care, 
ascertained to be between 0% and 10% penetration. Hospitals are relatively unaffected 
25 
 
at this stage and are able to maintain the relative over-supply of beds created by the fee-
for–service cost reimbursement policies of the past. At this stage hospitals also have 
little incentive to control utilization as the more services used, the more payment 
received. In stage two with HMO penetration of 11% to 30%, HMOs and other payers 
take advantage of the excess hospital bed capacity by demanding discounts in 
exchange for the incremental volume the plan may bring.  The MCO seeks to create a 
broad panel of providers to develop a full menu of services and provide choice to 
potential enrollees thereby capturing market share as quickly as possible. 
 
 
Figure 1. Consolidated Conceptual Model of Research in the Evolution of Managed Care 
Markets  
The concept is adapted from the Staging Scheme, University Hospitals Consortium, 1997 used with permission and 
purchase. ‘IPA’ abbreviates Independent Practice Association; IP abbreviates ‘inpatient’. 
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Managed care penetration 
At this stage of development MCOs have incentives to increase their market 
share in order to gain efficiencies and market power, and may make profits subservient 
to developing sufficient size. The predominant strategy is growth so as to”get big” 
(Grossman, 2000).  Kongstvedt estimated that a successful health plan had to achieve 
enrollment of at least 80,000 members to be profitable over time, making it difficult for 
smaller plans and rural areas to compete at this stage of development (Kongstvedt, 
2001).  
Larger size has the potential to reduce administrative and operating costs per 
enrollee and to lower the cost of capital for improvements and expansion. The 
administrative costs on average comprise 15% of premium allocation (Shi & Singh, 
2008). The premise that size is essential for success has been challenged in more 
recent studies performed in mature markets (Christianson, Feldman, & Wholey, 1997).  
In order to gain market share, plans at this stage are required to compete on the basis of 
price in response to purchaser pressure and price competition may become intense. 
Large for- profit and national managed care firms have been noted to offer prices below 
cost to gain market share at this stage (Grossman, 2000).   
In the early stages of managed care penetration Grossman’s data revealed that 
purchaser’s demand for service and quality “ranked a distant third behind stable 
premiums and choice” (2000). Hospitals and physicians responded to these pressures 
by forming relatively informal alliances to improve their bargaining position for selective 
contracting and secure the ability to negotiate with a relatively large pool of suppliers.  
In stage three with managed care penetration from 31% to 50%, competitive 
pressure is felt by the managed care plans and consolidation is generally observed. 
Inefficient hospitals and providers are dropped from panels to control contracting and 
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coordination costs. It is conventional wisdom that horizontal integration in the hospital 
sector increases during this stage, creating consolidation in the hospital markets and risk 
sharing agreements become prevalent (Dranove, Simon, & White, 1998).    
Managed care competition 
For a long time, it was assumed that most local markets had several MCOs 
offering homogeneous products. Consequently, minimal consideration was given to the 
competitiveness of HMO markets and the mergers that were observed as competitive 
pressures increased and consolidation resulted. Christianson, Feldman and Wholey 
reported that 107 HMOs disappeared from local markets between 1985 and1994 
through mergers. They cite anti-trust concerns, as many of these were smaller HMOs 
that were acquired by large national companies serving the same markets. By 1995 the 
largest 45 MCOs (250,000 members or more) accounted for approximately 50% of 
enrollments (Christianson, Feldman, & Wholey, 1997). Christianson et al. developed 
pricing models with simulation techniques demonstrating that HMO premiums are higher 
in markets with fewer competitors, providing incentives for established MCOs to create 
barriers to entry. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the study demonstrated that it is 
possible for small HMOs to be efficient suggesting that economies of scale need not be 
a barrier to entry for small firms should they not be barred by larger competitors 
(Christianson, et al.,1997).  
The degree of competitiveness in the managed care market has been effectively 
measured utilizing the index of competition (IOC) metric.  The IOC is a measure of 
competition within managed care markets calculated as (1 – (Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index for managed care)). The HHI for managed care is the sum of squares of the 
market share of the managed care organizations operating in a metropolitan statistical 
area on an annual basis. This metric has been utilized in a limited fashion in the peer 
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reviewed literature, but applied with consistent results by the Health Leaders InterStudy 
Group which makes proprietary data available for research purposes. Table 2 depicts 
the level of penetration and competition as measured by the IOC in the most competitive 
metropolitan markets at the end of 2001.  
It is noteworthy that three of the top 10 most competitive markets in the U.S. 
during this period were in Florida markets; in addition, managed care penetration and 
concentration do not move in the same direction and thus likely behave differently and 
measure different intrinsic market factors.  
 
Table 2. Comparison of Managed Care Activity in the Most Competitive Managed 
Care Markets 
MSA Index of 
Competition 
Number of 
HMO’s 
Total MCO Enrollment Market 
Penetration 
Kansas City 0.900 20   699,093 39.4% 
Ft. Lauderdale 0.895 20    656,638 40.5% 
Charlotte 0.889 20    330,264 22.0% 
Miami 0.886 20    955,862 42.4% 
Cleveland 0.870 21    715,840 31.8% 
Tampa 0.869 20    831,191 34.7% 
Phoenix 0.867 12 1,193,015 36.7% 
Los Angeles 0.862 19 5,481,415 57.6% 
Orlando 0.855 18    495,691 30.1% 
Baltimore 0.855 15    743,898 29.1% 
Source: InterStudy Publications. Regional Market Analysis, 6 December, 2001 used with permission and purchase. 
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Later in 2001, Pawlson and his colleagues correctly observe in their study of 
managed care markets that the major concern with the use of the IOC is that there is no 
empiric evidence that a market with a large number of small HMOs has more impact on 
provider behavior, prices, or other market characteristics than a market that has fewer 
HMOs with larger market shares. In addition, he expresses concern that the IOC does 
not take into account the proportion of the population covered by HMOs and that the 
validity of IOC in measuring market impact has not been well established (Pawlson, 
Moy, Kim, & Griner, 2001).  
Dealing with this specific concern, Gross and Krumholtz (2005) utilized the IOC 
in a study of the impact of managed care on member enrollment in clinical trials for 
cancer treatment. Utilizing a linear regression model the investigators tested the 
relationship between county level clinical trial enrollment rates and managed care as 
measured by penetration and index of competition, adjusting for other county 
characteristics. They discovered a strong inverse correlation between trial enrollment 
rates and IOC (r = -0.23; P < .001) and that greater county managed care competition as 
measured using the IOC  was inversely related to trial enrollment rates (2005). In this 
study the IOC provided insights that were not achievable using the managed care 
penetration metric alone.  
The IOC utilizes the concept of competitiveness embedded in the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI). The HHI takes into account the relative size and distribution of 
the firms in a market and approaches zero when a market consists of a large number of 
firms of relatively equal size. The HHI increases both as the number of firms in the 
market decreases and as the disparity in size between those firms increases.  It is a the 
most commonly accepted measure of market concentration in health services research 
and consideration of hospital market  concentration and IOC can be tested in this study 
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by controlling for Pawlson’s observations about population prevalence of managed care 
enrollment (Pawlson, Moy, Kim & Griner, 2001). 
The HHI is calculated by squaring the market share of each firm competing in the 
market and then summing the resulting numbers. Markets in which the HHI is between 
1,000 and 1,800 points are considered to be moderately concentrated and those in 
which the HHI is in excess of 1,800 points are considered to be concentrated 
(Department of Justice, 1997). The application of the reciprocal in the calculation is 
useful for explaining managed care behavior at this stage of market development.  
Managed care consolidation 
In stage four of the UHC/APM managed care market development model 
managed care is predicted to become the dominant financing and care delivery model in 
the market, with greater than 50% penetration. Consolidation results in the survival of a 
few strong plans as weaker less competitive plans leave the market and it becomes 
increasingly concentrated. Concentration is heavily correlated in managed care markets 
with the proportion of the market held by the top three plans, as defined by the 
developers of the UHC/APM model and used subsequently by other investigators. 
Coile’s model of managed care market development 
The only other comprehensive model of managed care market evolution offered 
in the literature is the five stage model introduced by Coile in 1997. To a large extent his 
model mirrors the four stages of the UHC/APM model, varying primarily in the 
percentage of penetration Coile ascribes to the early stages of penetration.  He labels 
the fifth stage in his paradigm as network cooperation in which he envisioned that payers 
and providers would shift to cooperation instead of competition after HMOs and 
providers recognize that operating margins have been reduced to minimum levels for 
both. Coile proposed that stage 5 is characterized by multi-year contracts with locked-in 
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prices, exclusive regional networks of hospitals and physicians, global capitation within 
integrated health systems and provider networks, shared data about patients and the 
adoption of shared practices and quality metrics (Coile, 1997).  In a national study of 
capitation agreements in place in 1999 in those markets with 30% or greater managed 
care penetration, 65% of physician groups were involved in capitation arrangements and 
47% of hospitals, with an average of 1.9 contracts per provider (Evergreen Research 
Group, 1999).  
Coile and others have applied the term managed competition as the desirable 
end state of the evolutionary process. The theory of managed competition as described 
by Enthoven is a strategy to obtain maximum value for purchasers. Containment of 
health care costs in a managed competition environment is achieved by stimulating price 
and quality competition among plans (Enthoven, 1993).  Yet in order for managed 
competition to be effective, employers must be able to contract with several different and 
competing health plans and provide subscribers with incentives to choose the lowest 
cost, best value plan on the basis of comparative prices and quality metrics.  The 
efficacy or achievement of managed competition has not been established to date and 
the hallmark characteristics of managed competition have been difficult to see even in 
mature managed care markets. One of the key reasons is likely the limitation in 
consumer choice observed in most markets. Studies by Marquis and Long, for example, 
found that only one fifth of employees had a choice of plans in the 1993 to 1997 period 
and that choice did not increase over time. By 1997 only 27% of workers had the 
opportunity to enroll in a traditional indemnity plan. (1999). Competition among plans is 
further affected by the limited access to alternative products provided to more rural 
locations with low population densities. HMO enrollment remains concentrated in large 
markets, with almost 75% of HMO members during the study period in metro areas of 
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large markets with populations of more than one million. Another 20.2% was in medium 
markets with populations between 250,000 and 999,999. The remaining 5.6% of HMO 
enrollment was in small markets, with populations less than 250,000 (InterStudy 
Publications, 2001). 
Coile’s model was developed as a futuristic guide for health planners and 
hospital executives attempting to position themselves for success in a managed care 
dominated health care environment. Although managed competition may be desirable in 
many respects, it has not to date materialized as Enthoven and Coile had predicted in 
most markets.  The question must be asked as to whether we have yet achieved a 
mature managed care steady state in 2010, or whether ongoing efforts at health reform 
will provide incentives for competition, especially in greater provision of alternative 
products to the traditionally underserved areas. It is clear that managed care is at a 
different stage of development within distinct markets. All four stages of managed care 
development can be observed in different markets. These differences necessitate 
understanding the stage of managed care development in order to predict with any 
degree of specificity how providers and purchasers should approach strategic planning 
and proactively respond to predictable changes associated with the different stages of 
maturation.  
Utilizing data for all 262 U.S. metropolitan statistical areas with operating HMOs, 
the study by Pauly et al. (2002) of market development for managed care provides 
support for the notion that the period 1994 to1997 is a period of mature managed care 
markets, with little countervailing provider power consistent with stage 4 of both the 
UHC/APM model and Coile’s model. Their conclusion is that this provides the best 
sample of time in which to examine the market impact of managed care plans.  These 
conclusions are supported by what is probably the best analysis of the changes and 
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evolution of the managed care market and its effects on hospital competition and 
revenue growth offered by Shen and Melnick.  They present an historical perspective of 
managed care and provide evidence to generalize that the “boom” period occurred from 
1990 to1994, ”mature period” from 1995 to 1999, and the “backlash period”  from 2000 
to 2003. (2006). 
Each of the models can be appropriately questioned and criticized. The primary 
concerns are related to whether either of these models is sufficiently robust over time, or 
is merely a snapshot in time; however, aggregating longitudinal data creates bias by 
regression to the mean and the use of annual data in model building does not accurately 
capture changes year after year. Given the variations in managed care activity in 
geographic markets at different points in time, the criticisms of the models may be 
overcome by studying the impact of the differences in population based outcomes over 
the study period. Adding to the information and utility of these models would therefore be 
useful, as well as providing structure to an extremely complex set of interacting 
variables.  
Managed Care Selective Contracting 
Selective contracting arrangements and utilization management are what 
differentiate managed care plans from other forms of health insurance, and both have 
the potential to impact hospital market share and operating margins. Some hospitals get 
contracts and the admissions that result, and others do not. Studies by Feldman et al. 
demonstrated that managed care plans in four major metropolitan areas contracted with 
only 10%-47% of the hospitals in their markets in1990 (Feldman, Chan, Krawlewski, 
Dowd, & Shapiro, 1990).  A decade later, thirteen metropolitan areas studied by 
Zwanziger and Bamezai revealed that on average managed care organizations 
contracted with 43% of the hospitals in their markets (2000).   
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According to Bamezai and colleagues, selective contracting had its origins in the 
recession of the 1980’s which resulted in significant budget shortfalls in large states like 
California. In order to address the increasing budget demands of California’s Medicaid 
program, regulations permitting the state’s Medicaid program (MediCal) and private 
insurers to contract selectively with hospitals on the basis of price and some rudimentary 
access and quality metrics were enacted (Bamezai, Melnick, Mann, & Zwanziger, 2003). 
This change was the impetus for insurance providers to selectively steer their members 
to hospitals with the pre-negotiated discounted rates. This introduced price competition 
for the first time into an environment in which the fee for service full reimbursement 
model had allowed hospitals to compete on the basis of non- price factors such as 
amenities and service lines. In a setting like Medicaid in which enrollee exit is not a 
threat, a large payer may have both the incentives and the ability to exercise undue 
market power especially since consumers have  little choice about selection plans. Their 
review of MediCal contracts demonstrated that the concern could not be supported by 
the data, and that hospital competition appeared to explain with greater consistency why 
hospitals choose to contract with MediCal while others do not (Bamezai, Melnick, 
Mann, Zwanziger, 2003).   
The selection of hospitals for participation in a managed care network involves a 
series of decisions based on competition in the market, the market power of the 
managed care plan, the number and capacity of hospital providers and arguably the 
stage of managed care development. The more willing a plan is to limit its provider 
panel, the more leverage the plan has to negotiate favorable terms; however, a small 
panel may limit consumer choice to the extent that enrollment is less attractive to 
prospective members. Should a small number of geographically disparate hospitals exist 
within the service area, it would be necessary to include them on the provider panel, 
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even though leverage for negotiation of favorable contract terms is more limited than it 
would be in a more populated hospital market (Kongstvedt, 2001). 
Given the financial risk to the MCO, the selection of acute care hospitals to 
participate in its panel of providers is one of the most critical decisions the MCO will 
make. Although the management of hospital relationships and price are essential for 
survival of the managed care plan, contracting with hospitals that are perceived by 
potential members and employers as undesirable is  likely to render them non 
competitive; thus, it is critical that the balance be struck between cost and perceived 
quality.  
Early studies of formal contractual relationships between managed care plans 
and hospitals found little evidence of competitive bidding for tertiary services; instead, 
location and the range of services were the primary considerations in alliance formation 
and selective contracting (Krawlewski, Countryman, & Shatin, 1982)  A study by the 
same investigators a decade later, revealed that infrastructure issues were replaced in 
priority with the hospital's reputation in the community, the quality of the medical staff 
and the ratings of the HMO panel physicians, and not with price (Krawlewski, Feldman, 
Dowd, & Shapiro, 1991).  
The manner in which hospitals attract managed care contracts has been a 
source of conflicting and limited research. Early studies by Krawlewski, Countryman and 
Pitt found that hospital location and range of services were the key predictors of hospital-
HMO contracts in the Minneapolis area (1983).  Later national studies (Krawlewski, et 
al., 1991) confirmed the importance of a full menu of services, specialist access and 
affiliation with HMO physicians as critical factors in the hospital selection process; 
however, price was the most important consideration in markets where several hospitals 
were available from which to select providers. 
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These original studies were based exclusively on interviews with managed care 
plan executives and hospital administrators. Subsequently, studies that compared the 
criteria articulated in the interviews with the actual contracting behaviors of the managed 
care plan, demonstrated a wide discrepancy.  Krawlewski et al. (1991) found that 
commercial insurers, self-insured plans and HMOs as a group were influenced 
predominantly by hospital charges, but less then Blue Cross plans. Staff HMO's were 
found to have the greatest sensitivity with a price elasticity of demand for inpatient 
services at -3.0.  
In addition to the maturity of the market, managed care market structure is a 
consideration in studying selective contracting behaviors. Because prior research has 
found non-linear effects of HMOs on most dependent variables, investigators at the 
Wharton School utilized an instrumental variable approach to model HMO market 
penetration at the metropolitan statistical area level of analysis, and its impact on 
physician-hospital alliances. Contrary to conventional wisdom, alliance formation was 
shown to be shaped by the number of HMOs in the market, or competition, rather than 
market penetration. The greater the number of managed care organizations in the 
market, the greater the complexity in contracting, and the greater the motivation for 
alliance formation. Alliance formation was found to be low in markets with a small 
number of managed care firms with substantial penetration (Burns, Bazzoli, Dynan & 
Wholey, 2000).  
One of the most insightful studies of the relationship between hospital market 
concentration and prices offered managed care plans was an examination of the hospital 
transaction prices achieved by a large preferred provider organization in 1987. The key 
findings were:  
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1. The PPO paid higher prices to hospitals in less competitive markets, where the 
leverage of selective contracting was less feasible.  
 2. A high percentage of PPO inpatient days served to apply downward pressure 
on price paid.   
3.  Higher prices were paid to hospitals in markets in which the PPO held 
significant market share, probably related to dependence on the hospital. 
4. High occupancy rates resulted in higher prices to hospitals in markets with 
high average occupancy. In markets with low occupancy rates, high occupancy hospitals 
were willing to accept lower prices probably to avoid shifting the business to hospitals 
with idle capacity.  
Thus, hospital market structure helped to determine the prices to managed care plans, 
as has the stage of managed care penetration (Morrisey, 2001).   
Jantzen and Loubeau (2000) completed the first study using a national sample of 
acute care hospitals with 1990's data, in order to identify the factors that influence the 
selection of hospitals to participate in managed care contracts. Those factors found to be 
statistically significant, after controlling for hospital differences, were lower costs of care, 
shorter lengths of stay and participation in an integrated delivery system. Hospitals with 
these characteristics had a significantly greater managed care share then did their 
counterparts. Hospitals with a per diem cost advantage of 10% achieved inpatient 
managed care shares that were 23% greater than less efficient competitors. Length of 
stay reductions of 10% or 0.6 days, for a constant case mix, increased their managed 
care share by 25%. Participation in an integrated delivery system was shown to have an 
advantage of 10.3% over stand-alone counterparts. It was hypothesized that such 
alliances served both to signal quality and provide cost advantages associated with 
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economies of scale. Hospital size offered an advantage, but with diminishing returns as 
size increased. 
An important study of the effect of selective contracting on hospital costs and 
revenues was completed using California data for the years 1983 to 1997, utilizing 
measures of competition from patient level discharge data to estimate a fixed effects 
multiple regression model. The results demonstrated that hospitals in more competitive 
markets had a lower rate of increase in revenue and costs for the study period. For profit 
hospitals lowered their costs and revenues after selective contracting relative to the not 
for profit sector. Although the authors believe that the observations were the direct result 
of selective contracting, they acknowledge the confounding effects of the Medicare 
prospective payment system which also placed downward pressure on hospital 
reimbursement during this time (Zwanziger, Melnick, & Bamezai, 2000).  
The influence of selective contracting on market segmentation has not been well 
studied and results have been unclear relative to the provision of tertiary care services. It 
is possible that the differences observed are related to the time period studied, and the 
evolution and maturity of the managed care sector within the market. The Clinical 
Economics Research Unit of Georgetown University identified three markets, with 
differing levels of maturity as defined by levels of managed care market penetration. 
Interviews were conducted with HMO and hospital managers about the role quality and 
outcomes play in their contracting decisions. The research team discovered that the 
most sophisticated contracting arrangements were found in the most mature markets, 
where managed care plans tended to select tertiary providers on the basis of both price 
and quality considerations; however, even in the most mature market, quality 
assessment was the least developed component of tertiary care contracting (Schulman, 
et al., 1997).  
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The importance of HMO competition in the analysis of selective contracting 
behaviors was further examined utilizing the same data as that used by the Georgetown 
group. The goal was to understand how managed care organizations choose hospitals 
for tertiary care contracts and the manner in which a contract affects how a managed 
care plan channels enrollees for tertiary care. On initial analysis using a linear multiple 
regression model the investigators ascertained that MCO market penetration in 
California from 1994 to 1997 was the strongest influence on whether price or quality 
assumed priority in contract negotiation. While quality was an important consideration 
in contract negotiations between managed care organizations and hospitals, as 
competition among both managed care organizations and hospitals increased, price 
assumed precedence in the decision making process.  
As the level of HMO market competition increased, so did the proportion of 
HMOs that reported being actively involved in the care of hospitalized enrollees 
through monitoring both length of stay and preadmission and post stay costs; however, 
when competition was removed from the model  and quality and geographic 
convenience were held constant, the investigators found that hospitals charging higher 
prices to the MCO for either coronary artery bypass graft surgery (CABG) or neonatal 
infant care were less likely to be awarded a contract by a managed care organization. 
(CABG and neonatal ICU care were determined to be representative of all tertiary 
services in the analysis.) Conversely, when price and geographic convenience were 
held constant, the higher the quality measure the more likely a managed care 
organization would award a contract to the hospital. Managed care organizations 
became less likely to award a contract to a hospital as the geographic distance 
between the hospital and enrollees grew, when controlling for quality and cost. In 
addition, in many areas studied, hospitals were not able to maintain necessary patient 
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volume unless they had contracted with managed care organizations, but managed 
care contracts were not a guarantee that a health plan would admit its enrollees to the 
contracted hospital. It is evident from these studies that both managed care penetration 
and competition must be considered in future studies. The entry into contracts is 
important to both parties, but the contract terms of greatest importance to achieve 
closure continued to be price (Hadley, 2003). 
Data to compare the quality outcomes achieved by health care providers were 
not consistently available in the early years of managed care contract negotiations. 
Where they were available, the data were limited to mortality rates and it was difficult to 
compare one provider against another, limiting non-price considerations. The underlying 
premise of a quality report card is that a competitive health care market will be more 
efficient if consumers can make informed choices in selection of providers utilizing 
comparative data about cost and quality. The caveat is that the decision maker for 
managed care plan enrollees is not exclusively the enrollee, but the plan administrator, 
who determines which providers are on the panel from which the enrollee may select. 
Whether plan managers consider quality and outcomes when the data is available, or 
simply chose the low cost provider, is a central issue in the redistribution question 
(Gormley & Weimer, 1999).  
Conflicting studies have examined whether managed care plans consider quality 
and outcomes data for hospitals when making contracting decisions, or if cost structure 
and price remain the predominant consideration over time. Quality report cards, as well 
as volume data, are increasingly available to plan administrators, including the risk 
adjusted procedure specific mortality and morbidity rates. New York State, for example, 
has published Cardiac Surgery Reports of hospital and surgeon specific outcomes data 
for coronary artery bypass surgery since 1990. In an effort to determine whether 
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managed care plans utilize this data to make contracting decisions, investigators 
interviewed plan administrators to determine the priority they placed on quality in panel 
selection. Within the limitations of the study, managed care organizations faced with 
selection from the set of available surgeons demonstrated "decisions consistent with 
contracting practices that ignore quality" (Mukamel, Muslin, Weimer, & Zwanziger, 
2000).  At the same time, the investigators did not find a systematic bias for either higher 
or lower than average quality surgeons, but they did discover an aggregate preference 
for selectively contracting with high volume surgeons, and those designated as high 
quality outliers. The same investigator expanded the research by including all cardiac 
surgeons offering CABG surgery and 78% of all MCOs in New York State in 1998. Using 
the provider panel composition and New York State Cardiac Surgery Reports the 
investigators determined the probability of a contract between surgeon and MCO was 
conditional on the surgeon’s risk adjusted mortality data and low volume status.   In all 
instances an increase of one standard deviation in excess risk adjusted mortality led to a 
decrease in contract probability, reaching levels of statistical significance of p = 0.5. Of 
interest is that when the low volume variable was excluded from the model the 
decreases were larger and more significant. As has been seen in other studies of small 
area variation, there were differences observed between regions of the state (Mukamel, 
Wimer, Zwanziger, & Mushlin, 2002). 
Using a familiar econometric model, Shahian and his team, examined cardiac 
surgery provider selection in the Boston metropolitan area, where competition and 
managed care penetration are high. The behavior of the commercial managed care 
payer group exhibited the least "value based" behavior, in that the length of stay 
observed was the longest of any group, and there was a group of hospitals for which 
higher mortality rates was associated with a higher probability of selection. The 
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paradoxical behavior of managed care in this environment was attributed to "unobserved 
choice factors that are not primarily based on objective provider performance" (Shahian, 
Yip, Wescott & Jacobson, 2000).  
Most of these studies were performed in an era during which quality metrics were 
evolving and being introduced to the market in general. They were not particularly well 
understood, and policy makers and health care leaders were struggling with the 
standardization and appropriate place for quality metrics. For example, the Cleveland 
Community Health Quality Choice initiative was one of the first to publish standard 
quality metrics for Cleveland Hospitals in 1989. These were published in the newspapers 
quarterly with detailed explanations of their meaning and implications. David Baker 
studied the relationship between risk adjusted mortality rates (which were published 
quarterly to the public) and hospital market share from 1991 to 1997 (Baker, 2001). The 
disappointing findings were that the identification of hospitals with higher than expected 
mortality did not adversely affect hospital market share or, with one exception, improve 
mortality. Despite several limitations, the investment in producing the data did not 
appear to change hospital utilization by managed care plans or consumers (White, 
1999). 
Escarce, Shea and Chen (1997) specifically examined the impact of managed 
care selective contracting for patients undergoing coronary artery bypass graft 
procedures (CABG) in southeastern Florida. They demonstrated that commercially 
insured patients and Medicare patients tend to use different hospitals then do enrollees 
in health maintenance organizations  They concluded that there was no evidence that 
HMOs systematically channel enrollees to high volume or low mortality hospitals in that 
market, which was characterized by rapid growth in managed care penetration, and low 
concentration of managed care providers.  A different result was observed in a study 
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performed by Paone, Higgins, Spencer & Silverman (1995) at the Henry Ford Hospital. 
This hospital system was the only provider of cardiac surgical procedures to the 450,000 
members of a traditional gatekeeper HMO serving the Detroit area. The investigators 
compared two concurrent groups of 569 HMO patients and 225 fee-for-service insurance 
enrollees who underwent the coronary artery bypass procedure. In addition to hospital 
mortality, the investigators found that the patient selection criteria, mean stay in the 
intensive care unit and total hospital length of stay were similar, concluding that the 
utilization rates were not impacted adversely by the referral patterns of the HMO. 
However, a later study of the Detroit metropolitan area was specifically designed to 
examine the 30-day postoperative mortality rate for 2,776 black patients undergoing 
CABG. (Higgins, Paone, Borzak, Jacobson, Peterson, & Silverman, 1998) Some studies 
had implied that non-whites may have worse outcomes then their white counterparts in 
the context of managed care. Race and payer status were not significant predictors of 
death in this cohort. What is certain from the conflicting results developed in these 
studies is that patient level analysis must be include consideration of race, co-morbidity, 
and socioeconomic status as potential confounders in studies of managed care impact 
on the individual.  
Erickson and his colleagues examined the segmentation of the pediatric cardiac 
surgery population in California using a retrospective cohort of more than 5,000 children. 
After controlling for medical, socio-demographic, and distance factors, children with 
managed care insurance were less likely to be admitted to a lower mortality hospital then 
were children with indemnity insurance. The differences held after stratification for race 
and ethnicity (Erickson, Wise, Cook, Beiser, & Newberger, 2000). 
In contrast, an analysis of the market share for open-heart surgery hospitals in 
California demonstrated that the number of cases performed by low volume providers 
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remained constant, in spite of substantial increases in managed care enrollment. The 
authors concluded that HMOs in California, including the state operated Medicaid plan, 
were more likely to send their enrollees to high volume facilities (Chernew, Hayward, & 
Scanlon, 1996). The investigators hypothesized that government managed care 
programs may influence volume and selective contracting differently from commercial 
plans. They concluded that government activism in a local market may influence surgical 
volume, in the form of Medicaid and Medicare managed care plan penetration and 
requires further investigation and therefore will be a consideration in this research. 
Whether managed care plans selectively contract with lower quality hospitals, whether 
they exclusively make contract decisions on the basis of price, or whether they steer 
patients to lower quality or lower volume hospitals is not clear from the research, This 
body of literature demonstrates the significance of selective contracting in hospital 
markets, but the quality/price trade-off is not well understood and likely varies by local 
market and stage of managed care development. 
The Impact of Managed Care on Hospital Utilization 
The purpose of selective contracting arrangements is to secure access to 
hospital care for managed care members at the most favorable price, while working to 
keep members healthy enough to never need the service. If successful, hospital 
utilization should theoretically fall on a proportional basis.  Of key interest in this 
research is whether managed care activity has impacted hospital utilization for those 
high risk complex procedures with volume and outcome endogeneity for which there is 
no outpatient alternative or substitution. Many factors affect a consumer’s preferences 
for a particular hospital, but the power of selection has migrated from the individual as 
purchaser of services to the insurance carrier or employer as the purchaser.  When 
consumers have a choice about the hospital they will use, the determinants of selection 
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demonstrated in the research have most consistently been the hospital’s reputation, 
historical referral patterns and geographic proximity. Although consumers may exert 
some pressure on the MCO to include their hospital of choice on the panel of providers, 
they will be limited to using the panel provider unless they choose to be responsible for 
all or a negotiated part of the hospital bill (Shahian, Yip, Wescott, & Jacobson, 2000). 
Like most of the studies of the impact of managed care, evidence exists to both 
support the notion that managed care has reduced hospital utilization and surgical 
access, and that it has not. Managed care plans influence hospital inpatient surgical 
utilization and volume in several ways. First, an overall reduction in the total number of 
procedures performed, through aggressive gate keeping, pre-certification requirements 
and a cost based preference for ambulatory surgical settings (Detmer & Gelijns, 1994).  
This reduction would affect all providers in a given market. Second, through selective 
contracting procedures, specific hospitals could be adversely affected by a redistribution 
of enrollees to contracted hospital providers, to the exclusion of non-panel members 
(Flood, Scott & Ewy, 1984). Finally, managed care plans may influence hospital volume 
and by a reduction in the length of stay or resource consumption through concurrent 
review of inpatient hospital care for continuing necessity. Managed care plans pay for 
services from selected hospitals differently depending on their structure and the services 
they require from the hospital. The most common payment terms are pre-negotiated per 
diem rates, per discharge bundled package rate by service line or diagnosis, discounted 
fee schedules and capitation. Each reimbursement methodology is predicated on the 
notion of controlling inpatient utilization and consumption of resources after admission to 
lower the cost of care. 
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Managed care control of hospital admissions and length of stay 
The financial risk of the per diem rate is that the inefficient hospital may invest 
more in procedures or practice variation than their payment will support.  According to 
the American Hospital Association, admissions to community hospitals went up by 1.7% 
between 1998 and 1999, but the average length of stay dropped to less than six days for 
the first time, reaching its lowest level in 2003 and 2004 at 4.8 days.  It is likely that the 
admission rate increases reported are related to the concurrent 18.5% reduction in 
hospital bed capacity which translated into an overall occupancy rate of 63.4%, and 
substantial idle capacity (Healthcare Financial Management, 2000). The average length 
of stay is calculated using the total days of care divided by the total number of 
discharges.  When applied to individuals or specific groups of patients, the length of stay 
serves as a proxy variable for severity of illness in the efficient hospital. It also serves to 
estimate the inpatient resources required for specific categories of patients, assuming 
that additional medical resources are consumed with each day a patient spends in a 
hospital (Shi & Singh, 2008).  
By 2008, average length of stay (ALOS) in the United States varied dramatically 
by region. States in the northwest have the lowest ALOS at 4.0 to 4.9 days while 
neighboring states experienced an ALOS of more than eight days, with a national 
average of 5.7 days.  Florida ALOS currently ranged from 5.0 to 5.9 days during the 
same period (American Hospital Association, 2010).  It is important to understand 
whether the reduction in average length of stay is a function of increased hospital 
efficiency, pressures exerted by reduced reimbursement associated with either managed 
care utilization management or prospective payment. A hospital may reduce its ALOS 
independent of externalities by improving throughput and expediting care. Efficiencies 
have been demanded not only to be cost competitive for managed care contracting, but 
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to maintain margins after the Medicare Inpatient Prospective Payment System was 
implemented in 1984, reducing reimbursement by the establishment of case rates.  
Some studies have attempted to quantify the impact of managed care on hospital 
efficiency, which is a multivariate and complex problem. The 1999 Benchmarking Guide 
utilized data from seven key healthcare markets segmenting the markets by high and 
low managed care penetration. (Low managed care penetration is defined as those 
hospitals with less than 51% fixed reimbursement and high managed care defined as 
fixed reimbursement percentages greater than 74.9%).  The authors found that in 
markets with low levels of managed care penetration hospitals outperformed their 
counterparts in highly penetrated markets in key measures of efficiency. These low level 
managed care hospitals had better return on assets, employed fewer staff per adjusted 
occupied bed, experienced lower critical care and routine care expenses per patient day 
with overall lower cost structures. These early efforts at data collection were largely 
observational and did not control for geographic or practice variations, but contrast with 
the conventional wisdom that managed care plans differentially contract with low cost 
hospital providers, or that low cost providers are sacrificing quality in order to be more 
efficient (Solovy, 1999).   
In spite of design or methodological limitations, other studies suggest that higher 
HMO market share is associated with lower hospital inefficiency. For example, Sari’s 
paper “Efficiency Outcomes of Market Concentration and Managed Care” examined the 
performance of125 acute care Florida hospitals over a seven year period (1990 to1997, 
excepting 1993). He suggests that managed care penetration over time is associated 
with greater hospital efficiency. The study is important because Inpatient surgical 
percentage was a consideration in his model (2003).  The question that must be posed 
is whether managed care plans steer patients to lower cost hospitals or whether the 
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presence of managed care in the environment stimulates improvements in efficiency 
designed to better position the hospital to compete for managed care contracts. The 
literature is unclear as to which event is precedent and which is responsive, a critically 
important distinction. Studies designed to answer this question frequently serve simply to 
correlate the observed reduction in ALOS and admission rates with a concurrent 
increase in managed care enrollment.   
Admission rate is defined as the ratio of the number of inpatients to the size of 
the external population (Lagoe, Arnold, & Littau, 1999). Cohen and Weinick’s early study 
of the effect of managed care on inpatient hospital utilization examined data from the 
Medical Expenditure Panel Study and its predecessors to estimate the likelihood of a 
change in inpatient hospital admissions and days of care for insured patients over the 
age of 65 from 1977 to 1996 (controlling for individual and market characteristics).  Their 
results demonstrated that the likelihood of admission and a decrease in average days of 
stay had occurred during the period of time that managed care penetration increased, 
suggesting the events were correlated, while acknowledging the need for additional 
study (2000).  A meta- analysis of managed care and indemnity plan performance 
completed by Miller and Luft concluded that when compared with indemnity plans, HMO 
plans “generally had lower admission rates although some differences were relatively 
small”. Of 11 observations in seven studies meeting their requirements for rigor, HMO 
admission rates were lower in eight and higher in three. The HMO plans demonstrated a 
1% to 20% shorter hospital length of stay in the 16 observations from 13 studies in which 
15 reported a shorter HMO financed episode of inpatient care (Miller & Luft, 1994). 
The impact of managed care on the length of stay was specifically studied by 
deJong, Westert, Noetscher and Groenewegen. The research compared patients in 
seven diagnostic groups including medical, surgical and obstetrical patients from 1999 to 
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2001 in New York State. The investigators hypothesized that HMOs attempt to control 
costs by influencing the treatment decisions of physicians and the patient and that the 
length of stay for HMO patients would be shorter than indemnity plans. After adjusting 
for age, gender and co-morbidities and controlling for hospital managed care share, de 
Jong et al. found no differences between indemnity plans and HMO plan in length of stay 
and less variation in practice among the managed care group (2004).  
The impact of managed care payment strategies on hospital utilization 
Discounted payments rates in hospital contractual agreements are the most 
common form of cost control for the MCO. The impact of discounts provided by hospitals 
to managed care plans is substantial. For example, the average list price for a vaginal 
delivery in 2010 ranged from $3,800 to $12,100, with an average of $7,600 before 
discounts. After discounts the average reimbursement rate ranged from $2,500 to 
$4,300.  For coronary artery bypass grafting the average list price before discounts is 
$94,500 and after negotiated discounts is $27,300 with an average length of stay of 
eight days. The least expensive U.S. location can be found in Puerto Rico at a 
negotiated price of $17,400.  Geographic variation in price is clear as well as the impact 
of discounts on hospital revenue when comparing the differential from full price. (VIMO, 
Inc., 2010). 
Capitation is a fixed pre-negotiated per capita amount that is paid to a hospital, 
clinic or doctor for each person served, shifting the financial risk from the MCO to the 
provider. The provider is paid per member per month prospectively regardless of the 
member’s utilization of services.   The arrangement enables a hospital to maintain a 
steady predictable revenue stream and to align its economic incentives with those of its 
physicians so that they are working toward the same financial goals. The risks are 
substantial for the same reasons as the bundled rate reimbursement method. The 
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proportion of hospitals reporting revenue from capitated contracts increased from 30% to 
40% from 1998 to 2002, but declined to 38% in 2005. Hospitals in inner city/urban and 
suburban areas are more likely to report capitation revenues than are rural hospitals 
(Deloitte & Touche, 2005). 
The earliest studies of the impact of managed care used California data and 
found reduced rates of hospital utilization as high as 40% when compared to 
unmanaged fee for service insurers (Robinson, 1996); however, Miller and Luft 
performed a comprehensive review of the early studies that met basic research criteria 
for inference (a comparison group, an attempt at statistical adjustment and inclusion of 
peer reviewed findings). They found that these early studies were limited by unmeasured 
selection bias, rapid local market changes with insufficient lag time measurement and 
the absence of common data sets. Their synthesis of the studies with good inferential 
bases revealed that HMOs had a “somewhat” lower hospital admission rate than did 
indemnity plans and the reduction varied from 1% to 20% and outcome measures were 
“mixed” (Miller & Luft, 1994). 
Impact of managed care on hospital income 
Even if it can be demonstrated that managed care organizations do not adversely 
impact hospital utilization and procedure volume over time, volume will not translate into 
margin if the case rates of reimbursement are insufficient based on the hospital’s cost 
structure. Hospitals have high fixed costs due to the investment in infrastructure and 
technology and are extremely sensitive to volume changes. A 10% volume reduction in 
hospitals with 500 or fewer total acute discharges per year (88% of which are located in 
non-metropolitan areas) is associated with a 3% increase in the cost per Medicare 
discharge. This effect is twice the size of the effect in hospitals with between 501 and 
900 total discharges, and nearly four times the effect found in hospitals with between 
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901 and 1,500 discharges. A 10% increase in volume would be estimated to have the 
opposite effect; that is, costs per discharge will decrease (Dalton, Holmes & Slifkin, 
2003). The hospital’s cost of care is important only in so far as it affects the likelihood 
that its executives will be able to compete for managed care contracts and its ability to 
maintain critical procedure volumes.  
Again, conflicting results are reported by other investigators. Mowell developed a 
composite index of nine financial and utilization indicators to assess a hospital’s 
vulnerability  from increased managed care activity; for example, hospitals with higher on 
average patient days are at greater risk for length of stay reductions imposed by 
managed care concurrent review.  His sample included hospitals in the five states with 
the highest managed care market penetration and five with the lowest penetration in 
1995. Penetration rates ranged from 42.1% in Massachusetts to zero percent in 
Wyoming and Alaska. Contrary to previous studies, the results indicated hospitals in 
high managed care states demonstrated a better cash position and higher profitability 
than hospitals in low managed care states. The investigator did not acknowledge the 
possibility that managed care plans chose to enter markets with more competitive, 
financially stronger hospitals (Mowell, 1998).   
A later study by Shen and Melnick elaborated on these findings and contributed 
to an understanding of the changes in managed care and hospital market dynamics. 
Their work demonstrated that while hospitals in high managed care growth areas 
experienced revenue and cost growth rates that were 18% less than hospitals in low 
managed care areas between 1990 and 1998, the cost containment effect of managed 
care utilization management reached a plateau after 1998. In addition, the cost 
containment effect of managed care did not become evident for hospitals in medium 
managed care growth areas until 2003 when those hospitals experienced rates of cost 
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growth that were 12% below hospitals in low managed care areas between 1990 and 
2003. The hospitals' own market power as measured by the HHI substantially reduced 
the cost containment effect from managed care; hospitals with high HHI had much 
higher rates of cost and revenue growth than those with low scores on the index. The 
effect was stronger in high managed care growth MSAs (Shen & Melnick, 2005). 
In addition to the direct impact of discounted pricing in managed care contracts, 
hospitals are affected by the spillover effect.  Kauf studied the indirect impact of 
managed care penetration on the charges for inpatient hospitalization to fee-for-service 
payers. The importance of her work was to ascertain whether cost shifting had occurred 
to the fee-for-service sector in order to accept lower prices from the managed care 
plans. Florida county level 1995 managed care data was utilized in conjunction with 
patient discharge data and charges for each episode of care. The key finding of the 
study was that market penetration by managed care plans had a negative and significant 
impact on charges to the fee-for- service payers; in addition, hospitals serving both types 
of patients billed lower charges to fee-for- service plans than did hospitals without 
managed care contracts (Kauf, 1998). Thus, lower prices and reimbursement were being 
experienced by these hospitals in all sectors. 
The first study to systematically examine the experience of Florida hospitals with 
HMO contracts was reported by Burgess, Desai and Valley. The investigators performed 
a longitudinal analysis for the period 1990 to 1997 and discovered that hospital operating 
margins diminished over time with median margins less than 1% at the study conclusion. 
Teaching hospitals experienced operating margins lower than their community 
counterparts. (2002). The debate over teaching hospitals takes place in the context of 
much lower total margin at major teaching hospitals relative to both other teaching and 
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community hospitals, 1.5 % versus 4.2% and 4.1 % respectively, in 2000 (Medicare 
Payment Advisory Commission, 2003).   
Teaching hospitals tend to behave differently than do community hospitals in 
several key areas. First, the teaching mission requires the hospital to offer the full scope 
health care services, including the most complex and state of the art surgical 
procedures. The number of resident physicians and salaried physicians combined with a 
high acuity case mix index require substantial investment in infrastructure and increased 
cost structures. These unique characteristics often make it difficult for academic centers 
to compete for managed care business on the basis of price. The literature is not 
definitive on the weight this exerts on the ability of academic centers to gain and 
maintain managed care market share for complex procedures that can also performed at 
community hospitals. For each study that demonstrates the net loss of volume on the 
basis of managed care selective contracting price based decisions, there are studies 
that demonstrate managed care plan preferences for contracting with hospitals which 
offer a complete menu of services packaged with more favorable outcomes (Newhouse, 
2003).  
Given the unique nature of teaching hospitals most of the research related to the 
impact of managed care on academic centers consists of single institution case studies, 
limiting their generalizability; however, most public hospitals are teaching hospitals as 
well.  Clement and Grazier studied the extent to which HMO penetration has 
differentially affected public hospitals when compared to the private hospital 
counterparts in the same markets. Using a sample of 2,300 hospitals within 321 MSAs in 
1995, the investigators found that hospitals in markets with higher HMO penetration had 
poorer financial performance than their low HMO penetration counterparts; however, 
public hospitals were not more disadvantaged than other hospitals in their markets 
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(2001). These findings conflict with the findings of Janzen and Loubeau in their paper 
entitled “Hospital selection by managed care plans.” In their sample of 235 acute care 
hospitals the mean managed care share was higher at teaching hospitals, which is 
inconsistent with the premise that managed care plans selectively contract with hospitals 
with the lowest cost structure or that teaching hospitals were disproportionately 
disadvantaged in their ability to compete for managed care business (2000). 
For purposes of this study, the interest is the utilization of hospitals for the 
performance of high risk procedures with volume and outcome endogeneity.  In a study 
of changing patterns specific to surgical care, Kozak combined the data from the 
National Hospital Discharge Data Set with the National Survey of Ambulatory Surgery 
allowing the investigators, for the first time, to overcome prior inability to study the total 
surgical population. Age specific procedure rates per 10,000 in population were 
calculated, and rates for 1980 compared to the rates in 1995. Although the overall 
pattern demonstrated a decline in the rate of inpatient operations, the decline was 
outweighed by the growth in ambulatory surgical procedures. The rates of inpatient 
operation did not decrease in spite of managed care penetration for patients aged 65 or 
older (Kozak, McCarthy & Pokras, 1999).  In fact, two categories of operations 
appreciated an increase in inpatient cases: operations on the cardiovascular system and 
obstetrical procedures. Thus, the notion that the mere penetration of managed care into 
a market reduces surgical volume could not be supported.  
By contrast, Robinson investigated the impact of managed care enrollment on 
hospital utilization in California from 1983-1993, during a period of rapid managed care 
growth. He concluded that 28% of the reduction in hospital expenditures observed in 
markets with high managed care penetration was the result of a reduction in the volume 
and mix of services. The volume of inpatient surgical procedures declined more rapidly 
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and volume of outpatient procedures grew more slowly in markets with high HMO 
penetration, in comparison with those with low penetration. The total surgical volume 
declined by 15% in heavily penetrated markets, while volume increased by 8% in 
markets with low penetration. The author stated that managed care penetration was a 
causal factor in the 38% reduction in the rise of health care expenditures observed over 
the period: and, that this reduction was the secondary result of fewer patients being 
admitted to the hospital and shorter length of inpatient stay. He did acknowledge as an 
intervening event (Robinson, 1996). 
In an advance over prior studies, Reschovsky and his colleagues examined how 
specific forms of insurance affect the use of health services. Using the Community 
Tracking Study Household Survey data, they were able to determine that few differences 
could be demonstrated in hospital use or frequency of surgery when comparing 
indemnity plans, preferred provider organizations (PPO), and open or closed model 
HMOs (Reschovsky, Kemper & Tu, 2000).  The likelihood of having unmet or delayed 
care did not vary by insurance type, bringing into question the notion that managed care 
plans significantly limit access to surgical care for their enrollees. In addition, the 
researchers examined the utilization of the most costly hospital based services. The 
study did not find evidence of statistically significant differences between HMOs and 
other forms of insurance in the use of costly hospital based services. Hospital admission 
rates were not different, nor were emergency room visits or use of surgery. Of interest 
was that in this cohort, there was no evidence that outpatient services were substituted 
for inpatient surgery (Reschovsky, Kemper & Tu, 2000). Bernacki and Guidera 
attempted to ascertain whether managed care techniques in a workman’s compensation 
program (prevention program, medical treatment guidelines, nurse case management, 
and utilization of a preferred provider organization) would reduce the rate of the claims 
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and surgery in their patient population. They found that both the claims frequency rate 
and surgical frequency rates per 1,000 employees and per 1,000 claims were 
significantly lower during the managed care period than during the year prior to the 
initiation of managed care (1998).  
The nationwide increase in the use of ambulatory settings for surgery could not 
be fully attributed to the pressures from managed care plans. Zeng et al. studied the 
California data with the objective of estimating the effect of HMO enrollment on 
hospitalization rates and total inpatient days for those procedures considered to be 
‘ambulatory care sensitive’, or feasible to be performed in a less expensive outpatient 
setting. After controlling for patient selection, Medicare HMO enrollees were observed to 
have lower hospitalization rates and fewer total inpatient days for 15 of these procedures 
than experienced by Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries. These findings suggest 
selection of healthier beneficiaries into HMOs does not completely explain their lower 
rates of inpatient hospitalization (Zeng, O’Leary, Sloss, Lopez, Dhahani & Melnick, 
2006). 
The intensive care unit (ICU) is one of the most costly services provided by the 
hospital, and patients undergoing high risk surgical procedures of interest in this study 
typically require days of care in that setting. In one of the few studies of managed care 
impact on ICU utilization, Angus reported a 35% decrease in resource consumption for 
Medicare managed care beneficiaries, as defined by length of stay. When adjusted for 
patient characteristics in their model, the payer status had no independent effect on ICU 
length of stay and the difference in resource consumption was attributed to difference in 
patient related factors (Angus, Linde-Zwirble, Sirio, Rotondi, Chellur, Newbold, Lave & 
Pinsky, 1996).  
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Data from the Health Care Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP) for Arizona, 
Florida, Massachusetts, New York and Pennsylvania during the period 1995 to 1997 
were studied by Wong and Hellinger. The investigators compared hospital utilization 
rates for beneficiaries enrolled in traditional Medicare fee for service plans and those 
who were enrolled in Medicare HMO plans. They found that Medicare HMOs had lower 
hospital utilization rates than their fee for service counterparts and that utilization rates 
vary substantially among these states. The study reinforces the notion of small area 
variation in utilization rates, but could not ascertain whether the lower utilization rates 
impacted outcomes or were otherwise medically appropriate. The principle conclusion of 
the study was that substantial improvement in data collection and methods were needed 
to fully understand this relationship. (2001).   Studies that compare population based 
surgical rates at a baseline prior to the implementation of managed care and subsequent 
to its adoption are rare. 
The surgical procedures of interest in this study are those with volume and 
outcome endogeneity, which are high cost and high risk. This could theoretically create a 
target for the exercise of financial incentives for providers and managed care plans to 
restrict access to them. Conventional wisdom has dictated that this would be especially 
true in the for-profit plans. The use of high cost operative procedures were compared for 
Medicare beneficiaries who were enrolled in a for-profit plan and those enrolled in a not-
for-profit plan testing the hypothesis that the rates of 12 common high cost procedures 
would be lower in for profit health plans. Using standardized CMS Health Plan Employer 
Data and Information Set (HEDIS), the investigators reviewed data associated with more 
than three million Medicare managed care enrollees in 254 health plans in 1997 and 
adjusted for differences in socio-demographics and plan characteristics. The study 
revealed the rates of carotid endarterectomy, cardiac catheterization, coronary artery 
58 
 
bypass grafting and coronary angioplasty were actually higher in the for-profit health 
plans, and the rates of the other procedures were not different between plan types. 
Contrary to their expectations, and conventional wisdom, the financial incentives could 
not be demonstrated to adversely impact utilization (Schneider, Zaslavsky & Epstein, 
2004). 
The question this body of literature poses but does not answer is: have managed 
care plans played a part in reducing hospital use for inpatient procedures, shifting 
volume to contracted hospitals? The research has produced inconsistent results, as 
managed care is one of the forces affecting hospital behavior in rapidly changing 
markets and has not been sufficiently well isolated to make rational inferences.  
Managed care impact on hospital market structure  
Prior to 1980 most hospitals were free standing independent organizations but by 
1996, 40% of community hospitals were members of a system (Shi & Singh, 2008). The 
flurry in development of integrated delivery systems and hospital mergers that occurred 
in the 90’s have frequently been attributed to managed care pressures to improve 
efficiency, add competitive services, expand geographical reach and reduce costs by 
achieving economies of scale. The consolidation is also thought to increase the hospital 
system’s market power to negotiate with managed care plans for favorable rates.  
Respected investigators like Dranove have studied this relationship. As in most health 
services research about hospital markets he utilizes the primary MSA as the definition of 
a local market and measures hospital concentration (HHI) over time. He then builds an 
empirical model in which hospital concentration is treated as a function of managed care 
penetration, while controlling for other market conditions such as population, age, 
income, urbanization and the number of physicians. His principal findings were that 
higher levels of local managed care penetration are associated with a substantial 
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increase in hospital and physician consolidation. For a market in which managed care 
penetration in 1993-1994 was two standard deviations from the mean, managed care 
was associated with a .094 increase in the HHI for that market. He concluded that 
managed care was “working as envisioned by its protagonists” and if consolidated 
hospitals’ increased market power allows them to resist MCO discounting, it may “limit 
managed care’s future ability to use selective contracting to constrain costs”  (Dranove, 
Simon & White, 2002).  
Refuting these conclusions, Town and his colleagues examined the data during 
the same period. In 1990, the mean population-weighted hospital Herfindahl–Hirschman 
index (HHI) in health services areas was 0.19. By 2000, the HHI had risen to 0.26. They 
made the case that most of this increase in hospital concentration was due to hospital 
consolidation. The investigators demonstrated that hospital concentration and HMO 
penetration shared a common, upward trend throughout most of the 1990s but that in 
the late 1990s there was a break in the relationship, as HMO penetration declined while 
hospital concentration continued to increase three fold. Town et al. make the statement, 
“our regression analysis strongly implies that the rise of managed care did not cause the 
hospital consolidation wave. This finding is robust to a number of different 
specifications”.  Although they disagree with Dranove’s findings that managed care had 
a causal association with hospital consolidation, they did agree with his later findings 
that consolidation enabled hospitals to increase prices in three of the four markets 
studied (Town, Wholey, Feldman, & Burns, 2007).  
There is increasing evidence that after years of decline in the 1990’s, hospitals’ 
negotiating power with managed care plans has increased over time. Devers et al. 
attempted to describe how hospital negotiating leverage had changed from 1996 to 
2001. The investigators visited a representative sample of 12 sites from the Community 
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Tracking Study and conducted three rounds of interviews of managed care and hospital 
executives. Despite increased consolidation, hospital reports of contract leverage 
remained weak; but a dramatic reversal was reported in the years 2001-2002. Hospitals 
in seven of the twelve sites reported behaviors which categorized them as contract 
makers rather than contract takers. They reported aggressive negotiation stances 
demanding prices well above their existing managed care contracts and direct to 
consumer social marketing campaigns. The contract changes that hospitals sought and 
won included pushing risk back to the plan by carving out high cost procedures from the 
global fee structure; in addition retroactive claims denials were forgone and there were 
changes in the standard contract length. The authors attribute the change in market 
power to hospital learning curves and development of a “must have” status in the MCO’s 
provider panel (Devers, Casalino, Rudell, Stoddard, Brewster & Lake, 2003).  
In addition to consolidation and network formation, the trend in conversion to for-
profit status has been implicated in changes in volume and distribution of high cost 
procedures. Between 1992 and 1998, more than 90 private nonprofit and 17 public 
hospitals nationwide converted from nonprofit to for-profit status, almost as many 
conversions as occurred during the entire decade of the 1980s  (Needleman, Lamphere, 
& Chollet,1999).  With respect to ownership control, Florida is unique in the proportion of 
hospitals that are proprietary and have corporate affiliations, both within and outside 
their catchment areas. By 1999, more than half the hospital beds were controlled by for-
profit organizations. Ownership type is thought to determine the mission and 
management style of the hospital. Public hospitals are dedicated by designation to the 
care of the poor and medically indigent in contrast with investor owned (proprietary) 
organizations that must serve the financial goals of the owners. The not-for-profit sector 
combines both social and commercial missions (Clement & Grazier, 2001).  
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It has been conventional wisdom that the nature of programs preferred by the for-
profit sector may change the distribution of surgical procedures, independent of 
managed care activity in the area. Less profitable surgeries may be forgone or de-
emphasized from a marketing perspective and programs developed to attract the more 
profitable options (Needleman, Lamphere & Chollet, 1999).  In addition, non-emergency 
surgical patients in sub-optimal payer classes may be transferred to public facilities for 
high cost elective surgical procedures. A change in ownership control during the study 
period may create a temporary impact on efficiency and productivity as management 
adjustments and stabilization occur, creating an independent impact on the volume of 
surgical procedures, uncompensated care and price. However, empirical research that 
examined the impact of conversion to for-profit status in several states, including Florida 
demonstrated that of the 43 conversions, 24 were followed by some decline in 
uncompensated care while 19 were followed by some increase in uncompensated 
care. In seven of the 24 conversions that were followed by a decrease in 
uncompensated care, the decrease was more than 40%. In eight of the 19 conversions 
that were followed by an increase in uncompensated care, the increase was more than 
40% (Young & Desai, 1999). The only study of ownership conversions in Florida alone 
during the period 1981 to 1996 used the AHCA data and demonstrated that converting 
hospitals were different from non-converting hospitals of the same type. They were 
smaller than their non-converting counterparts, were less likely to have a medical school 
affiliation, and more likely to be located in a nonmetropolitan area. These characteristics 
also render these hospitals less likely to have substantial managed care activity 
(Needleman, Lamphere & Chollet, 1999).     
The relative bargaining power of hospitals and managed care plans will continue 
to be an ongoing issue and certainly may vary with the stage of market development. It 
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is clear, however that managed care monopsony power has not been demonstrated with 
any degree of consistency, especially after 1999. The MediCal Medicaid HMO in 
California as a very large payer has the potential to exercise substantial market power 
through selective contracting practices. To determine the extent to which the plan 
leveraged its market power to set up networks and negotiate discounts the data were 
examined for the years 1985 through 1991, with 161 hospitals fully participating in the 
base year. The impact of managed care market power was examined, but did not “yield 
compelling evidence” in favor of undue market power exercised by the plan. There was 
no statistically meaningful evidence that the plan had shifted patients to low volume 
hospitals. Instead, the investigators found that hospital competition better explains why 
some hospitals contract with MCOs while others do not. HHI was found to be a 
significant predictor of a hospital’s likelihood of contracting with MediCal, with those in 
more competitive markets more likely to participate. Although hospital margins for that 
group declined there was no evidence of systemic cutbacks to service lines. Emergency 
department closures in contracting hospitals did occur, but hospital competition was the 
only statistically significant explanatory variable (Bamezai, Melnick, Mann, & Zwanziger, 
2003). 
The question of how market power and market timing differ was addressed by 
Bates, Rexford and Santerre. Utilizing data collected by the American Medical 
Association for the years 2001to 2004, they examined the HHI of HMO and PPO plans 
separately in various metropolitan statistical areas for which two consecutive years of 
managed care concentration data was available. Subjecting the data to regression 
analysis, the results indicated that HMO concentration declines with metropolitan 
population size, and the converse is true for PPOs. HMO and PPO concentration both 
decline initially and increase over time varying with the number of firms in the MSA. 
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Given the direction of the coefficient estimates, the results strongly suggest that health 
insurers do not hold monopsony power; in fact, it is important to note that a 10% 
increase in HMO concentration was associated with a 1.5% to 1.9% increase in inpatient 
days of care. Monopsony theory holds that there will be an inverse relationship between 
health insurance concentration and hospital services. These data serve to reject that 
theory in the sample studied and are important in any estimation of the impact of 
managed care on hospital utilization (Bates, Rexford, & Santerre, 2008). Again, timing is 
demonstrated to be an important consideration in understanding the contribution of 
these studies to understanding contemporary managed care and the results may be 
dependent on the stage of managed care development rather than true differences 
observed in utilization. 
Hospital Outcomes for Managed Care Enrollees 
If managed care re-distributes patients, it is important to understand if that re-
distribution has exposed those patients to better or worse quality of care as a result. 
Studies that examine the impact of managed care enrollment on outpatient and primary 
care quality are plentiful, but hospital based studies are not.  Greenfield and colleagues 
examined the outcomes for 2,235 patients with chronic medical conditions treated in Los 
Angeles, Boston, and Chicago from 1986 to 1990. He concluded in what has become 
known as the Medical Outcomes Study that HMO and fee for service (FFS) plans 
produced no differences in outcomes, or mortality rates, for the average patient. In this 
cohort, however, subsequent analysis again demonstrated that HMO enrollees in the 
poverty subgroup were six times more likely to experience deterioration in health status 
(Greenfield, Nelson, & Zubkoff, 1992). 
Other outcome studies corroborated the finding of no difference for the average 
patient when comparing fee for service with managed care enrollees, controlling for 
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other patient differences. These include the Mathematica study of nearly 7,000 Medicare 
beneficiaries enrolled in 75 HMO's from 44 markets, compared with 6,381 beneficiaries 
enrolled in traditional Medicare indemnity plans. The investigators found that the 
outcomes for patients with colon cancer and stroke, treated as inpatients, were no 
different. The same findings were present when the investigators examined conditions 
that were primarily treated on an outpatient basis (Brown, Clement, Hill, Retchin & 
Burgeron, 1993).  Care must be exercised, however, in generalizing the findings from 
the Medical Outcomes and Mathematica studies. Follow-up studies for subgroups of the 
same sample have found differing results and the studies were conducted during a 
period of time when the growth rate and penetration of managed care plans were 
relatively slow. The consensus in the current literature seems to be that managed care 
enrollment in itself will not diminish the care or outcomes experienced by plan 
participants. In fact, there are numerous studies that demonstrate superior outcomes for 
those conditions that are improved through prevention or screening (Hellinger, 1998).  
The investigators have speculated that outcomes observed for managed care enrollees 
were the result of favorable selection; however, the studies done to test this hypothesis 
have been inconsistent and inconclusive.  
Although the data for the so called “average” patient enrolled in managed care 
plans may consistently demonstrate outcomes as efficacious as their fee-for-service 
counterparts, sub-populations have been identified which may have a different 
experience (Balla, 1999).  Gold and colleagues were able to demonstrate the differential 
favorable impact of managed care on low-income populations, specifically within Florida 
markets (Gold, Aizer & Salganicoff, 1997). In spite of the notion that managed care 
penetration has had an impact on patient distribution, outcomes in large cross-sectional 
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studies do not consistently demonstrate differences in hospital volume or outcomes 
(Dranove, Simon, & White, 1998).   
The impact of managed care enrollment in the obstetrical population has 
changed over time and produces differing results. Cesarean section rates for managed 
care beneficiaries and traditional insurance plans were studied in 61 metropolitan areas. 
The most compelling finding was that when controlled for patient risk, no differences 
were observed in cesarean section rates, a key measure of the quality of hospital 
obstetrical care (Hueston & Sutton, 2000).  
The length of stay for hospital deliveries has been decreasing since 1970. In the 
Harvard Community Health Plan Study, HMO enrollees had the same length of stay as 
their fee-for-service counterparts (Wilner, Schoenbaum, Monson, & Winickoff, 1981); 
however, when a similar study was performed in  the Minnesota Twin Cities population, 
Dowd found that after controlling for the effects of the patient's age, sex, medical 
condition, and severity of illness, as well as the hospital's size, teaching and ownership 
status, and average annual occupancy rate,  patients in prepaid group practices and 
independent practice associations exhibit significantly shorter lengths of stay than similar 
patients in Blue Cross plans (Dowd, Johnson & Madson, 1986).  A decade later the 
overall length of stay for normal deliveries had dropped such that national data 
demonstrates that 35.9% of commercial plan enrollees were discharged in one day, 
compared with 57.7% of HMO members. As is the case with many of the observational 
studies of managed care, it is unclear whether reductions in length of stay are financially 
motivated, whether any adverse outcomes resulted from premature discharge or 
whether a lower length of stay is actually clinically favorable in these situations.  Many 
managed care plans, particularly the HMO model provide for home care on discharge at 
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a lower cost of care than the per diem rates of hospitals, which has not been factored 
into length of stay studies. 
In an effort to examine impact of HMO related reductions in length of stay on 
outcomes in this population, Gazmarian and Koplan designed a retrospective cohort 
study comparing the length of stay and readmission rates of mothers and newborns from 
HMO and commercial plans. Of the HMO group, 81.7% of the patients were discharged 
in one day compared with 61.4% in a point of service plan and 48.1% in an indemnity 
plan.  Of importance is that the readmission rates for complications or adverse outcomes 
were not statistically different among plan types (2002). 
Managed care and hospital operations 
Clinical effects of managed care penetration that may influence the overall quality 
of the care delivery process have also been examined. Managed care has been 
associated with a higher nursing skill mix in analysis of Tennessee hospitals from 1991 
to 1995. A higher nursing skill mix has been consistently associated with a lower 
inpatient mortality rate and improved patient outcomes (Grandjour, 2000);  however,  an 
extensive study using patient outcomes for nurse sensitive quality indicators in California 
suggests that the probability of an adverse outcome was associated with managed care 
penetration and for-profit ownership. Again, penetration is the managed care variable 
utilized, although the managed care market in California was mature at that time of the 
study (Broome, 2001).  
Hospitals are reliant on technology and capital investment to provide state of the 
art quality care. Studies of the impact of managed care on the diffusion and adoption of 
technology have been done, but are rare.  In addition, large retrospective cohort 
analyses, with simulation models for future projections demonstrated no reduction in the 
diffusion or utilization of innovative patient care technologies as a result of high levels of 
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managed care penetration.   Although hospitals went through a period of diminishing 
investment in infrastructure improvements in the 90’s for reasons previously presented, 
that reduction could not be statistically associated with variations in managed care 
(Spetz & Baker, 1999).  These results differ from those of Cutler and Sheiner for the 
same period of time, who state that there was preliminary evidence that managed care 
had reduced the diffusion of medical technologies. Their evidence was that states with 
high managed care enrollment were technology leaders in the early 1980s; “by the early 
1990s those states were only average in their acquisition of new technologies”, again 
relying on cross sectional and correlational data (Cutler & Sheiner, 1998).  
Managed care and mortality 
The association between HMO market penetration, market competition, and risk-
adjusted hospital mortality rates were examined for the Medicare population in all 
metropolitan statistical areas with five or more hospitals, controlling for differences in 
hospital characteristics. The investigators found a negative association between 
mortality rates and HMO market penetration. A 10% increase in HMO penetration was 
associated with a 0.1% decrease in mortality, providing additional support for the notion 
of a spillover effect on non-managed care patients (Mukamel & Zwanziger, 2000). 
In summary, attempts have been made to study the impact of managed care on 
hospital quality, but they are rare and result in inconsistent findings, even when the 
same source population is sampled.  
Managed Care Development and Hospital Utilization 
In order to isolate the impact of managed care on hospital utilization and volume, 
it is essential to consider and control for other factors that influence hospital use. 
Anderson utilized a causal model to identify the socio-demographic variables that drive 
admissions, days of care and length of stay in one state. He found that the supply of 
68 
 
hospital beds was a significant factor, especially in areas where alternative forms of care 
with lower cost structures were not available. Hospital use was sensitive to small 
changes in age structure and urbanization. Income, education and ethnicity did not have 
a statistically significant impact in this cohort (Anderson, 1973). 
The Health and Human Services short stay hospital data set for 2004 
demonstrates older people are admitted more, and have longer lengths of stay when 
compared with younger adults. Women are admitted more frequently, even after 
obstetrical care is factored out, but use on average 3% fewer days of care. Blacks use 
services more than whites on a population basis and individuals of lower income use 
hospital services more than other groups. Medicare and Medicaid patients are more 
likely to be admitted to hospitals than the rest of the population (Department of Health 
and Human Services, 2006). 
One of the most comprehensive reviews of the explanatory variables of 
importance in managed care research was provided by Balla in 1999. Summarizing the 
early studies, he suggests that the population demographics of age, mobility and per 
capita income exert “substantial influence on HMO development”. In addition, health 
market characteristics such as physician to population ratio and the number of physician 
specialists are a catalyst for managed care development. It is his opinion that prior 
research may not accurately describe the “post restructuring” period that occurred in the 
90’s, as it failed to consider the influence of government purchasing as a source of 
managed care payments (Balla, 1999).  His work utilizes the MSA as the unit of analysis. 
Of the ways to identify local health care markets, the most common are by 
political designation such as the state, county, metropolitan statistical area or boundaries 
established by a patient flow analysis. Most of the managed care research conducted in 
the past decade has utilized the metropolitan statistical area as a proxy for the 
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healthcare marketplace. This approach has been preferred because the MSA better 
approximates the true market for managed care plans and hospitals than do counties or 
states. Healthcare service areas, or use of sophisticated patient mobility or flow patterns 
such as those utilized by Garnick and her colleagues in the paper “appropriate measures 
of hospital market area" have conceptual appeal, especially in making local policy or 
market decisions; however there has not been general consensus about the 
methodology to be utilized, particularly when comparing multiple markets as is the case 
here (Garnick, Luft, Robinson, & Tetreault, 1987).  On a practical level, the data about 
managed care markets have not been collected utilizing the health services areas and in 
the absence of crosswalks for secondary data sets, the MSA is the better boundary for 
the healthcare environment.  
Balla identified per capita income as a potentially important explanatory variable 
in his model of utilization for health care services. The decision was based on competing 
theories; first, that the choice of a provider is a normal good and that it is likely that 
HMOs develop more extensively in low income areas where people are willing to trade 
choice for lower premiums. Or, that managed care development is more likely in areas of 
high income where healthy people receive insurance as a fringe benefit of employment 
(1999). 
The third socio-demographic explanatory variable tested by Balla was the 
proportion of the population over 65 years of age. Although the elderly consume more 
health care resources making them less attractive to managed care plans based on 
adverse selection, they also have Medicare for which provider payments are frequently 
more generous than discounted fee for service plans. Finally, overall population size was 
considered, as more populous or urban areas were expected to attract more managed 
care development. In addition, the physician to population ratio, the proportion of 
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physicians practicing in group settings and the proportion of physician specialist were 
tested, as the availability of physicians to support the development of a comprehensive 
provider network is critical to managed care network development. Two explanatory 
variables were utilized to measure government purchasing: the percent of Medicaid 
eligible individuals enrolled in managed care and the percent of the Medicare population 
enrolled in managed care plans. Using hurdle Poisson analysis, the only population 
demographic that predicted managed care activity was population size, and the effect 
was larger than any other explanatory variable. The prevalence of general and specialty 
physicians was positively associated with managed care penetration into hospital 
markets (Balla, 1999). 
In the absence of significant intervening variables, utilization of health care 
services increases incrementally with population and Florida is one of the fastest 
growing states in the nation. Eighty- two percent of population growth was the result of 
net immigration, with a birth rate that fell during the study period from 13.7 births per 
1,000 population in 1994 to 12.8 in 1999; however, geographic variation is significant. 
One third of the total population lives in South Florida, whereas the elderly are 
concentrated on the west coast, as well as the south (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 
2000b).  Markets with older populations will tend to have higher utilization of procedures 
associated with aging such as coronary artery bypass surgery or carotid endarterectomy 
surgery. Florida, with approximately 18% of its population 65 years of age or older has 
proportionately more seniors than the national average of age of 13% (Hobbs, 2000).   
This body of managed care literature is used to identify those variables that may 
impact the volume and hospital market share for surgical procedures. These must be 
included in a comprehensive empirical model and are summarized in Appendix 3; in 
71 
 
addition, these studies provide the context and foundation required to evaluate the 
potential policy implications of the findings.   
If managed care has had an impact on the volume and/or distribution of inpatient 
admissions and procedures, it is essential to understand the importance of that impact 
on population health outcomes. What difference does a hospital’s volume make in the 
outcomes observed?  Why does it matter that procedures are shifted from one hospital 
to another? For the research questions in this study it is essential to understand for 
which procedures there is sufficient evidence to support the premise that the patient 
outcomes are endogenous with the volume of the procedure performed. 
Studies that demonstrate the inverse relationship between the volume of a 
particular surgical procedure and the associated mortality and morbidity are plentiful, but 
vary in their quality and rigor. In addition, many of the studies rely on state level data 
bases or regional populations served by a small number of hospital providers 
(Birkmeyer, 2000).  In 2000, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) held a workshop with 
industry experts to review the research and establish an agenda for the future. Eighty 
eight studies of surgical volume had been completed to that time and were reviewed, 
excluding studies with “patient cohorts treated prior to 1980, samples that were not 
community or population-based, those in which a health outcome was not the dependent 
variable, and those in which volume was not an independent variable”.  These studies 
reported findings for eight conditions and six procedures. The procedures included:  
coronary artery bypass graft surgery (CABG), pediatric cardiac surgery, carotid 
endarterectomy (CEA), abdominal aortic aneurysm repair (AAA) and two forms of cancer 
surgery (Halm, Lee, Chassin, 2000). 
On review of this research the IOM concluded that a “higher-volume, better-
outcome” association was observed in 77% of the studies reviewed. At that time the IOM 
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position was that volume is an important but “imprecise” indicator of quality. The data 
demonstrated that some low-volume providers had excellent outcomes, and conversely, 
some high-volume providers had poor outcomes, leading them to  conclude that “volume 
per se does not lead to good outcomes in health care; it is instead a proxy measure for 
other factors that affect care. With few exceptions, however, the literature does not shed 
light on the structures or processes of care that underlie the apparent relationship” 
(Institute of Medicine, 2000).   Because hospital procedure volume is relatively easy to 
count and is thought to be a proxy for experience  it has been used frequently in 
research; however, the IOM team that reviewed the research did not find the quality of 
the research to meet the optimal requirements for inference, with the highest ranking of 
the studies at 78% compliance with the standards they had established for rigor; thus, 
they questioned whether the models developed to that time were sufficiently robust to 
withstand scrutiny (Halm, Lee, & Chassin, 2000).  
After the IOM report was made public, consumer and business groups focusing 
on the improvement of patient safety in hospitals began utilizing volume data as a factor 
to be considered in selective contracting decisions. As early as 2002, state governments 
and purchasers of health care began publishing hospital volume information and 
encouraging the use of the data in the choice of hospitals and the debate about the 
establishment of regional referral centers for high risk surgery began in earnest.  Since 
the IOM workshop, additional studies designed to overcome the prior limitations were 
published and will be utilized here. 
An important addition to the evidence was the study by Dudley and Johansen et 
al. (2000), designed to estimate the number of deaths that could theoretically be avoided 
if patients undergoing procedures with volume outcome endogeneity at low volume 
hospitals had been admitted to high volume centers. In order to accomplish this, it was 
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necessary to identify those procedures for which there is good evidence that a 
volume/outcome relationship exists. Based on rigorous criteria, 72 peer-reviewed studies 
involving 40 procedures for which there was some evidence of volume and outcome 
endogeneity were analyzed.  From the highest quality study for each procedure the 
investigators determined the odds ratio (OR) for inpatient mortality. These ORs were 
then applied to the California database of hospital discharges to estimate the odds of 
death from the procedure in high and low volume hospitals.  
The extrapolation to “lives saved” in the study is subject to criticism; however, the 
most significant contribution of this work is the identification of those procedures for 
which volume and outcomes are endogenous, and the number of procedures required to 
achieve an outcome differential based on volume. The procedures the study identified as 
having strong evidence for volume/outcome endogeneity are followed by parentheses 
listing the annual procedure volume required to be designated as a low volume provider, 
specifically: abdominal aortic aneurysm repair (≤ 31 procedures), coronary artery bypass 
surgery (<500 procedures) carotid endarterectomy (<101procedures), lower extremity 
arterial bypass surgery (< 20 procedures), heart transplantation (< 8 procedures), 
pediatric cardiac surgery (<100 procedures), pancreatic cancer surgery (< 6 
procedures), esophageal cancer surgery(< 6 procedures) and cerebral aneurysm  
surgery(< 6 procedures) (Dudley, Johansen, et al., 2000).  
Since Dudley and colleagues published their work, the LeapFrog Group 
published their list of evidence based volume guidelines which recommend modestly 
different procedure volumes as the minimum number for optimal safety. The group is a 
voluntary program aimed at “mobilizing employer purchasing power to alert America’s 
health industry that big leaps in health care safety, quality and customer value will be 
recognized and rewarded” (LeapFrog, 2008). Using risk adjusted mortality rates, the 
74 
 
number of CABG procedures recommended is lower at 450, but abdominal aortic 
aneurysm repair, pancreatic resections and esophagectomy volume recommendations 
were increased to 50, 11 and 13 respectively. Based on their volume cut points, 
Birkmeyer and Suidema estimated that 11,208 lives could be saved annually if they were 
performed at high volume centers (LeapFrog, 2008).   
Several of these procedures are infrequently performed, even in the high volume 
hospitals; in addition, fewer than 50% of the procedures in question are performed in 
high volume hospitals with the best overall mortality. Using the volume thresholds from 
the analysis by Dudley et al. in California, a subsequent study used data from the 2000 
Nationwide Inpatient Sample to evaluate volume, mortality and hospital characteristics 
for seven of the high risk procedures. Hospitals were stratified on the basis of 
ownership/control, bed size, teaching status, urbanity and geographic region. The 
investigators found that for seven of the 10 procedures, more than 75% of institutions 
performing them would be considered low volume. For only two procedures (heart 
transplantation and lower extremity arterial bypass) do at least half of the hospitals meet 
the threshold for high volume?  Across all ten procedures about 27% were performed in 
low volume institutions (Elixhauser, Steiner, & Fraser, 2003).  
A study published in the Annals of Surgery examined the association between 
surgical volume and complication rates, including mortality for the period 2000 to 2003 in 
the Nationwide Inpatient Sample of the Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project. 
Procedures studied included CABG, AAA, pancreatectomy, esophagectomy and 
percutaneous coronary intervention. For all the procedures high volume hospitals were 
associated with lower odds for in-hospital mortality when compared with low-volume 
hospitals (p < 0.05). High-volume hospitals were associated with significantly lower odds 
for at least one complication following three of the five procedures.  These authors 
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suggest that patients who have procedures in low volume hospitals may differ from 
those who choose high volume hospitals and recommend additional study; however, 
they do not identify whether managed care enrollment was associated with selection 
(Allareddy, Ward, Allareddy & Konety, 2010).  
One of the few early studies that specifically utilize the concept of ‘endogeneity’ 
to understand the relationship between volume and outcome relationship examines 
Medicare claims data. The authors evaluate the effect of hospital volume on surgical 
outcomes for knee replacement over a six year period. The investigators tested the 
hypothesis that hospitals where more knee replacement procedures were performed 
would have superior outcomes while controlling for risk factors. Using a stepwise linear 
regression approach among other validating tests, they concluded that the endogeneity 
between hospital volume and hospital complication rates is at the hospital level, not the 
patient level. This provides support for the hospital focused analysis used in this study 
but also supports the notion that patient specific data is essential to understanding 
individual complications (Norton, Garfinkel, McQuay & Heck, 1998).   
Hospital mortality associated with inpatient surgery varies widely from region to 
region and between hospitals. One group studied these variations in eleven common 
surgical procedures among Medicare patients using small area analysis. The 
investigators divided the U.S. into 306 hospital referral regions with cardiovascular and 
neurosurgical capability and control for the systematic non- random component of total 
variation across regions. Regional variations were observed for all procedures. Back 
surgery is noted to be performed on 1.1 Medicare patient per 1,000 enrollees in a city in 
Tennessee and 7.0 Medicare patients in a city in Utah. The highest variations were 
observed in lower extremity revascularizations, carotid endarterectomy, back surgery 
and radical prostatectomy procedures. The prostatectomy procedures demonstrated the 
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greatest variability at 0.64 procedures per 1,000 enrollees in a city in Texas compared 
with 4.98 per 1,000 enrollees in a city in Louisiana. The investigators concluded that the 
most significant finding from a health policy perspective is that these wide variations 
were physician related, as the procedures for which the greatest variation was observed 
were discretionary, or elective in nature (Birkmeyer, Sharp, Finlayson, Fisher & 
Wennberg, 1998).  
The number of specialty surgeons has been shown to increase the likelihood of 
having a surgical procedure, often with odds in excess of four. The resulting differences 
in the risk of surgery, attributable primarily to variation in local medical opinion, give rise 
to what has been termed the surgical signature. It is so named because a community 
can be differentiated by its characteristic pattern of the risk for surgery (Wennberg, 
2008).   Birkmeyer, Leape, Wennberg and others have found that most of the 
geographic variation in the rate of certain study procedures is caused by a few surgeons 
in high-use areas who perform large numbers of operations such that the loss or addition 
of a specialty surgeon may have a significant effect on surgical volume, unrelated to 
changes in managed care activity or selective contracting (Leape, Park, Solomon, 
Chassin, Kosecoff & Brook,1989; Birkmeyer, Sharp, Finlayson , Fisher & Wennberg, 
1999).   
In 1974 the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on 
Interstate and Foreign Commerce of the US House of Representatives held hearings on 
the subject of unnecessary surgery. The report of the Committee, entitled Cost and 
quality of health care: Unnecessary surgery, alleged that 2.38 million unnecessary 
operations performed in the United States that year resulted in 11,900 deaths and an 
expenditure of $3.92 billion dollars. The current estimates are that as many as 30% of 
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surgeries are not medically necessary; thus, a reduction in surgical volume may not be 
as problematic as undergoing unnecessary surgery (Barclay, 1976; Lenzer, 2006). 
A subsequent study by Barclay specifically examined the interface between 
surgeon volume and operative mortality using the Medicare national claims data for the 
eight cardiovascular and cancer surgeries previously identified as having volume 
outcome endogeneity. Using a nested regression model, the relationship between 
mortality, surgeon volume and hospital volume was isolated after controlling for patient 
and provider characteristics. Significant findings included that patients were more likely 
to have surgery performed by a low volume surgeon if they were admitted to a low 
volume hospital, even though 25% of the surgeons practiced in more than one hospital. 
When surgeon volume was treated as a continuous variable it was inversely related to 
operative mortality for all procedures studied at the p = 0.001 level of statistical 
significance. When hospital volume was treated as a continuous variable, it was 
inversely related to operative mortality for all procedures at that level of significance 
except for carotid endarterectomy (p = 0.20).  Based on their methodology, once can 
calculate the proportion of the effect of procedure volume on surgical mortality that can 
reasonably be attributed to the surgeon’s volume. The proportion ranged from 24% in 
lung resection to 100% in aortic valve replacement. The proportional effect of surgeon’s 
volume on patient outcomes for CABG was 49%, 57% for abdominal aortic aneurysm 
repair, with the remainder demonstrating the surgeon volume effect as less than 50% of 
the outcome.  Despite the limitations inherent in administrative data, the investigators 
concluded that “patients can improve their chances of survival substantially, even at high 
volume hospitals, by selecting surgeons who perform the procedure often” (Birkmeyer, 
Stukel, Siewers, Goodney, Wennberg & Lucas, 2003).   
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This conclusion was supported by Peterson, Coombs, deLong, Haan and 
Ferguson (2004) in their study of volume as a marker of quality for CABG procedures in 
439 hospitals performing 267,089 CABG procedures over two years ending December 
2001. They concluded that, despite the obvious presence of collinearity between 
surgeon and hospital volume, both were significant predictors of mortality, with the 
highest risk adjusted mortality observed when patients were treated in low volume 
hospitals by low volume surgeons, although significance levels were not reported from 
the observational data.   
An additional finding of importance is the findings associated with the 
consistency of secondary datasets for these types of research.  The Society for Thoracic 
Surgery Database (STS) consisted of 439 hospitals participating in the voluntary 
submission of data to the professional society. The authors attempted to determine the 
validity of their information by comparing it to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (CMS) patient data sets. The CMS data was missing more than 20,000 patients 
who underwent surgery in the cohort hospitals and the investigators believed that the 
missing data was likely due to the non-reporting of managed care plan enrollees. The 
process exposes the key limitation of using Medicare administrative data sets for 
extrapolating outcomes that require a total population count inclusive of managed care 
patients. In addition, the use of voluntary unaudited self reported data from the private 
sector creates potential measurement bias. The researchers concluded that volume is 
only “modestly” associated with CABG outcomes, but acknowledged that low volume 
hospitals tended to operate on patients at higher risk and under urgent conditions. They 
did not address physician practice variation in the potential explanations (Peterson, 
Coombs, De Long, Haan & Furguson, 2004).  
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Methodological improvements were made by Hannan et al. (2003), who studied 
these procedures in New York from 1997 to 1999 using population based clinical data to 
estimate the impact of both hospital and surgeon procedure volume (and their 
interaction) on mortality after CABG. Four combinations of surgeon and hospital volume 
were created and risk adjusted mortality calculated for each. Multiple regression models 
were tested such that the odds of death for patients in low volume hospitals, low volume 
surgeons, or both were 1.31 to 1.47 times the odds of patients treated in high volume 
situations. Utilizing generalized estimating equations (GEE), all odds ratios remained 
significant, but the confidence intervals widened and the estimation of an additional 
hierarchal model yielded similar odds ratios. However, the odds ratio for higher volume 
surgeons in lower volume hospitals was no longer significant. 
 Again, studies relying on administrative data sets provide differing results and 
degrees of rigor. In their study of how quality and volume relate in the context of CABG 
procedures.  Auerbach (2009) utilized an observational cohort design to study hospitals 
participating in the Premier group purchasing organization database. After interpolating 
missing data and substantial limitation in the ability to control for confounders, the 
authors rendered findings that the lowest volume surgeons and highest hospital volume 
were associated with higher mortality rates and lower readmission rates in this 
population.  These findings and methodology are inconsistent with prior findings and the 
investigators acknowledge the limitations. 
There are a small number of studies that portend that volume is a weak predictor 
of surgical mortality.  Shukri et al. (1999) studied the relationship between surgical 
volume and outcomes in eight common intermediate complexity operations in 44 
Veteran’s Administration medical centers. A mixed effects logistic regression model was 
utilized for each procedure at the patient and hospital level of analysis. The study 
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concluded that volume was not associated with risk adjusted mortality rates associated 
with carotid endarterectomy. The study population differs from the other studies as it is 
more homogeneous, with shared operational policies, procedures and practices across 
the system. In addition, the cases were not emergent and the non-Veteran’s 
Administration studies typically include all cases in the cohort. Emergent procedures 
tend to have higher mortality and complication rates than nonemergency cases. 
An additional study that questions the validity of volume as a proxy measure for 
quality examines CABG outcomes and also uses the STS database. Medicare data was 
utilized to examine CABG risk adjusted mortality categorized into quartiles of hospital 
volume from very low to high.  The research team utilized the chi square discrimination 
or c score, which was then entered into a multiple regression model to adjust for patient 
and hospital characteristics to determine whether surgical mortality can be discriminated 
on the basis of hospital volume.  They conclude that volume is a poor discriminator of 
mortality and “marginally only better than a coin flip”. One of the important limitations in 
this study is that Medicare managed care beneficiaries were not included in the analysis 
and that risk adjustment was limited by the data in the administrative data set. The 
methods and findings are unique and not replicated in any other population based 
studies (Welke, Barnett, Sarrazin, & Rosenthal, 2005). It is of interest that the few 
studies refuting the notion that volume of procedures is a proxy variable for quality have 
been published in the journals of the surgical specialties, i.e. specialties potentially 
affected by any changes the research may bring about.  
The problems in demonstration of causation in the volume/outcome endogeneity 
phenomenon, from a policy perspective, can be demonstrated by examining the 
outcomes from colorectal cancer surgery. Although managed care outcomes have been 
found to be equivalent to fee-for-service outcomes for colorectal surgery, 
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volume/outcome endogeneity has not been found consistently to be a factor. In a large 
general-population study conducted in Canada, investigators demonstrate the absence 
of a hospital volume or teaching status effect on treatment decisions or long-term 
survival from colorectal cancer (Simunovic, To, Baxter, Ross, Cohen, McLeod & 
Engstum, 2000)  
In contrast, a retrospective population based cohort study was undertaken using 
the SEER Medicare data registries to identify all incident cases of colon cancer from 
1991 to 1996 in five states representing 14% of the U.S. population. Controlling for 
additional socio-demographic patient variables, and stage of disease on diagnosis, the 
investigators found that hospital procedure volume predicts both short term and long 
term survival following surgical resection; however, they failed to identify any patient 
characteristics that would account for the observed differences. The statistical methods 
used did not handle confounding as well as a regression model might have, but the 
results were consistent with studies in other states. The study contributed to the 
literature by demonstrating that the age, sex, and co-morbidity were similar across strata 
of hospital volume and that sub populations of non-white patients, those with unstaged 
tumors and those with low socio-economic status were more likely to undergo surgery at 
low volume hospitals. No relationship to managed care was tested at the individual unit 
of analysis (Schrag, Cramer, Bach, Cohen, Warren & Begg, 2000).  
The use of high volume hospitals varies significantly by region. One group 
conducted a small area analysis of coronary artery bypass programs in California, New 
York, and three provinces in Canada. The locations were selected on the basis of the 
degree of regionalization of the procedure. They found that only 2% of cases in Canada, 
and 4% of the cases in New York, were performed at low volume hospitals, defined as 
those performing fewer than 200 cases annually. In contrast, one third of all procedures 
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performed in California, where more hospitals perform the procedure, were done by low 
volume providers. The age and sex adjusted 14-day inpatient mortality rates declined in 
both California and New York as the average volume increased. The comparison of 
hospitals performing 500 cases annually, compared with those performing 100 or less 
resulted in a 49% improvement in mortality in California, and 37% in New York 
(Grumbach, Anderson, Luft, Roos, & Brook, 1995).  
Studies that might isolate the impact of managed care on hospital volume are 
rare and inconsistent over time.  In an early study, Feldman and Scharfstein (1998) 
compared the average provider volumes for surgical cancer patients undergoing breast 
cancer, colorectal cancer, and gynecologic procedures in Massachusetts hospitals.  
Dealing with largely cross sectional data, they found that managed care cancer patients 
tended to receive care at hospitals that perform fewer procedures, while the fee-for-
service patients tend to be treated at hospitals that perform more procedures. In 
addition, managed care cancer patients tended to be treated by surgeons who perform 
fewer operations than those operating on fee-for service patients. The investigators did 
acknowledge that there was substantial variation across managed care plans in provider 
volume. “Patients in some plans are treated by surgeons with more than 40% lower 
volume than the surgeons of fee-for-service plans and at hospitals with roughly half the 
volume. Other managed care plans seem to be no different than fee-for-service 
insurance, and patients in one managed care plan are treated at very high volume 
hospitals. These findings differed in several respects from a study by Merrill et al., 
reported a year later. They measured outcomes from colorectal cancer in a large cohort 
of cancer cases diagnosed between 1985 and 1992 and followed through 1995.  HMO 
cases had a lower overall mortality and use of surgical resection was not statistically 
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different between HMO and fee for service enrollees (Merrill, Brown, Potosky, Riley, 
Tapin & Barlow, et al., 1999). 
A later retrospective cohort study of nearly 60,000 patients was conducted for 
patients admitted in New York State for coronary artery bypass surgery during the period 
1993-1996. The data supported the conclusion that patients with private managed care 
insurance and Medicare managed care were significantly less likely to use lower 
mortality hospitals for CABG surgery when compared to patients with fee for service 
indemnity plans (Erickson, Torciana, Schneider, Newburger & Hannan, 2000).   
Carotid endarterectomy is the only major procedure with mixed and controversial 
results on the relationship between volume and outcomes (Wennberg, Birkmeyer, 
Bredenberg & Fisher, 1998). The only recent population based study to assess to impact 
of managed care on several dimensions of quality for this procedure was undertaken by 
Halm et al., who studied nearly 10,000 Medicare beneficiaries in New York who had 
undergone the procedure. Their findings demonstrated no difference between fee for 
service and managed care patients in indications for surgery, peri-operative risk, co-
morbidity or clinical outcomes. They differed in that managed care patients were less 
likely to use a high volume surgeon or hospital (p = 0.05) (Halm, Press, Tuhrim, Wang, 
Rojas & Chassin, 2008).  
Summary Conclusions from the Literature 
The literature reviewed here is broad based, but iterative and necessary to inform 
the research questions posited in this study. The literature is replete with conflicting 
evidence: managed care stimulated hospital market consolidation, and it didn’t; enrollee 
access is constrained or they have better access; selective contracting has sent patients 
to low volume, lower quality hospitals or they have not. Managed care has facilitated 
diffusion of technology, or constrained it. Nursing is better in areas with significant 
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managed care penetration, and it is worse. Managed care has constrained health care 
spending or it hasn’t. The best answer to all of these questions based on the current 
body of knowledge is that “it depends”. It depends on which time frame is being studied. 
It depends on which region or market is being studied. It depends on which stage of 
market development is being studied.  Much of the conventional wisdom about managed 
care cannot be supported by the published evidence. The jury is still out about the 
impact of managed care on the outcomes it was designed to achieve, which were to 
control national health expenditures by increasing access to screening, prevention 
services and care management and by creating competition and secondary efficiencies 
in healthcare markets.  
Perhaps these differences are less about research methodology, data integrity or 
our evolving knowledge, as they are about the variations in managed care markets and 
the need to use several different measures of managed care activity to better isolate its 
impact. It is clear that volume is endogenous to outcomes for a select number of high 
risk surgical procedures. While, as a structural measure volume cannot explain all of the 
variation in surgical outcomes; however, based on the large body of research a minimum 
volume level can be ascertained as a necessary precursor for effective process. Also, 
the evidence is strong for volume and outcome endogeneity for seven high risk inpatient 
surgical procedures: coronary artery bypass, lower extremity revascularization, carotid 
endarterectomy, abdominal aortic aneurysm repair, esophageal reception, pancreatic 
resection and cerebral aneurysm repair. Although volume may not be sufficient for 
causal association, it is certainly necessary. The question then remains as to whether 
managed care activity in the market has had a role in shifting volume for those 
procedures in Florida.  
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The review of the literature supports the feasibility of the following possible 
scenario:  Demand for major elective surgery is reduced by managed care prevention 
programs and denial of unnecessary surgery. As a result, the total volume of surgery 
may drop at the MSA level. The smaller number of necessary surgeries is then 
distributed by managed care plans to those hospitals with a managed care contract and 
away from hospitals without managed care contracts, redistributing the cases within the 
market. Any redistribution of procedures should be reflected in a change in the individual 
hospital’s procedure volume and market share.  
Conversely, the literature could also support a different scenario: Demand for 
major elective surgery is reduced by managed care denials of elective procedures, 
resulting in a reduction of population based procedure volume and rates. In either 
scenario, the first requirement is to determine whether a reduction has, in fact occurred 
in the state of Florida.  
The impact may not be isolated taking a snapshot in time, aggregating annual 
data, or choosing a sampling frame that is too narrow. Rather, to overcome the 
limitations of prior studies it will be informative to determine difference over time to see 
how volume and market share vary with measures of managed care penetration, 
competition, concentration and government activism. This study will be an effort to add 
to the body of knowledge about the impact of managed care on local Florida markets. It 
is essential to clearly understand that impact in order to make data based decisions 
about public policy and understand impact on population health, for a specific high-risk 
patient population undergoing procedures with volume and outcome endogeneity.  
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Chapter 3 
Research Methods 
Organizational Approach to the Research Methods 
If managed care plans have limited enrollee access to high risk/high cost surgical 
procedures, the total number of those procedures performed should have declined over 
time as managed care enrollment in the market increased. Likewise, if managed care 
selective contracting with hospitals has redistributed the volume of these procedures to 
preferred providers, a change in hospital market share of the procedures should be 
observed.    
In order to understand changes in volume and distribution over time a 
retrospective cohort design is utilized relying on the cross sectional variation in managed 
care activity in the state of Florida. Changes in volume and market share for seven high 
cost/high risk inpatient surgical procedures are measured over a five year period of time 
during which managed care activity is thought to have surged, peaked and reached a 
plateau. Changes in managed care activity, the volume of selected surgical procedures 
and hospital market share are measured at a predetermined baseline in 1995 and again 
at the end of 1999. The differences observed between the study starting point and its 
end-point five years later are calculated for each outcome, explanatory and control 
variable known to impact volume and market share and transformed to a difference 
score. These difference scores capture changes in the surgical volume, rate and market 
share as the primary outcome variables and are used to test the size and direction of 
 hypothesized managed care influences. A summary 
relationship among study variables which will be tested follow in Figure 2.
Figure 2. Research Design
 
To isolate and estimate the impact of managed care activity on changes in 
volume it is necessary to build and test multivariate statistical models that control for 
other potential sources of change in hospital volume and market share as identified from 
prior research.  The general purpose of multiple regression analysis is to learn more 
about the relationship between several independent or predictor variables and a 
dependent or criterion variable, as is the case in this study (Munro & Page, 1993). 
managed care explanatory variables of interest are managed care penetration, managed 
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care competition, managed care concentration and government activism as measured 
by Medicare managed care and Medicaid managed care penetration. The other 
covariates which may also affect volume and market share must be measured and 
controlled. Control variables identified from the prior research can logically be 
aggregated into general market variables, (total population, population over the age of 
65 and income) hospital market variables (HHI, hospital use rates, managed care share, 
total number of surgeons who perform the procedures of interest) and hospital specific 
characteristics (beds, ownership control, type). Although the definitions for each of these 
variables are listed in Appendix 3, it is important to make the assumptions and 
measurement of these covariates explicit and define the boundaries for their use in this 
research.    
Thus, for purposes of clarity, this chapter is organized into the following sections: 
first, the null and alternative hypotheses associated with the research questions are 
listed. These are followed by the rationale for selection of the sampling frame, study 
period, and secondary data sources. The criteria, rationale and methods for selection 
and counting of procedures that have volume and outcome endogeneity are presented 
next.  The estimates of procedure volume, rate at the MSA level, and the volume and 
market share for these procedures within specific acute care hospitals serve as the 
primary outcome measures of interest. Rationale for their measurement will be 
described in detail. Fourth, the methods to define and measure general market, hospital 
market and hospital specific covariates known to impact surgical volume and market 
share are specified.  The chapter concludes with the statistical methods and model 
building procedures.  
The data are abstracted from the secondary data sets and converted to excel 
spreadsheets for data screening and calculation of derived variables. Cleaned and 
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validated data is imported into SAS® for the requisite univariate and bivariate analyses, 
testing of assumptions, building the multivariate models and finally testing the study 
hypotheses. The methodology for each is presented in detail.      
Study Hypotheses 
To answer the research questions posed here, the null and alternative 
hypotheses to be tested at the MSA level of analysis are: 
 
Ho1: There is no relationship between change in the number of inpatient surgical 
procedures with volume and outcome endogeneity and change in managed 
care activity in Florida hospital markets, when controlling for other factors 
that influence surgical volume.  
 Ha1: There is a relationship between change in the number of inpatient surgical 
procedures with volume and outcome endogeneity and change in managed 
care activity in Florida hospital markets, when controlling for other factors 
that influence surgical volume.  
Ho2: There is no relationship between change in the rate of inpatient surgical 
procedures with volume and outcome  endogeneity and change in 
managed care activity in Florida hospital markets, when controlling for other 
factors that influence surgical volume.  
Ha2: There is a relationship between change in the rate of inpatient surgical 
procedures with volume and outcome endogeneity and change in managed 
care activity in Florida hospital markets, when controlling for other factors 
that influence surgical volume.  
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The hypotheses tested at the hospital level of analysis include: 
Ho3: There is no relationship between change in the number of inpatient 
surgical procedures with volume and outcome endogeneity and 
change in managed care activity in Florida, when controlling for 
other factors that influence hospital surgical volume.  
Ha3: There is a relationship between change in the number of inpatient 
surgical procedures with volume and outcome endogeneity and 
change in managed care activity in Florida hospital markets, when 
controlling for other factors that influence hospital surgical volume.  
Ho4: There is no relationship between change in a hospital’s share of 
inpatient surgical procedures with volume and outcome endogeneity 
and change in managed care activity in Florida hospital markets, 
when controlling for other factors that influence hospital surgical 
market share.  
Ha4: There is a relationship between change in a hospital’s share of 
inpatient surgical procedures with volume and outcome endogeneity 
and change in managed care activity in the market, when controlling 
for other factors that influence hospital surgical market share.  
Study Period 
The time period selected for this study is 1995 to 1999. This period is thought to 
be appropriate because the period reflects the full theoretical business and life cycle for 
managed care, as has been observed over time in mature markets and depicted in 
Figure 1.  Managed care growth in Florida was comparatively slow when compared with 
early adopter states such as California and Minnesota. Consequently, the managed care 
market as it existed at the end of 1994 has been found by other investigators to 
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summarize the activity observed from 1980 to 1994. The state level correlation between 
1994 HMO market share and the 1983 to 1994 change in HMO market share was 0.78 
(Spetz & Baker, 1999). In addition, from a practical perspective, the systematic collection 
of managed care data including the number, type and enrollment in managed care plans 
was not done until 1994 when it was recognized to be a factor in the Florida healthcare 
markets. Taking into account the lag time for market changes and delays in completing 
data collection for a given year, changes measured between the baseline in 1995 and 
the endpoint should reflect the maximum hospital market impact expected as the result 
of managed care activity in Florida markets. This assumption will be validated with data 
abstracted for this study period.  
Primary Data Sources 
The Florida Hospital Inpatient Discharge Data Set is produced by the Florida 
Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA) and is available for purchase. Since 
1988 Florida hospitals have been required to submit inpatient data on a quarterly basis 
to capture information about each episode of care on a patient specific basis.  Data is 
released in a comma delimited format on CD-Rom when 75% of the hospitals have 
certified the accuracy of the data reported. On average, hospitals certify their patient 
data within 130 days after the end of the quarter and 100% are certified within 180 days. 
The data set utilized from 1988 to 2006 consists of 32 elements, some of which are 
blinded prior to release to protect patient identifiable information. Admission and 
discharge dates and principal procedure dates are reported by quarter only and patient 
birthdates are converted to age for compliance with privacy regulations (Agency for 
Health Care Administration, 2009).   
Each hospital licensed in the state of Florida during the reporting period is 
identified by a unique numeric code. These codes remain the same, irrespective of 
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subsequent ownership or name changes. Hospitals are classified by type (general, 
psychiatric, substance abuse, teaching or specialty) and control (not-for-profit, investor-
owned or government). Patient data of interest in this study includes demographic 
information and principal and secondary procedure codes. In addition, the principal 
payer for each episode of care is listed with managed care payers differentiated 
(Medicare HMO, Medicaid HMO or Commercial HMO/PPO).   The primary surgeon 
performing the principal procedure is identified by the Unique Provider Identification 
Number (UPIN).  
The second source of data for this research is the Florida Hospital Uniform 
Reporting System which identifies the structural profile and financial transactions of 
hospitals in the state. Section 408.061 of the Florida Statutes gives the Agency for 
Health Care Administration the authority to collect financial data under rule 59E-5.102, of 
the Florida Administrative Code. The rule authorizes the Florida Hospital Uniform 
Reporting System (FHURS) as the standard for reporting financial data. Within 120 days 
of the close of a fiscal year, hospitals are required to file their actual financial experience. 
The report must be prepared from hospital financial data audited by a Florida licensed 
Certified Public Accountant using generally accepted auditing standards and accounting 
principles and any differences between the FHURS report and the audited financial 
statements must be reconciled and/or explained (Florida Agency for Health Care 
Administration, FHURS, 2000). Given the compliance with audit criteria these data are 
generally held to be verified with a high level of accuracy for financial data; however, the 
structural elements required validation as they were frequently incomplete or lacked 
specificity. The reliable structural elements extracted from this data set for use in this 
study included:  hospital ownership, licensed beds and teaching status.  The American 
Hospital Association Directory of Hospitals (2000) was utilized to validate the type and 
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location of all acute care hospitals in Florida and the number of licensed beds. Where 
differences were observed, the hospital is contacted directly for the information.  
Consideration was given to using a measure of the patient care services 
provided by a hospital and it’s and network affiliation as hospital specific covariates. 
Since some studies suggest that managed care plans contract preferentially with 
hospitals that offer the greatest menu of clinical services and are affiliated with others in 
a network; however, the data were so incomplete that they were not considered reliable.  
In addition, there is a strong correlation between the number of services offered and the 
number of licensed beds, and the number of beds is more easily counted (Balla, 1999). 
In addition, the ownership and change in control serve as the best available proxy for 
system affiliation over the study period, as acquisitions would be reflected in the data if 
ownership changes had occurred. It is recognized that the number of licensed beds 
differs from the number of beds in use or staffed beds; however, accurate data about 
beds in use was not consistently available, even when hospitals were contacted directly 
for the information, as it is sensitive in nature.         
The third major source of secondary data utilized in this study is the HMO Market 
Share Report available for purchase from the Florida Hospital Association. These 
reports are published quarterly and were acquired for the years 1994-2001. The reports 
are the most comprehensive source of information about managed care plan activity, 
changes in corporate ownership and plan closures reported consistently in a form useful 
to healthcare executives and strategic planners. They incorporate the licensure 
information provided by the Florida Bureau of Managed Care, but also provide the 
overall HMO penetration and individual HMO market share and enrollment data for all of 
Florida's metropolitan statistical areas and counties.  (Florida Hospital Association,  
94 
 
1994 -2001).  Additional data sources are identified with the data and charts to which 
they have been applied in Appendix 3 and are described more fully in the sections that 
follow: 
Metropolitan Statistical Areas 
The MSA defines the market for purposes of this study. The United States 
Office of Management and Budget defines metropolitan statistical areas according to 
published standards applied to United States Census Bureau data. In 2000, the 
standards for defining metropolitan statistical areas were amended to include outlying 
counties if they met specific commuting criteria to and from central counties, in order to 
better approximate actual and increasing consumer flow within geographic markets. In 
health care, this is particularly true for elective surgical procedures for which patients 
have the time to choose to commute to competing providers to have the procedure 
(United States Census Bureau, 2003). Consequently, the zip code commuting criteria 
and definitions utilized in the 2000 standards were applied in this study.  
Of the 67 Florida counties, a significant number remain relatively rural, with 32 
not meeting population centers requirements for designation as a Metropolitan Statistical 
Area. Eleven counties do not have a hospital at all, resulting in the migration of 
individuals from those counties into other MSA and non-MSA markets to have complex 
procedures such as those considered in this study. This leaves a small number of acute 
care hospitals in geographic locations which are rural and cannot be associated with a 
primary MSA. Thus, hospitals were assigned to the 20 Florida MSAs based on their 
location within the MSA, or if they reside in an outlying MSA county. For inclusion in one 
of the primary designated MSAs, a hospital must have met the MSA commuting criteria 
and have patient discharges residing in zip codes within the primary MSA, thereby 
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demonstrating market share competitiveness with other hospitals within that MSA. A 
map of Florida MSAs is located in Appendix 1. 
To evaluate the size and impact of any study procedures performed in the 12 
hospitals that do not meet criteria for inclusion in a primary MSA, a 21st non-MSA cohort 
has been created. Given the small population base and the nature of rural hospitals, the 
impact on procedure volume is anticipated to be small, but will be measured to validate 
this assumption; however, they do not constitute a market for inclusion in predictive 
models developed as a component of the study design, since they are geographically 
disparate and do not compete against one another for volume or market share. In 
addition, data related to the managed care activity in these counties have not been 
collected or tracked. This non-MSA group is included exclusively to estimate its impact 
and make certain the number of procedures and managed care enrollees in the group 
are not so large as to add to error in the final model parameter estimates or 
generalizability.  
Surgical Procedure Selection 
 The primary outcome of interest is procedure volume and the procedures of 
interest are those with demonstrated volume and outcome endogeneity.  Although 
hundreds of studies have been performed and reported on a procedure specific basis, 
the quality and rigor varies, as do the results. The best overall meta-analysis of 
volume/outcome studies was completed by Dudley et al., who were able to identify 
those procedures for which peer-reviewed research consistently demonstrated that 
more procedure volume produced consistently better patient outcomes (2000). Of the 
ten surgical procedures identified as having a statistically significant and inverse volume 
and outcome relationship, seven were appropriate for inclusion in this study. Heart 
transplantation and pediatric cardiac surgery are not performed in community hospital 
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settings and are restricted to major transplant centers and pediatric hospitals 
respectively. Consequently, these procedures would not be useful in detecting general 
hospital market changes and are not included in this analysis.  
In addition, percutaneous coronary procedures (PCI) are performed by 
cardiologists and although interventional radiologic procedures are invasive, they are 
not surgery, are not performed by surgeons, and are increasingly being performed on 
an outpatient basis.  Thus, angioplasty and stent procedures are not included in this 
cohort. Consequently, the remaining procedures that do meet inclusion criteria for this 
study are: (a) coronary artery bypass surgery (CABG), (b) lower extremity arterial 
bypass surgery, (c) elective abdominal aortic aneurysm repair (AAA), (d) carotid 
endarterectomy (CEA), (e) cerebral aneurysm repair ,(f) esophageal cancer surgery; 
and, (g) pancreatic cancer surgery.  
Procedures performed from 1995 to 1999 were extracted from the Florida 
Hospital Discharge Dataset if one of these seven study procedures was listed as the 
principal or secondary procedure. Utilizing standard ICD9-CM procedure code 
nomenclature, the procedure codes utilized for this study are listed in Appendix 2.  Study 
procedures were individually counted for each hospital within each MSA and summed to 
obtain the total number of procedures of each performed within the MSA for each year of 
the study period. This method permits the calculation of each hospital’s share of the 
market for these procedures individually and collectively by dividing the procedure 
volume for each hospital by the total number of procedures performed within its MSA. 
Given the small number of procedures anticipated in some of the categories, the 
procedures will be subjected to individual analysis and aggregated to achieve total 
procedure volume.  
  
97 
 
Managed Care Variables 
Several measures of managed care activity will be utilized to test their ability to 
predict the outcomes of interest in this study. Penetration, index of competition (IOC) 
and concentration will all be tested in the models. In addition, measures of government 
activism will be considered utilizing Medicare managed care penetration and Medicaid 
managed care penetration as unique predictors, in the event they behave differently 
from the commercial plans. The frequency with which managed care plans enter and 
depart the market requires that the count of managed care plans and enrollment 
consider those changes on an annualized basis. Where a plan was in existence for more 
than 180 days in a study year, enrollment counts are attributed to that plan. If a plan 
merged with another during a study year, and that merger occurred within the first six 
months of the study period, those enrollees are attributed to the recipient managed care 
plan.  All calculations of managed care enrollment, market share and changes in 
ownership are computed based on the data provided through the Florida Department of 
Insurance, Bureau of Managed Care Database and the Florida Hospital Association 
HMO Market Share Reports for all of 1995 through the fourth quarter of 1999. 
Commercial, Medicare and Medicaid plan enrollment from 1995 to 1999 are used to 
calculate penetration for each study year and permit the calculation of penetration and 
market share at the MSA level and penetration in aggregate at the state level.  
Commercial managed care penetration has been utilized in the overwhelming 
majority of studies about managed care. Penetration is typically defined as the 
proportion of individuals in the market who are enrolled in managed care as the primary 
form of healthcare coverage, and the number of individuals with health insurance 
coverage serving as the denominator (Dranove, Simon, & White, 1998). 
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The additional managed care explanatory variables to be tested in this study are 
managed care competition and concentration as they are thought to have a different and 
separate impact on healthcare markets. The only measure of competition employed in 
the literature is the IOC. This index is a measure of competition within managed care 
markets calculated as (1 - Herfindahl Index for managed care). The HHI for managed 
care is the sum of squares of the market share of the managed care organizations 
operating in a metropolitan statistical area during a study year. An MCO's market share 
is its proportion of the total managed care enrollment with each MSA. IOC values range 
from zero (monopoly) to one (competition among numerous HMO's with similar market 
shares). These are calculated variables determined for each study year.  
Managed care concentration is derived as the proportion of managed care 
enrollment held by the three plans with the largest enrollment at the MSA level for each 
of the study years. Given the potential interaction among the managed care variables, 
they will be entered into statistical models separately. Correlation matrices will be used 
to evaluate their potential multicollinearity and stepwise regression utilized to deal with 
that possibility.  
The review of literature demonstrates the potential importance of government 
activism in the managed care markets, and suggests that Medicare and Medicaid 
priorities and legislative changes may have a unique influence on managed care 
enrollment; consequently, they will also be entered into models separately.  For each, 
the proportion of eligible individuals who are enrolled in a government managed care 
plan is measured at the MSA level of analysis for each study year.  
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Additional Variables Associated with Procedure Volume 
 It is clear that factors other than the behavior of managed care plans can 
potentially influence inpatient utilization and demand for surgery. The other variants 
shown to influence inpatient utilization and procedure volume are calculated for each 
study year and the differences measured, described and tested to determine whether 
those differences are statistically meaningful prior to inclusion in the empirical models.    
General market demand factors  
Population base, age of the population and income levels has been consistently 
associated with demand for hospital services (Balla, 1999). Consequently, population for 
each MSA in each study year will be determined using the annual population estimates 
reported in the 1990 estimated census data (U.S. Census Bureau, 2002).  Given the 
evidence that the elderly use more hospital services, are much more likely to require the 
procedures of interest, and are Medicare recipients, the population over age 65 will be 
considered as having an independent impact on procedure volume and rates within each 
MSA. The population data for each year for each MSA is obtained from the same source 
at the U.S. Census Bureau.    
Since access to inpatient surgical procedures can be both elective and emergent, 
the performance and timing of elective procedures has been independently associated 
with both insurance levels and personal income. In addition, MSAs within Florida differ in 
age distribution and income which can influence both access and type of insurance 
coverage observed. Therefore, in addition to age parameters, the average inflation 
adjusted annual individual income in constant dollars pegged to 1995 levels for each 
Florida MSA is calculated for each study year. The Consumer Price Index Conversion 
Factor tables for 1995 conversion are utilized to accomplish the inflation adjustment 
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(Sahr, 2003). These general market factors are treated as continuous variables for the 
purpose of model building. 
Healthcare market factors  
Inpatient utilization varies among markets, independent of population 
characteristics. Differences in ethnicity, rurality, and attitudes toward personal health 
care have all been associated with the likelihood of using health care services. In 
addition, small area variation in the performance of procedures identified by John 
Wennberg and others has been well established (Wennberg, 2008).  Consequently, it is 
feasible that the tendency or preference for the use of inpatient admission and elective 
surgery will vary on the basis of community norms independent of established evidence 
based criteria or managed care selective contracting decisions. Consequently, hospital 
use rates will be calculated for each MSA within each study year to capture those 
potential variations. Changes in hospital use rates at the MSA level of analysis will be 
included in hypothesis testing models to predict procedure volume. Use rates are 
calculated as the total annual inpatient admissions per 100,000 population.  Admission 
counts are extracted from the Florida Hospital Discharge Data Set and the population 
estimates from the U.S. Census Bureau are utilized to create the calculated variable. 
For those markets that experienced a net increase in procedure volume over 
time, beyond what is predicted by demographic change, it is critical to determine which 
hospitals were the net beneficiaries or losers of the incremental procedure volume. 
Likewise, in those markets experiencing a net loss of study procedures it is important to 
ascertain whether individual hospitals maintained or lost market share, irrespective of 
the net loss in overall market demand. Whether changes in that share can be attributed 
to changes in managed care managed care activity will be critical to the study.  
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The number of hospitals, the degree of hospital market concentration and the 
number of surgeons have also been associated with utilization of inpatient services. The 
relative hospital market factors within each MSA are estimated using the variables 
reported in prior studies, including: the number of beds, the proportion of admissions 
financed by managed care and the HHI. The HHI has been consistently used over time 
as a reliable measure of market concentration and competitiveness at the MSA level of 
analysis. The index is a sum of the squares of the market shares of all the hospitals 
within the MSA. The more concentrated the market, the less competitive it is; when 
market power is invested in fewer providers, the index rises. As markets consolidate and 
admissions are concentrated, it is reasonable to believe by extension that procedures 
will also consolidate. Thus, the independent impact of capacity and concentration are 
included in this analysis and in model building.   
Consolidation of providers in networks has been associated with market power, 
independent of affiliations with managed care plans and is so universal that it is rare to 
locate a hospital in the Florida market that is not in a network; however, the level of 
integration employed in those networks varies from full horizontal integration to 
affiliation.  The nature and extent of these affiliations are difficult to ascertain in a reliable 
manner for the study period, except when ownership changes are captured by a change 
in a hospital’s ownership as reflected in its operating license. In addition, network 
affiliation and service diversity have been consistently correlated with size; thus bed 
capacity is utilized as more efficient and has been associated with market share in other 
studies (Balla, 1999).  The use of occupancy rates as a measure of hospital utilization is 
less useful in Florida markets than in other state or national studies as a result of the 
seasonality of inpatient census. Many Florida hospitals function over capacity during 
peak season from January to April with census dropping by as much as 50% in the 
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summer months; thus average inpatient census loses its utility as a measure of 
utilization on an annualized basis (Radcliffe, Dobalian & Duncan, 2005).   
The number of surgeons in a given market has consistently been associated with 
the volume of procedures performed in that market, and specialty surgeon affiliation 
influences hospital market share for those procedures.  Consequently, changes in the 
number of surgeons over the study period may have an impact on the volume of surgical 
procedures independent of managed care and must be included as a potential 
explanatory variable in models with procedure volume and market share as dependent 
outcomes.  The surgical signature is determined for each MSA for the procedures of 
interest by counting the number of surgeons who perform them in each MSA in each 
study year.   The procedures with volume and outcome endogeneity are performed by 
specialists. For example, cardiac surgical procedures are uniformly performed only by 
cardiac surgeons; however, a carotid endarterectomy may reasonably be performed by 
either a vascular surgeon or a neurosurgeon and an esophageal surgery may be 
performed by a thoracic surgeon or a general surgeon; therefore, for purposes of this 
study the number of unique surgeons performing any of the study procedures were 
counted, without duplication, to obtain the total number of surgeons performing the study 
procedures within an MSA for each study year. This is done to account for differences in 
access to surgeons during the study period as an independent explanation for changes 
in procedure volume. This variable is of greater utility at the MSA level of analysis, since 
many of the specialists practice at more than one hospital or change affiliations during a 
calendar year. Surgeons are identified uniquely in the Florida Inpatient Discharge 
Dataset by their UPIN identification number.   
Finally,  If this research demonstrates that there is a difference in procedure 
volume among Florida MSAs associated with managed care activity, the question will 
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appropriately be posed as to whether those differences are merely a function of the 
degree of influence managed care has in a given market.  In order to deal with the 
substantial differences in managed care activity across Florida MSAs, the proportion of 
annual inpatient admissions for which managed care plans are the primary payer at the 
MSA level of analysis will be utilized in model building as a control variable. This will also 
serve to deal with the methodological concerns identified by Pawlson, Moy, Kim and 
Griner in their analysis of the predictive value of the IOC in managed care research 
(2001). Managed care share is a calculated variable utilizing admission and primary 
payer data extracted from FHURS (Florida Agency for Health Care Administration, 
FHURS, 2000).   
Hospital-specific factors  
Hospitals in this study are those designated as acute care, short stay general 
hospitals licensed in the state of Florida and operating throughout the period 1995-1999. 
Military, veteran's administration and pediatric acute care and specialty hospitals are 
excluded as they behave differently than the acute care general hospital in population 
served, contracting strategies and managed care participation. Each hospital is assigned 
a unique identifier by the Agency for Health Care Administration which remains constant 
throughout the hospital’s history, irrespective of ownership or name change. The 
hospital-specific variables with demonstrated impact on procedure volume and market 
share are size, number of specialties/programs, ownership control and hospital type.    
Hospital control information is abstracted from the Florida Hospital Uniform 
Reporting System for the study year 1995 and study year 1999. Control designations in 
the data set include: investor-owned (including individual, partnership of corporate 
structures) government (including city, county, hospital authority, or hospital district 
structures) or not for profit (including the religiously affiliated). A change in ownership 
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control has occurred for study purposes if corporate ownership is different in 1999 than 
in 1995. This designation is entered into statistical models as a dummy variable and a 
variable created to capture a change in ownership if it changed during the study period.   
An additional consideration of importance identified in the literature review is the 
hospital type.  Short term, acute care hospitals are designated in the datasets by type, 
either teaching or general. A teaching hospital is defined by AHCA as a hospital with a 
residency-training program approved by the Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical 
Education or the American Osteopathic Association. Nominal dummy variables are 
created for type and for a change in type, if such a change occurred during the study 
period to estimate the influence of managed care on procedure volume and 
redistribution.        
Statistical Methods 
The research questions posed in this study are best answered through the use of 
multivariate regression to identify and quantify the relationship between a single 
outcome variable (volume, rate or market share) and an optimally weighted linear 
combination of predictor variables. (Hatcher, Stepanski, 2001). In order to fully 
understand the relative importance of the hypothesized predictor variables and assure 
that the assumptions for use of multivariate regression techniques have been met, 
pertinent descriptive data must be summarized, bivariate analysis of the relationships 
and correlations between variables completed to test model assumptions, and the full 
regression equation estimated.  
Data management and screening 
This study involves a great deal of data collected from a variety of sources 
requiring careful review for accuracy and missing data elements. The data is extracted, 
cleaned, aggregated and entered into Microsoft Excel spreadsheets for exploration, 
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screening and ease of graphics production. The extracted data is carefully examined to 
identify missing values, out of range data, univariate outliers, and evidence of incorrect 
data entry. Where values were missing from the AHCA Hospital Discharge Data Set, 
they were randomly distributed and represented less than 0.5% of the procedure data. 
Rather than imputing the missing values, the data was cross-referenced with the other 
data sources, or the hospitals were contacted directly for the information. One hospital in 
the Palm Beach MSA that would otherwise have been included in the sampling frame 
had not submitted the procedure information to AHCA, and was not willing to provide it 
to the investigator, as a computer malfunction had resulted in lost billing data. It was 
eliminated from the data set. Dropping cases with missing data is a viable alternative 
when it involves a small number of observations, does not have a systemic impact on 
statistical inference, and the cases are evaluated for their impact when possible, which 
will be accomplished (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). 
After data extraction from secondary data sets is complete, the calculated 
variables are created and entered into Microsoft Excel spreadsheets and checked in the 
same fashion for accuracy and completeness. Cleaned and ordered data is imported 
into the SAS® software academic version 6.11 for additional testing of the assumptions 
upon which most multivariate statistical procedures rely to achieve parameter estimates 
that are unbiased, consistent, and efficient (Andrews, Klem, O'Malley, Rodgers, Welsh , 
& Davidson,1998).   
Theoretical basis for use of least squares regression analysis 
The statistical approach of greatest utility in this study is a least squares 
regression analysis building on a methodology proposed by Dranove, Simon and White 
in their studies of healthcare market consolidation (2002). This approach has been used 
in the study of naturally occurring events in which there are many independent variables 
106 
 
potentially influencing or predicting a single outcome of interest and those independent 
variables are all potentially correlated to varying degrees (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). 
The use of a multivariate model is flexible and will permit the simultaneous analysis of 
multiple independent variables and the strength of their influence on the outcomes of 
interest.  Regression relies on the correlation between variables and their relationship to 
a straight line in order to develop a predictive equation. The equation allows the 
investigator to predict the score or value of one variable given the score or value of the 
others, as well as to explain the relationship between variables. The use of multivariate 
regression methods serves to answer whether there is a significant relationship between 
outcome and predictor variables. In addition, the regression model can compute how 
much of the variation in the outcome of interest (volume, rate and market share) can be 
explained by the predictor variables and which of those variables are relatively important 
in the prediction of the observed outcomes (Hatcher& Stepanski, 2001). The empirical 
and generic specifications for the multiple regression equation to be estimated here, 
follows: 
Y' = + 1X1 + 2X2 + 3X3 ……. kXk  +  e 
 
Where Y' is the predicted value of the dependent variable and X is a predictor variable; 
1 through k are parameters to be estimated. The intercept constant () is a fixed value 
either added to or subtracted from the weighted sum of X scores in computing Y' in the 
statistical program.  The multiple regression ‘ weight’ for a given X variable is the 
average change in Y' associated with a one unit change in that X variable while holding 
constant the remaining predictor variables.  The regression line expresses the best 
prediction of the outcome variable for each value of the independent variable.  
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Since naturally occurring events seldom are perfectly predictable, there is 
variation of the observed data around the theoretically perfect correlations predicted by 
statistical models. The deviation of an observation from its predicted value on the 
regression line is the residual value, and the collective residuals reflect the error in the 
model (StatSoft Inc., 2010). The smaller the variability of the residual values around the 
best fitted regression line, the better the overall model is as a predictive tool. The 
principle of least squares in this context is that Y values should be calculated such that 
the sum of the squares of these errors of prediction is minimal. The SAS® software will 
calculate the optimal  weights, and intercept, such that no other set of values could do 
better in fitting a line that minimizes the squared errors of prediction for the specific data 
entered into the model (Hatcher & Stepanski, 2001).  
For purposes of this study, the generic regression equation is modified to 
incorporate the geographic cross sectional variations in managed care activity over time, 
such that:  
Y t - Y t-1 = +  1 ( X1t - X1t-1) + 2 ( X2t – X2t-1)  …….  k(X k t – X k t -1)   +  e 
 
Where t and t-1 denote the difference between a given observation in 1995 (t-1) from 
that observation in 1999 (t). Differenced values are on both sides of the equation for 
each variable in the model (Dranove, Simon & White, 2002). 
Empirical Models  
In order to determine whether managed care activity predicts the volume for 
procedures with volume/outcome endogeneity at the market and hospital level, 
multivariate regression models are built and tested.  A change(∆)  in procedure volume 
(PROCEDUREVOLUME)  as a function of change in managed care activity (MC), while 
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controlling for change in general (GENERALMARKET) and hospital market 
(HOSPITALMARKET) covariates known to influence procedure volume change are the 
multiple regression model, such that: 
 
∆ MSA PROCEDUREVOLUME = α + β1 ∆MC + β2 ∆GENERALMARKET + 
                                                            β3  ∆HOSPITALMARKET  +  e 
where ∆ represents the difference score t -1 and the variables are categorized for 
simplicity.  The equation fully expanded for the MSA level of analysis including all of the 
variables in the managed care activity, general market and hospital market categories 
appear in Figure 3.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Saturated MSA Level Procedure Volume Regression Equation 
  
                                   Procedure volume (1999-1995) =        α  +                β1 Penetration(1999-1995)  + 
     β2  Competition(1999-1995)  + 
                                                                                     β3  Concentration(1999-1995)  +  
                                                         β4  Medicare Penetration (1999-1995) + 
                                                         β
 5 Medicaid Penetration(1999-1995)  +  
                                                                                    β6   Total Population(1999-1995) + 
                                                         β7 Population Over 65(1999-1995)  + 
                 β8  Income(1999-1995)  + 
       β9   HHI(1999-1995)  + 
                                    β10  Use Rate(1999-1995)  + 
    
   β11  Surgeons(1999-1995)   +       
                                   β12  Managed Care %(1999-1995) +  e 
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 Thus, the hypothesized models for prediction of change in procedure volume at 
the MSA level are sequentially regressed on linear combinations of managed care 
activity controlling for socio-demographic general market demand characteristics and 
hospital market variables. In a similar fashion, models for procedure rate at the MSA 
level are constructed; and, at the hospital level of analysis models are built and tested, 
with change in volume and change in market share (SHARE) as functions of managed 
care activity, while controlling for those general market, hospital market and hospital 
specific (HOSPITAL) covariates known to influence procedure volume and market share. 
Figure 4 expands the regression equations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Figure 4.  Hospital Level Saturated Regression Models  
 
 The difference between the MSA level and hospital level of analysis is the 
addition of five predictor variables that relate specifically to each hospital: the number of 
beds, hospital ownership and type of hospital and dummy variables for change in 
ownership and change in type.  
The SAS® procedure PROC REG will be utilized initially to estimate the fully 
saturated model at the MSA level which contains all of the model covariates with 
∆PROCEDUREVOLUME = α + β1 ∆MC + β2 ∆GENERALMARKET +  
                                         β3 ∆HOSPITALMARKET + β4 ∆HOSPITAL+ e 
 
∆SHARE                        = α + β1 ∆MC + β2 ∆GENERALMARKET + 
                                         β3 ∆HOSPITALMARKET + Β4 ∆HOSPITAL+ e 
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procedure volume change and change in procedure rates as the outcomes of interest.  
Because the regression equation will have greatest inferential power when each of the 
independent variables is strongly correlated with the dependent variable, but not with 
other independent variables, it is important to identify “the fewest number of independent 
variables necessary for the prediction. Each independent variable should predict a 
substantial but independent portion of the variability in the outcome variable (Tabachnick 
& Fidell, 1996). The goal here is to build a model that is neither largely unspecified and 
thus yields biased regression parameters; or, is over specified and yields unbiased 
calculations, but imprecise parameter estimates (Glanz & Slinker, 2001).  The 
methodology to produce the most parsimonious model consisting of the smallest number 
of reliable, but uncorrelated variables begins with an exploration of each of the variables 
and testing of the assumptions necessary for regression utilizing univariate and bivariate 
procedures. The mechanisms used to eliminate independent variables that do not add to 
the predictive power of the model will permit the distillation from a saturated to a 
subordinate model with parameter estimates that are less subject to statistical error.   
Test of assumptions and univariate analysis 
For multiple regression analysis to provide output suitable for valid inference, it is 
necessary that the relationship between variables is linear, that variables are normally 
distributed and relatively independent and that the variance of errors is similar across all 
levels of the independent variable (homoscedasticity). Although minor deviations in 
linearity rarely impact the final results, pair wise plots of the predictor and outcome 
variables are created, in order to identify and address problems with linearity. Should the 
relationship between independent and dependent variable not be linear, the results of 
the regression analysis will under estimate the true relationship and increasing  the 
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likelihood of a Type II error and the risk of Type I error (over estimation) for other 
predictor variables sharing variance with it (Osborne, Waters, 2010).  
Univariate descriptive statistics generated for each study variable are used to 
inspect the data for accuracy of input and provide context within each of the study years 
and calculate the composite difference scores. The PROC UNIVARIATE procedure in 
SAS® software is utilized to compute measures of distribution, central tendency and 
dispersion. The frequency, range, means, standard deviation, variance, standard error, 
skewness and kurtosis of the mean for each of the continuous variables in the study for 
each year of the study period are determined. The data are tabulated for reporting, 
additional review and later post hoc analysis should it be indicated. In that grouped data 
is utilized for each of the continuous variables in this study, analysis of the sampling 
distributions of the means of the group variables and difference scores are also used to 
assess the assumption of normality. The univariate analysis will serve to identify outliers 
with an extreme value in one or more variables which must be addressed.  
Of the methods to test for linearity and homoscedasticity, the most robust for 
models with multiple predictor variables is the computation and plotting of standardized 
residuals as a function of standardized predicted values. For efficiency, they are used 
here as the most appropriate and sensitive alternative to screening variables prior to 
their inclusion in the model building process, as well as utilized to perform traditional 
regression diagnostics. If the relationships between dependent variables and the 
predictor variables in each model are linear and the dependent variable is normally 
distributed, then the distribution of residuals will be approximately normal and 
independent.  The differences between measured and predicted scores obtained 
through regression are symmetrically distributed around a mean of zero.  A studentized 
residual that is in excess of 3.29 (p< .001 utilizing a 2-tailed test) will be viewed as a 
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potential outlier. In order to determine the degree of influence such a residual may have 
on the model, the Cook's Distance (Cook's D) is calculated to estimate the extent to 
which a potential outlier is in line with other cases. Observations with a Cook's D greater 
than one are potentially influential outliers (Pedhazur & Schmelkin, 1991).  Influential 
outliers will be addressed by dropping the outlier or by mathematically transforming it 
based on exploratory tests to ascertain how they impact model performance (Munro & 
Page, 1993).  
Transformation will be considered, should the skewness of the distribution of any 
of the continuous variables reduce the utility of the mean, as the best measure of central 
tendency and successful normalization is demonstrated. The method selected for 
transformation depends on the shape of the non-normal distribution. The most common 
transformation used in similar designs are the square root and logarithm; these 
alternatives will be tested in order to complete the analysis, with recognition that in a 
large sample a variable with statistically significant skewness or kurtosis does not 
deviate enough from normality enough to make a material difference in the final analysis 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). In addition, the stepwise variable selection procedure, 
utilized to develop the most parsimonious predictive model of managed care activity, will 
serve to reduce the likelihood of the violation of these assumptions by eliminating the 
non contributory and potentially collinear variables. 
Bivariate analyses 
To understand the relationship between the outcomes of interest and their 
hypothesized predictive and control variables, measures of their association are 
employed, utilizing a series of bivariate analyses. This is done to assess the strength 
and direction of the relationships, and test the statistical significance of those 
associations. The PROC CORR procedure in SAS® is utilized, followed by the 
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application of the PROC PLOT procedure to determine whether the relationships are 
linear. At this stage of the analysis, computation of correlation matrices is important not 
only to ascertain linearity and identify outliers, but to identify potential singularity, 
interaction, and multicollinearity among variables proposed for subsequent model 
specification. For normally distributed interval variables the Pearson Moment Product 
Correlation will be informative. 
Multicollinearity occurs when variables are highly correlated, at approximately 
0.90 or greater. Singularity exists when variables are redundant.  This is a risk in this 
study since the managed care variables of concentration, penetration and index of 
competition have not been previously studied in the same model, and several of the 
explanatory variables are composites that may combine elements of other variables. 
When present, these phenomena create unstable correlation matrices and affect 
statistical inferences by inflation of error terms, potentially affecting both the size and 
direction of parameter estimates (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996).  Multicollinearity does not 
reduce the predictive power or reliability of the model as a whole; it only affects 
calculations regarding individual predictors. That is, a multiple regression model with 
correlated independent variables can indicate how well the entire bundle predicts the 
outcome variable, but it may not give valid results about any individual predictor, or 
specify which predictors are redundant with others. This potential problem provides 
rationale for the use of statistical stepwise regression in building the final empirical 
models discussed later.     
Bivariate analysis of means will be utilized initially to determine the impact of 
predictor variables on changes in volume and market share at the MSA and hospital 
level of analysis.  Since measurements were made for the same MSAs in 1999 as were 
measured in 1995, paired samples t tests will be utilized to compare the means for the 
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difference scores.  Comparison of the means for the difference score tests whether the 
average difference scores are significantly different from zero for each level of the 
analysis. If the average difference score is not significantly different from zero, rejection 
of the null hypothesis fails and the conclusion that there is no difference can be 
demonstrated from 1995 to 1999 and the converse is also true. Because a paired 
samples t test has fewer degrees of freedom than does the independent samples test, it 
must display a larger t value to attain statistical significance; thus the paired samples 
approach results in a smaller standard error of the mean, where the two sets of 
observations are positively correlated and the smaller standard error will result in a more 
sensitive test. Basic correlations will be utilized to test this assumption (Hatcher & 
Stepanski, 1994). Difference scores are obtained for each explanatory and outcome 
variable by subtracting the 1995 levels from the 1999 levels. Descriptive summary 
statistics and t tests are utilized to understand whether those differences are statistically 
meaningful. This approach is utilized for all study variables. 
Model Building 
The method used to build the most parsimonious predictive models is sequential 
stepwise regression. The first stage involves entering all of the variables identified as 
having an independent effect on the outcome variable into the regression procedure in 
SAS®. The variables are entered by their theoretical importance to the research 
questions and in the blocks established in the research design; thus, the managed care 
activity difference scores are entered first in order of their theoretical market 
appearance: penetration and competition followed by concentration. The Medicaid and 
Medicare managed care penetration variables are entered to complete the managed 
care block of variables.  For the MSA level of analysis, the general market and hospital 
market variables are entered; for the hospital level of analysis, the hospital specific 
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variables are entered as well. The PROC REG procedure will produce the full or 
saturated model containing all of the variables and compute the significance of the 
overall model, as well as the parameter estimates for each of the predictor variables as 
the first stage of the analysis.  
The second stage of model building is the selection of those variables identified 
as having predictive power.  Parsimonious or subordinate models are subsets of the full 
model and are preferable to it as long as both have similar predictive power. There are 
several methods available for selecting the best model, each of which has limitations 
and may sacrifice the accuracy of parameter estimates. Sequential variable selection is 
the most rational manner in which to screen a large list of independent variables with 
potential collinearity.  Glanz and Slinker recommend a variable selection process that 
combines the investigator’s knowledge of the subject matter and variables with a 
combination of statistical methods to build the best model (2001). Given that the MSA 
level models are limited to the 20 Florida units, the resulting degrees of freedom will 
benefit from a reduction in the number of model variables despite the potential 
drawbacks.  
To follow this recommendation, the saturated model containing all of the potential 
predictor variables will be entered in each of the three models in order of their logical 
importance starting with the managed care variables. These will be regressed and 
reported, followed by a second statistical or stepwise regression to identify the most 
parsimonious subordinate model.   Three statistical methods have been proposed to 
reduce the number of variables in a regression model. Forward elimination is an 
algorithm that begins without any independent variables and each is sequentially 
entered to ascertain how much the residual sum of squares is decreased with it included 
in the equation. All subsequent variables are introduced until none further reduces the 
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residual sum of squares and the incremental sum of squares is maximized as computed 
by the F statistic. This process will by default assign greater residuals to the earlier 
entries and may fail to include a subsequent variable that may be material.  
The backward elimination procedure copes with this flaw by starting the 
procedure with all variables entered into the model and eliminating those variables that 
produce the smallest decrease in residual variance, as measured by the R2 or coefficient 
of determination. The F statistic is interpreted as it is in forward selection; however, the 
incremental sum of squares is the measure of increase in the residual sum of squares 
associated with removing the variable in question. Because a variable may be deleted 
as non essential in situations in which variables may be collinear with others that may 
have been eliminated in prior steps, the model may be underspecified (Glanz & Slinker, 
2001; Munro & Page 1996). 
The relative strengths and weaknesses of these methods have resulted in efforts 
to combine them to maximize their respective value and minimize their shortcomings. 
Stepwise regression as applied in the SAS® software enters variables as is done in the 
forward selection process. After each variable is added, a backward elimination 
procedure is applied to the set of variables entered into the model by that point. A 
determination is made as to whether any variable alone or in combination with other 
variables in the equation makes redundant one or more of the independent variables 
already entered through the forward selection process.  Should redundant variables be 
detected, they are eliminated from the model in a stepwise fashion and the software 
moves forward again to add the next variable. The process is halted when the addition of 
a new variable would reduce the mean square residual in a material fashion (Glanz & 
Slinker, 2001). Stepwise regression will be employed in this study after each managed 
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care activity variable is regressed independently on the outcome of interest to evaluate 
its independent influence on volume and market share respectively. 
Post Hoc Procedures 
The key research question in this study is to understand the relationship between 
managed care activity and the volume of high risk surgical procedures.  The data related 
to volume in this study are longitudinal count data which are measures of recurrent 
events over the study period. One of the most widely used regression models for 
multivariate count data is the log-linear model based on Poisson regression, using the 
following equation: 
 
                             Log (E (Yi)) = log t1 + β' xi 
 
Where β is a vector of regression coefficients, xi is a vector for the covariates of subject i 
and the ‘offset variable’ log t1 accounts for possible different observation periods (ti) for 
different subjects. The Poisson regression is in a class of generalized linear models that 
allows the mean of a population to depend on a linear predictor through a non linear link 
function. The log linear model is not predicated on or constrained by the same linearity 
and normality assumptions of least squares regression, and can add significant 
confidence to the results of traditional regression when data is nested such as the data 
in models utilized here. In addition, this approach permits the use of all of the study 
years as repeated measures rather than relying on the difference scores between 1999 
and 1995.   
The PROC GENMOD function in SAS® can fit a wide range of generalized linear 
models to compute the goodness of fit of the model and its independent variables using 
their deviance and the Pearson Chi Square Statistic (Pedan, 2000). Although this 
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approach is based on the Poisson distribution, extra variability can be anticipated in this 
data because the repeated measures of the model events/counts are naturally occurring 
and not subject to the controls of a traditional experiment where binomial distributions 
can be assured. The impact of non-independent repeated measures is known as over-
dispersion. Over- dispersion can be controlled in the generalized linear model by the 
introduction of a dispersion parameter into the relationship between the variance and the 
mean. This quasi-likelihood approach permits inferential testing and parameter 
estimation without full knowledge of the probability distribution of the data” (Pedan, 
2000). The use of log link by inclusion of the dscale code in the PROC GENMOD 
function creates the correction term for the parameter estimates in the model and 
provides for a more conservative and likely estimate or “likelihood” of a variable 
predicting the outcome of interest.  
Given the importance of the parameter estimates for the managed care 
variables, and the possibility of outliers or non linear relationships, this procedure 
overcomes some of the limitations of least squares regression and provides greater 
confidence in the variable selection in the final models for procedure volume.  The 
results of the generalized linear equation will then be compared with those of the least 
squares subordinate model. 
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Chapter 4  
Study Results 
The study results are presented in two sections. The substantial descriptive 
information generated from the data is presented to provide context for changes over the 
study period and an overview of the managed care environment; the testing of model 
assumptions is then reported followed by the results of the model building and 
hypothesis testing procedures. The key state and MSA level primary outcome variables 
of interest are the volume and rate of inpatient surgical procedures with demonstrated 
volume and outcome endogeneity. Lengthy tables summarizing the hospital specific 
descriptive data are located at the end of the chapter. 
Procedure Volume  
Procedure volume at the state level 
During the period 2,246,702 inpatient surgical procedures were performed in 
Florida averaging 449,340 procedures annually, increasing each year over the study 
period by nearly 5,000 cases. In aggregate the procedures with volume and outcome 
endogeneity constituted 254,170 of those procedures, or 10.5% to11.8% of the total 
procedures performed on an annual basis (Figure 5). 
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Figure 5. Inpatient Procedures Performed in Florida 1995 through1999 
Source: Data extracted from the AHCA Hospital Inpatient Discharge Data Set for the period. 
 
Procedure volume at the MSA level  
Fifteen of the Florida MSAs appreciated an increase in procedure volume as 
summarized in Table 3. Of the five MSAs experiencing a reduction in the total number of 
procedures the reduction ranged from -1 to -658. Coronary artery bypass graft 
procedures (CABG) accounted for the majority of the reduction in those MSAs where 
they were performed. The Ft. Myers MSA was an outlier for decreased surgical cases 
with a five percent reduction. The changes in the procedure volume occurred at a time 
that ownership changes were being implemented with the transition of for-profit hospitals 
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to the not-for-profit Lee Memorial Health System. These not-for-profit hospitals reduced 
surgical volume during the transitional period.   
 
Table 3. Summary of the Mean and Total MSA Procedure Volume 
MSA AAAR  ∆ CAN ∆ CABG ∆ LEXT ∆ PAN ∆ ESO ∆ CAN ∆ Total ∆ 
  
 
              
Daytona  518 -22 1,650 76 3,739 152 1,302 33  66 2  25 9 0 0  7,300 250 
Lauderdale 1,463 43 4,387 -16 14,431 155 3,568 75 293 5 119 -2 3 1 24,264 261 
Ft. Myers   821  3 2,948 -99 5,613 -549 1,704 -16 102 0  69 3 0 0 11,257 -658 
Ft. Pierce   341  5 2,011 135  139 139  968 34 53 -4  23 -2 0 0  3,535 307 
Ft. Walton   97 - 2  540  12 0 0  219 -14 11 5  10 -1 1 -1    878 -1 
Gainesville 601 16 1,355 -43 3,634 -189 1,204 -18 198 -5 171 9 31 6 7,194 -224 
Jacksonville 609 82 3,047 70 6,907 101 2,150 102 137 -3  94 2 0 0 12,944 354 
Lakeland 472 13 2,245 69 3,174 87 1,319 -17 55 3  19 0 2 1  7,286 156 
Melbourne 494 15 2,251   3 4,083 305 1,735 -17 82 -5  23 -3 0 0 8,668 298 
Miami-Dade 1,142 47 2,797  19 12,155 -117 3,878 -35 771 23 270 -24 7 -1 21,020 -88 
Naples   404 13 1,379   9  1,474 506  595 94 68 14  15 2 1 0  3,936 638 
Ocala   701  1 2,385 327 5,368 192 1,317 17 42 4  16 -1 1 1 9,830 541 
Orlando 1,727 23 6,285 247 18,191 1,267 3,966 105 250 13  87 -12 5 -2 30,511 1641 
Panama    199 -15  767  10 1,789 95  446 29 66 12  17 0 1 0 3,285 131 
Pensacola   449 -10 1,338  25 5,544 -10 1,311 29 87 0  92 -11 0 0 8,821 23 
Punta    292  5 1,421  26 1,718 7  630 60 27 5  11 1 0 0 4,099 104 
Sarasota 1,300 -19 4,016 113 9,069 226 2,846 22 131 -2  33 -6 2 -1 17,397 333 
Tallahassee   145 - 7  911 - 36 3,560 -54  575 28 44 -4  36 -6 0 0 5,271 -79 
Tampa 3,083  2 12,607 221 23,031 16 8,097 75 601 -22 294 -3 4 0 47,717 289 
Palm Beach 1,148 - 9 4,678  63 10,303 624 2,620 49 161 0 47 -10 0 0 18,957 717 
Summary Measures 
Total 16,006 184 
 
59,018 1,231 13,3922 2,953 40,450  635 3,245 41 1,471 -55 58 4 
   
254,170 
    
4,993 
Mean 800 9 2,951  62 6,696 148 2,023 32 162 2 74 -3 3 0 12,709 250 
Median 560 4 2,248  26 4,726 98 1,318 29   85 1 35 -2 1 0 8,745 256 
Std Dev 703 25 2,706 104 6,167 359 1,826 43 196 9 83 8 7 2 11,370 450 
p  = |t| 0.08    0.01    0.04    0.01  0.17  0.04  0.04   0.0005  
 
Mean of the years 1995-1999 for each procedure; p = |t| is the result of paired sample t tests to test Ho: µ 1995 = µ 1999 
at the .05 level of significance for a two tailed test;  
 ∆ = 1999 procedure volume-1995 procedure volume; p values reflect paired sample two tailed t tests for the null 
hypothesis Ho: µ 1995 = µ1999 with a critical value p ≤ 0.05 
AAAR = Abdominal Aortic Aneurysm Resection 
CAN = Carotid Endarterectomy 
CABG = Coronary Artery Bypass Graft 
LEXT = Lower Extremity Vascular Bypass 
PAN = Pancreatic Resection 
ESO = Esophageal Resection 
CAN = Cerebral Aneurysm Repair  
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The other MSA with material changes in procedure volume was the Gainesville 
MSA where a major university teaching hospital is located; however, the other MSAs 
with university teaching hospitals in Tampa and Miami did not experience reductions in 
procedure volume over the study period despite much higher levels of managed care 
penetration and competition.  The other volume losing MSAs had reductions of less than 
one percent of the total procedure volume.  
The small area variation observed in other regions of the country is observed in 
Florida on the MSA level.  Although more procedures are performed in the most 
populous MSAs, the Tampa MSA performed the most procedures despite having neither 
the greatest population base nor the greatest number of residents over the age of 65. 
That MSA does, however, have the greatest number of acute care general hospitals and 
one university teaching hospital. The observations of the variations between procedure 
utilization and socio-demographic and health care market factors again suggest that 
factors other than managed care may be influencing procedure volume.  
 Individual procedure volume at the MSA level 
The number of each study procedure, procedure rates, and the number of surgeons who 
perform those procedures are included in the following tables, with the difference scores 
reflecting 1995 numbers contrasted with 1999.  The individual procedure levels in each 
of the 161 study hospitals are summarized in the following sections, Table 24 and the 
volume, difference scores, procedure rates and surgeons performing each of the 
individual study procedures are listed in tables 4 through 10. 
Abdominal aortic aneurysm resection 
There was an overall increase across the state of 184 cases of the AAAR 
procedure, one of the most prevalent study procedures performed. Even so, seven of 
the 20 MSAs experienced a reduction. The modest overall increase is 6% with a median 
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increase of four cases at the MSA level. A small reduction in the mean population 
procedure rate over the study period is observed which is consistent with the small 
growth in procedure volume at a time when population was increasing. More than 50% 
of the MSAs experienced a net reduction in procedure rate in spite of a net increase in 
operating physicians.  There does not appear to be a correlation between the loss or 
gain of surgeons and the loss or gain of cases, since MSAs that added surgeons did not 
experience an increased procedure volume and MSAs that lost surgeons did not 
necessarily lose volume. Other explanations than surgeon availability require 
identification and are further explored in the multivariate models.  
 
Table 4.  Elective Abdominal Aortic Aneurysm Repair Procedure Levels 
MSA Procedures 1995 Difference 
Total 
Procedures 
Procedure 
Rate 
1995 
Difference Speciality Surgeons Difference 
        
Daytona Beach 114 -22 518 0.2514 -0.6238 22 -3 
Ft. Lauderdale 283 43 1463 0.1956 0.0089 81 -6 
Ft. Myers 155 3 821 0.3956 -0.2983 42 8 
Ft. Pierce 56 5 341 0.1928 0.0001 18 0 
Ft. Walton 22 -2 97 0.1351 -0.0001 6 -1 
Gainesville 104 16 601 0.5101 -0.0168 14 -3 
Jacksonville 73 82 609 0.7299 0.0454 23 6 
Lakeland 86 13 472 0.1923 0.0694 16 3 
Melbourne 95 15 494 0.2105 0.2248 18 -1 
Miami-Dade 194 47 1,142 0.0930 0.0155 79 -14 
Naples 79 13 404 0.3957 -0.0204 14 2 
Ocala 122 1 701 0.5290 -0.0466 24 8 
Orlando 319 23 1,727 0.2233 -0.0106 74 3 
Panama City 49 -15 199 0.3448 -0.1153 7 0 
Pensacola 88 -10 449 0.2315 -0.0412 19 0 
Punta Gorda 60 5 292 0.4590 0.0045 17 5 
Sarasota 265 -19 1,300 0.4892 -0.0664 62 1 
Tallahassee 43 -7 145 0.1613 -0.0332 9 -1 
Tampa 601 2 3,083 0.2611 -0.0155 164 1 
West Palm 
Beach 211 
-9 1,148 0.2081 -0.0273 54 -2 
        
Summary 
Measures 
       
Total 3,019 184 16,006 6.209 -0.947 763 6 
Mean 151 9 800 0.310 -0.047 38 0 
Median 100 4 560 0.241 -0.016 21 0 
Standard 
Deviation 136 25 703 
0.165 0.165 
39 5 
Difference = 1999 levels -1995 levels 
Total Procedures = Sum of all procedures performed 1995 through 1999 
Procedure rate 1995 = Number of procedures/1000 population within the MSA 
Specialty surgeons = the discrete number of surgeons who performed study procedures  
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Carotid endarterectomy 
Nearly 60,000 carotid endarterectomy procedures were performed over the study 
period by jointly by both neurosurgeons and vascular surgeons. The statewide volume 
increased by more than 1,200 from 1995 to 1999 with an increase in mean procedure 
rate and the addition of 55 surgeons. The median increase at the MSA level of 26 cases 
was again unassociated with the gain or loss of surgeons at the local level.  Eight MSAs 
demonstrated a reduction in population procedure rates with the overall mean statewide 
change of 1.3%.   
 
Table 5. Carotid Endarterectomy Procedure Activity Levels 
MSA Procedures 1995 Difference 
Total 
Procedures 
Procedure 
Rate 
1995 
Difference Speciality Surgeons Difference 
        
        
Daytona Beach 291 76 1,650 0.6418 0.1123 28 -3 
Ft. Lauderdale 891 -16 4,387 0.6156 -0.6682 102 -5 
Ft. Myers 679 -99 2,948 1.7329 -0.3903 59 9 
Ft. Pierce 340 135 2,011 1.1703 0.3318 27 1 
Ft. Walton 92 12 540 0.5648 0.0504 9 -3 
Gainesville 300 -43 1,355 1.4728 -0.2821 13 -4 
Jacksonville 532 70 3,047 0.5319 0.0212 38 10 
Lakeland 409 69 2,245 0.9146 0.0853 23 8 
Melbourne 447 3 2,251 0.9905 -0.0373 23 -11 
Miami-Dade 550 19 2,797 0.2636 -0.0074 136 -3 
Naples 272 9 1,379 1.3625 -0.2160 16 3 
Ocala 278 327 2,385 1.2055 1.1674 36 15 
Orlando 1,077 247 6,285 0.7540 0.0694 131 20 
Panama City 156 10 767 0.6786 0.0227 11 -1 
Pensacola 258 25 1,338 1.0978 0.0116 31 6 
Punta Gorda 253 26 1,421 0.6786 0.0542 29 1 
Sarasota 734 113 4,016 1.9353 0.1008 82 23 
Tallahassee 204 -36 911 1.3549 -0.1673 18 -2 
Tampa 2,422 221 12,607 0.7652 0.0276 259 -18 
West Palm 
Beach 832 
63 4,678 1.0880 -0.0194 79 9 
        
Summary 
Measures  
      
Total 11,017 1,231 59,018 19.8210 0.267 1,150 55 
Mean 551 62 2,951 0.9910 0.013 58 3 
Median 375 26 2,248 0.9526 0.022 30 1 
Standard 
Deviation 
515 104 2,706 0.4314 0.345 61 10 
Difference = 1999 levels -1995 levels 
Total Procedures = Sum of all procedures performed 1995 through 1999 
Procedure rate 1995 = Number of procedures/1000 population within the MSA 
Specialty surgeons = the discrete number of surgeons who performed study procedures  
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Lower extremity revascularization procedures  
Lower extremity revascularization procedures increased 8.4% over the study 
period. Of note is the loss of surgeons performing these procedures in four MSAs with 
the contiguous urbanized south Florida MSAs of Ft. Lauderdale and Miami-Dade 
experiencing substantial outmigration.  In spite of similar losses of operators other MSAs 
behaved differently with respect to changes in procedure volume and rate. In spite of the 
losses in these locations there was a net increase of 55 surgeons performing the 
procedures across the state.     
Table 6. Lower Extremity Arterial Bypass Procedure Activity Levels 
                                                                                            Procedure 
                                            Procedures                          Total             Rate                             Specialty 
MSA                                      1995          Difference      Procedures     1995      Difference     Surgeons   Difference 
 
Daytona Beach 246 33 1,302 0.5425 0.0307 33 3 
Ft. Lauderdale 708 75 3,568 0.4893 0.0019 129 -48 
Ft. Myers 354 -16 1,704 0.9035 -0.1210 47 0 
Ft. Pierce 166 34 968 0.5714 0.0611 27 2 
Ft. Walton 55 -14 219 0.3376 -0.0951 12 2 
Gainesville 248 -18 1,204 1.2175 -0.1519 21 2 
Jacksonville 377 102 2,150 0.3769 0.0632 44 17 
Lakeland 253 -17 1,319 0.5658 -0.0721 21 8 
Melbourne 354 -17 1,735 0.7844 -0.0706 29 2 
Miami-Dade 753 -35 3,878 0.3609 -0.0376 157 -41 
Naples 72 94 595 0.3607 0.3166 19 2 
Ocala 252 17 1,317 1.0928 -0.0377 30 5 
Orlando 727 105 3,966 0.5090 0.0084 115 3 
Panama City 70 29 446 0.4926 0.1756 19 6 
Pensacola 232 29 1,311 0.6102 0.0264 31 -1 
Punta Gorda 98 60 630 0.7496 0.3770 26 14 
Sarasota 552 22 2,848 1.0189 -0.0325 75 14 
Tallahassee 85 28 575 0.3189 0.0833 13 1 
Tampa 1,516 75 8,097 0.6810 -0.0095 250 -7 
West Palm Beach 463 49 2,620 0.4567 0.0017 80 1 
        
Summary Measures        
Total 7,581 635 40,452 12.440 0.520 1,178 -15 
Mean 379 32 2,023 0.622 0.026 59 -1 
Median 253 29 1,318 0.554 0.002 31 2 
Standard Deviation 347 43 1,826 0.263 0.133 61 16 
Difference = 1999 levels -1995 levels 
Total Procedures = Sum of all procedures performed 1995 through 1999 
Procedure rate 1995 = Number of procedures/1000 population within the MSA 
p = |t| one tailed t test Ho: µ1999 = µ1999 with significance at p ≥ 0.05 
Specialty surgeons = the discrete number of surgeons who performed study procedures 
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Coronary artery bypass graft  
The CABG is the most prevalent of the procedures with demonstrated volume 
and outcome endogeneity with more than 130,000 performed in Florida during the study 
period. The Naples and Ft. Pierce MSAs implemented a cardiac surgical program and 
recruited the surgeons required to perform them during the study period; in addition, the 
Orlando Regional Health System grew their program substantially through hospital 
acquisitions and growth of the university affiliated system adding the most cardiothoracic 
surgeons to their staff. The Ft. Walton MSA is located in the northwestern part of the 
state and those patients requiring cardiac procedures have ready access to tertiary 
centers in Alabama and the university hospital in Gainesville which are approximately 
equidistant. No elective cardiac surgical procedures were performed in that MSA during 
the study period. The Gainesville MSA experiences higher than average population rates 
for several of the study procedures. Shands University Hospital receives referrals from 
throughout the state for complex procedures and the Gainesville MSA has a smaller 
population base than the MSA commuting areas of the coastal areas.  
 The volume of procedures decreased in four MSAs; however, on an annualized 
basis the reductions were fewer than eight procedures annually over the study period 
but with a change in distribution.  Nine MSAs experienced a modest reduction in 
population and those that added programs experienced the greatest increase.  Again, 
there is not a clear correlation in the descriptive data between change in procedure 
volume or rate and the number of surgeons available. The state added 145 cardiac 
surgeons in the aggregate. 
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Table 7.  Elective Coronary Artery Bypass Graft Procedure Activity Levels 
 
                                                                                        Procedure 
                                          Procedures                          Total            Rate 
MSA                                     1995         Difference      Procedures   1995        Difference    Surgeons   Difference 
 
Daytona Beach 738 152 3,739 1.6276 0.2011 16 10 
Ft. Lauderdale 2,813 155 14,431 1.9439 -0.0820 93 -33 
Ft. Myers 1,466 -549 5,613 3.7415 -1.6187 29 5 
Ft. Pierce 0 139 139 0.0000 0.4396 2 2 
Ft. Walton 0 0 0 0.0000 0.0000 0 0 
Gainesville 775 -189 3,634 3.8046 -1.0897 18 -6 
Jacksonville 1,251 101 6,907 1.2508 -0.0086 34 0 
Lakeland 588 87 3,174 1.3149 0.0971 17 10 
Melbourne 669 305 4,083 1.4824 0.5806 21 -8 
Miami-Dade 2,377 -117 12,155 1.1394 -0.1218 100 16 
Naples 0 506 1,474 0.0000 2.0645 11 11 
Ocala 866 192 5,368 3.7552 0.3944 26 8 
Orlando 3,033 1,297 18,191 2.1233 0.5508 157 50 
Panama City 293 95 1,789 2.0691 0.5571 11 6 
Pensacola 1,124 -10 5,544 2.9563 -0.2394 24 7 
Punta Gorda 330 7 1,718 2.5243 -0.1212 20 15 
Sarasota 1,692 226 9,069 3.1232 0.1730 71 40 
Tallahassee 722 -54 3,560 2.7083 -0.3310 11 -5 
Tampa 4,433 16 23,031 1.9914 -0.1135 153 2 
West Palm Beach 1,659 624 10,303 1.6365 0.4076 36 15 
        
Summary Measures        
Total 24,829 2,983 133,922 39.1927 1.7399 850 145 
Mean 12,41.5 149 6,696 1.9596 0.087 43 7 
Median 821 98 4,726 1.9680 0.049 23 7 
Standard Deviation 1,160 363 6,167 1.1837 0.71378 47 17 
        
Difference = 1999 levels -1995 levels 
Total Procedures = Sum of all procedures performed 1995 through 1999 
Procedure rate 1995 = Number of procedures/1000 population within the MSA 
Specialty surgeons = the discrete number of surgeons who performed study procedures 
 
 
 Pancreatic resection 
 Pancreatic resection is predominantly performed by general surgeons for 
treatment of cancer.  The prevalence of pancreatic cancer as primary or metastatic 
diagnosis has a substantially lower prevalence than previously presented procedures 
with volume and outcome endogeneity. The total number of procedures performed 
during the five year period was 3,254 with a median of 23 procedures at the MSA level. 
Miami-Dade and Tampa perform more of these procedures than other MSAs and most 
are performed at the publicly supported university teaching hospitals in those 
communities. 
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Table 8.  Pancreatic Cancer Procedure Activity Levels 
 
                                                                                           Procedure 
                                            Procedures                            Total           Rate                            Specialty 
MSA                                        1995        Difference      Procedures    1995         Difference   Surgeons   Difference 
 
Daytona Beach 11 2 66 0.0243 0.0025 12 5 
Ft. Lauderdale 59 5 293 0.0408 -0.0006 23 -8 
Ft. Myers 23 0 102 0.0587 -0.0055 17 2 
Ft. Pierce 13 -4 53 0.0448 -0.0163 5 -4 
Ft. Walton 0 5 11 0.0000 0.0296 2 2 
Gainesville 39 -5 198 0.1915 -0.0339 11 -3 
Jacksonville 32 -3 137 0.0320 -0.0054 12 -7 
Lakeland 8 3 55 0.0179 0.0052 8 2 
Melbourne 22 -5 82 0.0488 -0.0127 9 -6 
Miami-Dade 152 23 771 0.0729 0.0059 58 -15 
Naples 8 14 68 0.0401 0.0497 8 2 
Ocala 6 4 42 0.0260 0.0132 8 4 
Orlando 43 13 250 0.0301 0.0047 30 -5 
Panama City 9 12 66 0.0633 0.0784 13 7 
Pensacola 23 0 87 0.0605 -0.0040 13 0 
Punta Gorda 4 5 27 0.0306 0.0336 7 4 
Sarasota 25 -2 131 0.0462 -0.0066 17 -1 
Tallahassee 10 -4 44 0.0375 -0.0162 5 -2 
Tampa 128 -22 601 0.0575 -0.1276 53 -15 
West Palm Beach 25 0 161 0.0247 -0.0023 19 0 
        
Summary Measures        
Total 640 41 3245 0.9482 -0.0083 330 -38 
Mean 32 2 162 0.0474 -0.0004 17 -2 
Median 23 1 85 0.0405 -0.0015 12 -1 
Standard Deviation 40 9 196 0.0382 0.0392 15 6 
        
Difference = 1999 levels -1995 levels 
Total Procedures = Sum of all procedures performed 1995 through 1999 
Procedure rate 1995 = Number of procedures/1000 population within the MSA 
Specialty surgeons = the discrete number of surgeons who performed study procedures 
 
Even those hospitals and MSAs with the majority of the cases performed fewer 
than 800 over the study period. As few as four procedures were performed annually at 
the MSA level with substantial variability year to year. 
Esophageal resection  
Like pancreatic resection, this procedure is most frequently performed to manage 
cancer of the esophagus. Thoracic surgeons and general surgeons frequently perform 
this procedure together when the surgical approach requires access through the chest 
wall. The summary of procedure activity is presented in Table 9. The procedure volume 
in total increased in each MSA at a level of statistical significance (p = |t|, 0.04 listed in 
Table 3), but the population rates declined in 14 MSAs by a median statewide reduction 
of -0.004. As was observed with other procedures, the greatest loss of specialty 
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surgeons took place in the Miami-Dade MSA, accounting for nearly half of the specialty 
surgeon losses over the study period.       
 
Table 9.  Esophageal Cancer Procedure Activity Levels 
 
                                                                                         Procedure 
                                            Procedures                           Total           Rate 
MSA                                       1995         Difference      Procedures   1995          Difference    Surgeons Difference 
 
Daytona Beach 2 9 25 0.0044 0.1820 9 7 
Ft. Lauderdale 22 -2 119 0.0152 -0.0027 17 -1 
Ft. Myers 12 3 69 0.0306 0.0041 7 -3 
Ft. Pierce 6 -2 23 0.0207 -0.0080 3 -1 
Ft. Walton 3 -1 10 0.0184 -0.0066 2 1 
Gainesville 29 9 171 0.1424 0.0337 14 5 
Jacksonville 17 2 94 0.0170 0.0005 10 -1 
Lakeland 5 0 19 0.0112 -0.0007 4 -1 
Melbourne 6 -3 23 0.0133 -0.0069 3 -3 
Miami-Dade 72 -24 270 0.0345 -0.0129 19 -24 
Naples 3 2 15 0.0150 0.0054 5 3 
Ocala 5 -1 16 0.0217 -0.0060 3 -1 
Orlando 23 -12 87 0.0161 -0.0093 8 -10 
Panama City 3 0 17 0.0211 -0.0009 3 0 
Pensacola 21 -11 92 0.0552 -0.0308 6 -4 
Punta Gorda 3 1 11 0.0230 0.0056 3 1 
Sarasota 9 -6 33 0.0166 -0.0115 1 -5 
Tallahassee 10 -6 36 0.0375 -0.0233 1 -3 
Tampa 61 -3 294 0.0274 -0.0029 36 -9 
West Palm Beach 15 -10 47 0.0148 -0.0103 5 -6 
        
Summary Measures        
Total 327 -55 1,471 0.556 0.098 159 -55 
Mean 16 -3 74 0.028 0.005 8 -3 
Median 10 -2 35 0.020 -0.004 5 -1 
Standard Deviation 19 8 83 0.029 0.044 8 6 
        
 
Difference = 1999 levels -1995 levels 
Total Procedures = Sum of all procedures performed 1995 through 1999 
Procedure rate 1995 = Number of procedures/1000 population within the MSA 
Specialty surgeons = the discrete number of surgeons who performed study procedures 
 
Cerebral aneurysm repair  
This neurosurgical vascular procedure is the least frequently performed among 
the study procedures. The numbers in Table 10 reflect the non-emergent procedures, as 
is the case for the other procedures selected for study. More of these procedures are 
performed on an emergency basis with a high mortality rate. It is clear that the majority 
of the 58 procedures were performed at Shands in the Gainesville MSA on a selective 
referral basis to the neurosurgical residency program at the University of Florida. 
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Table 10. Elective Cerebral Aneurysm Procedure Activity Levels 
 
                                                                                          Procedure 
                                            Procedures                              Total        Rate                               Specialty 
MSA                                        1995         Difference        Procedures 1995          Difference    Surgeons  Difference 
 
Daytona Beach 0 0 0 0.0000 0.0000 0 0 
Ft. Lauderdale 0 1 3 0.0000 0.0006 1 1 
Ft. Myers 0 0 0 0.0000 0.0000 0 0 
Ft. Pierce 0 0 0 0.0000 0.0000 0 0 
Ft. Walton 1 -1 1 0.0061 -0.0061 0 0 
Gainesville 5 6 31 0.0245 0.0264 2 -1 
Jacksonville 0 0 0 0.0000 0.0000 0 0 
Lakeland 0 1 2 0.0000 0.0000 0 -1 
Melbourne 0 0 0 0.0000 0.0000 0 0 
Miami-Dade 2 -1 7 0.0010 -0.0005 1 -1 
Naples 0 0 1 0.0000 0.0000 0 0 
Ocala 0 1 1 0.0000 0.0039 1 1 
Orlando 2 -2 5 0.0014 -0.0014 1 -1 
Panama City 0 0 1 0.0000 0.0000 0 0 
Pensacola 0 0 0 0.0000 0.0000 0 0 
Punta Gorda 0 0 0 0.0000 0.0000 0 0 
Sarasota 1 -1 2 0.0018 -0.0018 1 -1 
Tallahassee 0 0 0 0.0000 0.0000 0 0 
Tampa 1 0 4 0.0004 -0.0001 1 -1 
West Palm Beach 0 0 0 0.0000 0.0000 0 0 
        
Summary Measures        
Total  4 58 0.0352 0.0210 8.0 -4.00 
Mean 0.6 0.2 12 0.0018 0.0011 0.4 -0.2 
Median 0 0 1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0 0.00 
Standard Deviation 1.2 1.54 7 0.0055 0.0062 0.6 0.60 
 
   
 
 
 
 
Difference = 1999 levels -1995 levels 
Total Procedures = Sum of all procedures performed 1995 through 1999 
Procedure rate 1995 = Number of procedures/1,000 population within the MSA 
Specialty surgeons = the discrete number of surgeons who performed study procedures 
 
In summary, the descriptive data related to the volume and rates of these high 
risk/high cost procedures provide context for subsequent model development and 
analysis. These data were assembled in a manner that permits identification of trends 
and associations at the state and MSA levels of analysis. To restate: the purpose of this 
research is to ascertain whether any observed changes in volume and rate for these 
procedures can be attributed to the influence of managed care; the observational data 
alone generate questions of importance for public policy and will be identified in the 
discussion. The volume and rate are the primary dependent outcome variables of 
interest. The section that follows addresses the observational data for the primary 
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managed care independent predictor variables that are hypothesized to influence the 
volume and rate for procedures with volume and outcome endogeneity.    
Surgical Procedure Rate  
Change in procedure volume over the study period is central to the research 
questions posed; however, a change is arguably meaningful only if any observed 
change in procedure volume was not merely a function of a concurrent change in 
demand created by a population change. In order to determine if this was the case, the 
rate for study procedures was calculated as an additional outcome measure for each 
MSA. The rate takes into account the changes in population establishing the procedure 
volume as a function of population. The aggregate rates for all of the study procedures 
are listed for each MSA and the differences between 1995 and 1999 are summarized in 
Table 11 for the total population. Both mean and median population based procedure 
rates increased over the study period despite modest reductions in seven of the MSAs. 
The paired two sample t test was used to evaluate differences between the 1995 and 
1999 mean rates. The test resulted in a t value of -0.703 (critical t for the two tailed test = 
2.09) and p value of 0.49. The result demonstrates that the mean procedure rates in 
1995 are not different in 1999 from those in 1995 at a level that is statistically significant.  
Ft. Myers and Gainesville MSAs demonstrate the greatest reduction in rate for the study 
procedures, in addition to an overall reduction in procedure volume. The MSAs that 
experienced a reduction in rate cover the State in terms of location.   
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Table 11. Annual Study Procedure Rates per 1,000 Population 
 
              
MSA 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Difference 
              
Daytona Beach 3.09 2.85 2.96 3.22 3.39 0.302 
Ft. Lauderdale 3.30 3.27 3.03 3.20 3.16 -0.141 
Ft. Myers 6.86 6.19 5.16 4.59 4.70 -2.161 
Ft. Pierce 1.99 2.19 2.32 2.27 2.81 0.808 
Ft. Walton 1.06 1.01 1.05 1.14 1.02 -0.045 
Gainesville 7.36 7.49 6.76 6.82 5.91 -1.452 
Jacksonville 2.28 2.46 2.60 2.56 2.42 0.140 
Lakeland 3.02 3.16 3.29 3.12 3.15 0.132 
Melbourne 3.53 3.90 3.55 3.78 4.00 0.475 
Miami-Dade 1.97 2.02 1.99 1.98 1.81 -0.159 
Naples 2.17 2.35 4.17 4.35 4.37 2.200 
Ocala 6.63 7.74 8.63 9.20 8.12 1.489 
Orlando 3.66 4.07 4.09 3.97 4.27 0.612 
Panama City 4.09 4.30 4.80 4.54 4.80 0.718 
Pensacola 4.59 4.75 4.27 4.29 4.31 -0.278 
Punta Gorda 5.72 6.31 6.02 6.18 6.08 0.354 
Sarasota 6.05 6.11 6.32 6.28 6.21 0.155 
Tallahassee 4.03 3.85 3.94 3.90 3.54 -0.488 
Tampa 4.11 4.25 4.33 4.09 3.99 -0.127 
West Palm Beach 3.16 3.51 3.18 3.74 3.51 0.350 
 
Summary Measures       
Mean 3.93 4.09 4.12 4.16 4.08 0.14 
Median 3.60 3.88 4.02 3.94 4.00 0.15 
Std Dev 1.78 1.85 1.80 1.85 1.64 0.92 
 
Procedure rate calculation:  All Study Procedures/ (Total Population/1000) *100 
Difference = Procedure rate in 1999 - Procedure rate in 1995  
Source for the population estimates is the U.S. Census Bureau, Bureau of Economic 
Development       
 
Since the study procedures are most commonly performed in older adults and 
the total population includes children and young adults, the data were extracted and the 
procedure rate for the population older than age 65 was derived. Changes in procedure 
rates in this population vary within each MSA when compared to the total population 
data, as expected and reflected in Table 12.   
 
133 
 
 
Table 12.  Annual Procedure Rates per 1,000 Population over Age 65 
    
MSA                                 1995             1996              1997            1998              1999        Difference 
Daytona Beach 13.33 12.22 12.75 13.97 14.88 1.556 
Ft. Lauderdale 17.90 18.15 17.50 19.14 19.52 1.626 
Ft. Myers 27.83 25.14 21.15 19.11 19.81 -8.024 
Ft. Pierce 8.24 8.96 9.52 9.36 11.56 3.318 
Ft. Walton 9.92 9.20 9.19 9.71 8.49 -1.430 
Gainesville 79.02 80.48 72.33 72.82 63.27 -15.740 
Jacksonville 21.61 22.20 23.57 23.30 22.17  0.560 
Lakeland 15.84 16.56 17.42 16.77 17.13 1.280 
Melbourne 19.16 20.49 18.30 19.24 20.15 0.988 
Miami-Dade 14.02 14.32 14.15 14.02 12.92 -1.109 
Naples 9.49 10.32 18.62 19.82 20.23 10.737 
Ocala 47.89 32.03 35.61 37.97 33.32 -14.566 
Orlando 27.88 30.85 31.30 30.66 33.14   5.260 
Panama City 31.66 33.36 36.78 34.27 35.97   4.310 
Pensacola 37.20 38.26 34.45 34.58 34.15 -3.051 
Punta Gorda 17.00 18.64 17.90 18.52 18.40 1.399 
Sarasota 20.75 21.06 22.17 22.40 22.46 1.709 
Tallahassee 46.06 44.48 45.46 45.00 40.99 -5.070 
Tampa 20.12 21.03 21.84 21.12 20.99 0.879 
West Palm Beach 13.26 14.76 16.27 16.23 15.45 2.193 
 
Summary Measures 
Mean 
             
24.91 24.62 24.81 24.90 24.25 -0.659 
Median 19.64 20.76 19.89 19.53 20.19 1.134 
Std Dev 17.05 16.39 14.79 14.73 12.73 6.261 
 
Rate calculations = Total study procedures/1,000 population age 65 or older 
Difference = Procedure rate in 1999 - Procedure rate in 1995 
Source for the population estimates is the U.S. Census Bureau, Bureau of Economic 
Development and Population Estimates (2002)  
 
Although the procedure rate changed in several MSAs, the difference statewide 
was not statistically significant with a change of 0.66 per 1,000 of the population over the 
age of 65, and the mean rate remaining at 24 to 25 per 1,000 throughout the study 
period. As was seen in the total population data, reductions in one MSA tended to be 
offset by increases in others; however, the increases were not consistently observed in 
the MSAs neighboring those where reduced rates were observed. The greatest 
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reduction in both volume and rate of study surgical procedures were observed in those 
MSAs with low managed care penetration, as is presented in the following sections.  
Although the procedure rates remained stable for the state of Florida in 
aggregate, small area variation in procedure rates is substantial with a range of   
8.24/1,000 population over 65 in the Ft. Pierce MSA to a rate of 79.02/1,000  in the 
Gainesville MSA where the University of Florida affiliated hospital benefits from 
statewide referral (1995). In 1999 that range was 8.49/1,000 to 63.27/1,000. The rate 
calculation permits the comparison between MSAs with extreme variability in the number 
of older adults which is diluted in both the total population and population over 65. The 
reductions observed in procedure rates occurred in MSAs that are geographically 
disparate and cover the state; however, the largest reductions tend to be in the northern 
regions of the state. The comparison of means between 1995 and 1999 did not reach 
statistical significance to reject the null hypothesis that µ1995 = µ1999. Thus the notion 
that procedure rates dropped over the study period cannot be supported irrespective of 
the managed care activity across the state. 
Managed Care Enrollment 
The descriptive analysis of managed care requires the assembly and summary of 
the plans in existence for each of the study years and their enrollment numbers within 
each MSA. Changes observed over time serve to test the assumption that the period 
1995 to 1999 captures the stages of managed care market development as summarized 
in the conceptual model. In addition, the data are necessary to compute the managed 
care penetration, index of competition and concentration over time. 
 Managed care activity statewide during the period 1995 to1999 in Florida was 
extremely volatile.  Figure 6 summarizes the enrollment in managed care plans over the 
study period. Enrollment accelerated through 1997, reached a plateau in 1998 and after 
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two years of diminishing enrollment leveled off at approximately 92% of employed 
workers. At the conclusion of the study period 4,862,000 Floridians were enrolled, which 
was approximately one third of the total population and slightly more than the national 
average of 30% at that time (Florida Hospital Association, 2000). Figure 6 demonstrates 
that managed care enrollment did not increase in a linear fashion as had been predicted 
in prior research, but in Florida assumed a pattern of maximum growth, plateau and 
stabilization of enrollment.  
 
 
 
Figure 6. Managed Care Enrollment in Florida First Quarter 1995 through the Final 
Quarter 2000.Calculated using data extracted from the Florida Department of Insurance Database and FHA 
Managed Care MonoTrend Reports Eye on the Market, July, 2000 
  
 
3.456
4.179
4.434
4.936 4.860 4.838
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
0.0 
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
Millions 
136 
 
 
Figure 7. Percent Change in HMO Enrollment in Florida 1995 to 2000  
Computed using data from the Florida Hospital Association HMO Managed Care MonoTrend Reports1995-2000 
 
Managed Care Plans 
Enrollment and plan ownership changes are further reflected in the financial 
performance of managed care plans that drove the mergers, closures and consolidations 
observed during the study period. The Florida Department of Insurance records indicate 
that in the four years between 1996 and 1999, 11 plans closed after being declared 
insolvent by the State and six were acquired by stronger plans (Florida Department of 
Insurance Database 1995-2000). The progressive losses peaked in 1997 and by 1999 
operating losses exceeded $183 millions. Figure 8 reflects the number of managed care 
plans in each MSA at the beginning and end of the study period. Where the total number 
of plans may be similar, the numbers do not reflect the many changes in the type or 
ownership of the plans which may have changed several times during the study period 
and are specified in detail for commercial, Medicare and Medicaid managed care plans 
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in the tables that follow. Figure 8 (Number of Managed Care Plans in 1995 and 1999) 
summarizes the number of plans active in each MSA at the beginning of the study period 
in 1995 to the close in 1999.  
The number of managed care plans varies tremendously by MSA ranging from 
two to 21. The distribution demonstrates the substantial geographic variation in 
managed care penetration that permits the comparisons necessary to understand 
whether variation in procedure volume should be associated with managed care activity.   
Four MSAs experienced an increase in the total number of managed care plans during 
the study period, even as consolidation occurred across the state. An additional snap 
shot of the managed care market behavior over the study period is captured by the 
summary of plan closures and mergers over the study period.  Figure 9 (Managed Care 
Plan Mergers and Closures 1990 to 2000) provides additional validation for the use of 
the 1995 through 1999 period to capture market changes in Florida. A surge in managed 
care plan penetration 1995 through 1997 is followed by a drop and stabilization in 
mergers and consolidation from 1997 through 2000.  Plan closures demonstrated a 
bimodal peak in 1995 and 1997 before leveling off. Twenty of the 40 MCOs operational 
in 1995 were still active in 1999 with the peak number at 43 in 1996.  In the fourth 
quarter of 1997, 38 MCOs were active in the state. The number of plans declined each 
year so that in the fourth quarter of 2001 only 27 plans were licensed. The data suggest 
that penetration and consolidation did not impact the market in the same fashion at the 
same time, supporting the premise that penetration alone does not satisfactorily explain 
managed care influences. 
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Figure 8. Number of Managed Care Plans in 1995 and 1999  
Calculated from the Florida Department of Insurance Dataset 1995 to 1999; plan counts are non unique as some plans 
were active in several MSAs 
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 Figure 9. Managed Care Plan Mergers and Closures 1990 to 2000
The data is calculated from the Florida Department of Insurance Managed Care Database
 
 
Commercial managed 
At the study baseline in 1995, 29 commercial plans were licensed as managed 
care providers and 31 plans were active in the market at the end of the study 
1999. During the period of peak managed care penetration, 44 plans had
ranging from a maximum of 663,600 
for Healthy Palm Beaches which closed during the study period. 
independent existence by merger and an additional seven plans exited the Florida 
markets or were closed altogether
market over the period. Eighteen of the plans surviving to
enrollment during that year as they absorbed
by closures or mergers with floundering managed care organizations
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one third of the 12 surviving plans demonstrated  higher enrollment in prior years, with a 
drop by the study end in1999.  Total commercial managed care plan market penetration 
was 26.9% in 1995, peaked in 1998 at 34.3% and closed the study period at 25.7% 
statewide penetration as graphed over the study period in figure 10. The evolution of 
commercial managed care plan enrollment, ownership and peak enrollment year 
between 1995 and 1999 is summarized in Table 13.  
    
 
Figure 10. Commercial Managed Care Plan Enrollment in Florida 1995 to 1999. 
Data extracted from the Florida Department of Insurance Database and the FHA Eye on the Market HMO Market Share 
Reports 1997 to 2001. 
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the commercial managed care activity is summarized in Table 13 that follows (Florida 
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enrollment curve, albeit at greater overall numbers.  Both Medicare and commercial 
plans differ in a similar manner from the pattern of Medicaid enrollment and penetration.  
The data provide confirmatory evidence that these managed care plans behave 
differently and will therefore be considered differently in building the subsequent 
multivariate models. 
Table13. Florida Commercial Managed Care Plan Changes 1995 to1999 
                                                        1995                   Peak             1999                                             
Managed Care Plan                                         Enrollment          Enrollment     Enrollment        Change        Peak Year      
                                                                                                                                                                                                  
Aetna Health Plan of Florida 29,378 299,230 299,230 918.6% 1999
AHL Select HMO 0 7,826 7,826 3892.9% 1999
American Medical Healthcare 0 28,294 28,294 1,754.1% 1999
Amerihealth HMO of Florida 29,074 29,074 24,986 -14.1% 1995
AvMed 215,426 294,509 281,538 30.7% 1998
St. Augustine Health 0 2,199 0 Merged 1997
Beacon Health Plans 0 27,879 23,913 2,907.9% 1998
CAC- United Health Care 145,370 145,370 0 Merged 1995
Capital Health Plan 57,714 100,624 100,624 74.3% 1999
CareFlorida Health Plan 6,082 6,082 0 Merged 1995
CareFlorida 49,262 49,262 0 Merged 1995
Champion Healthcare 0 5,801 0 Closed 1997
Cigna Health Care of Florida 345,318 364,205 96,936 -71.9% 1996
Community Health Care Systems 0 17,068 17,068 181.6% 1999
Florida 1st Health Plan 3,399 13,251 10,617 212.4% 1997
Florida Health Care Plan 30,292 37,971 37,971 25.3% 1999
Florida Health Choice 0 37,620 37,620 824.6% 1999
Foundation Health 4,050 91,718 91,718 54.4% 1999
Health First 0 22,459 22,459 180.5% 1999
Health Options 456,205 663,600 663,600 45.5% 1999
Health Options Connect 147,832 169,059 59,417 -59.8% 1997
Health Plans of America 0 17,338 0 Closed 1997
Healthplan Southeast 53,548 69,194 67,091 25.3% 1998
Healthy Palm Beaches 0 89 89 Not applicable 1999
Healthcare USA 273 310 0 Closed 1998
HIP Health Plan of Florida 53,741 185,329 185,329 244.9% 1999
Humana Medical Plan 354,345 354,345 1998 -57.0% 1998
Neighborhood Health Partnership 35,432 106,843 106,275 199.9% 1998
One Health Plan of Florida 0 4,668 4,668 939.6% 1999
Oxford Health Plan 3,605 15,285 0 Closed 1997
PCA Family Health Plan 90,334 92,817 0 Merged 1996
PCA Health Plans of Florida 62,769 64,332 0 Merged 1996
Mayo Health Plan 0 21,210 21,210 552.6% 1999
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Table 13. Continued 
 
 
 
 
Metlife 48,091 48,091 0 Merged 1995
Physician Health Care Plans 3,397 59,509 30,302 792.0% 1996
Preferred Medical Plan 13,603 27,498 27,498 792% 1996
Prudential Health Care 309,421 520,100 490,960 58.7% 1998
The Public Health Trust 9,741 22,274 22,274 128.7% 1999
SunStar Health Plan 0 86,015 86,015 Closed 1999
Total Health Choice 53,452 53,452 17,794 -66.7% 1995
Ultramedix Health Care System 114 1,771 1,771 Closed 1996
United Healthcare 0 613,233 585,465 202.6% 1998
Vantage Health 0 2,540 0 Closed 1997
Well Care HMO 3,411 44,339 44,339 1199.9% 1999
 
Percentage on merged plans calculated on combined data. If plan functioned as a separate entity for at least180 days of 
the reporting year, enrollment is listed for the plan.  If the plan did not function as an independent entity for at least 180 
days of the reporting year, the enrollment was assigned to the recipient entity   
Plan status was determined in the fourth quarter of each reporting year  
Calculations performed on data provided through the Florida Department of Insurance and the Florida Hospital 
Association HMO Market Share Reports 4Q95-4Q99 
 
Government managed care plans  
In a similar fashion to the commercial plans, the number and evolution of 
Medicare managed care plans over the study period is summarized in Table14. Of the 
24 Medicare managed care plans active during the study period, 11 had no enrollment in 
1995, demonstrating the strong period of growth in subsequent years. Three plans 
merged, three both entered and exited the market and one plan closed during the study 
period. Of the survivors, 13 plans reached peak enrollment in 1999 and unlike the 
commercial plans, only one survivor ended the period with off peak enrollment.  
  
                                                                             1995                   Peak              1999                                             
Managed Care Plan                                         Enrollment          Enrollment       Enrollment        Change        Peak 
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Table 14.Florida Medicare Managed Care Plan Changes 1995 to 1999 
                                                                                                                                                              
                                                            1995             Peak              1999                              Peak 
Managed Care Plan                         Enrollment    Enrollment    Enrollment     Change  Enrollment  
                                                                                                                                               Year                    
 
Aetna Health Plan 0 13,347 13,347 149.1% 1999
AvMed 63,168 78,420 63,038 -0.2% 1998
Beacon Health Plans 0 2,508 2,508 0.0% 1999
Capital Health Plan 2,289 4,152 4,152 81.4% 1999
Care Florida 26,120 26,120 0 Merged 1995
Cigna Health Care 79 13,373 13,373 16827.8% 1999
Community Health Care Systems 0 2,932 2,641 34.7% 1998
Florida First Health Plan 12,555 16,061 16,061 27.9% 1999
Florida Health Choice 0 8,350 8,350 Exited 1998
Foundation Health 0 29,053 29,053 11.2% 1999
Health First 0 17,745 17,745 145.1% 1999
Health Options 44,719 148,677 148,677 232.5% 1999
Health Options Connect 0 3,560 0 Exited 1998
HIP Health Plan of Florida 10,307 28,320 28,320 174.8% 1999
Humana Medical Plan 209,794 264,127 250,405 19.4% 1998
PCA Health Plans of Florida 39,220 39,220 0 Merged 1995
Neighborhood Health Partnership 1,312 17,210 17,210 1211.7% 1998
Physician Health Care Plans 0 4,747 4,747 425.1% 1999
Preferred Medical Plan 0 114 114 Not applicable 1999
Prudential Health Care 14,472 76,723 76,723 430.1% 1999
Sun Star Health Plan 0 2,318 1826 Closed 1997
United Healthcare 0 106,450 106,450 128.5% 1999
CAC United Health Care 46,596 46,596 0 Merged 1995
Well Care HMO 13 13 0 Exited 1995
 
If plan functioned as a separate entity for at least180 days of the reporting year, enrollment is listed for the plan.  If the 
plan did not function as an independent entity for at least 180 days of the reporting year, the enrollment was assigned to 
the recipient entity   
Plan status determined in the fourth quarter of each reporting year  
Calculations performed on data provided through the Florida Department of Insurance and the Florida Hospital 
Association HMO Market Share Reports 4Q95-4Q99 
Not applicable assigned in the change column when the plan began enrollment in 1999 
 
 
Medicaid managed care plans listed in Table 15 numbered 26 during the study 
period, with eight plans licensed after 1995. Eight plans closed or exited the Florida 
market during the study period and five were merged into larger plans with enrollment at 
the study close ranging from a high of 138,554 in the Humana Medical Plan to a low 
among surviving plans of 2,380 in the Healthy Palm Beach Plan.  
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Table 15. Florida Medicaid Managed Care Plan Changes 1995 through 1999 
                                                                  1995               Peak               1999                                      Peak         
Managed Care Plan                              Enrollment       Enrollment     Enrollment          Change     Enrollment 
                                                                                                                                                               Year     
                                                                                                                                                         
AvMed 2,475 15,385 15,385 444.8% 1999 
St. Augustine Health 349 13,197 0 Merged 1998 
Beacon Health Plans 0 6,225 6,225 57.7% 1999 
Care Florida Health Plan 21,314 21,314 0 Merged 1995 
Champion Healthcare 0 6,827 0 Closed 1997 
Community Choice 4,846 4,846 0 Closed 1995 
Discovery Health Plan 5,077  0 Merged 1996 
Florida First Health Plan 0 4,405 4,405 969.2 1999 
Florida Health Choice 0 5,835 5,835 80% 1999 
Foundation Health 0 20,959 18,325 -14.0% 1998 
Frontier Health Services 4,006 4,006 0 Closed 1995 
Healthplan Southeast 5,091 13,551 5,259 -48.3% 1998 
Healthy Palm Beaches 0 2,380 2,380 5.8% 1999 
Healthcare USA 25,889 27,732 0 Closed 1996 
Humana Medical Plan 0 138,554 138,554 -19.5% 1999 
Medchoice 3,241 3,241 0 Merged 1996 
Neighborhood Health Partnership 6,010 10,048 10,042 67.1% 1999 
Personal Health 3,200 3,704 0 Closed 1996 
Physician Health Care Plans 41,354 66,523 66,523 60.9% 1999 
Preferred Medical Plan 5,090 7,919 7,919 55.6% 1999 
The Public Health Trust 6,341 7,169 7,169 13.1% 1999 
Reliable 1,628 1,628 0 Closed 1995 
Sunshine Health Plan 801 874 0 Closed 1996 
Tampa General Health Plan 0 7,632 6,899 136.6% 1999 
HealthEase 2,916 3,680 0 Merged 1996 
Total Health Choice 8,307 8,307 0 Exited 1996 
 
 
Percentage on merged plans calculated on combined data. If plan functioned as a separate entity for at least180 days of 
the reporting year, enrollment is listed for the plan.  If the plan did not function as an independent entity for at least 180 
days of the reporting year, the enrollment was assigned to the recipient entity   
Plan status was determined in the fourth quarter of each reporting year  
Calculations performed on data provided through the Florida Department of Insurance and the Florida Hospital 
Association HMO Market Share Reports 4Q95-4Q99 
 
 
Market entry and exit in the Medicaid managed care market was the most active 
of the managed care plan types during the study period, but represented a much smaller 
enrollment when compared with the Medicare population. The different scope and 
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pattern of enrollment in Medicare and Medicaid managed care plans is apparent from 
Figure 11. The Medicare program grew consistently over the study period while the 
Medicaid enrollment stuttered, ending the period at approximately the same level of 
enrollment as observed five years previously. Although the overall membership 
remained largely unchanged in the Medicaid program, the distribution of enrollment for 
both government programs varied significantly among MSAs. The penetration of 
government subsidized managed care plans also varied. Although the Medicare 
Program enrollment increased over time by a mean of 10% across the state (see Figure 
11), population over the age of 65 also increased over the period, holding penetration 
growth rates to single digits. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11. Medicare and Medicaid Enrollment in Florida 1995 to 1999 
 
Penetration rates, differences between 1999 and 1995 levels and the percent change 
over the study period are summarized in Table 16. 
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Table 16. Medicare and Medicaid Managed Care Penetration Rates and Differences 
1995 to 1999 
 
 
Medicare 
Penetration 
 Medicaid 
Penetration 
 
MSA  1995 1999 Difference  
% 
Change          1995 1999 Difference 
% 
Change 
Daytona  0.353 0.356 0.003 0.85% 0.285 0.237 -0.048 -33.30% 
Ft. 
Lauderdale 0.424 0.491 0.067 15.80% 0.310 0.374 0.064 -24.60% 
Ft. Myer 0.000 0.300 0.300 30.00% 0.316 0.400 0.084 -23.20% 
Ft. Pierce 0.000 0.173 0.173 17.30% 0.146 0.190 0.044 -10.20% 
Ft. Walton  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00% 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00% 
Gainesville 0.162 0.131 -0.031 -19.14% 0.339 0.167 -0.172 -51.10% 
Jacksonville 0.213 0.228 0.015 7.04% 0.383 0.231 -0.152 -53.50% 
Lakeland  0.000 0.260 0.260 26.00% 0.378 0.522 0.144 -23.40% 
Melbourne 0.000 0.201 0.201 20.10% 0.250 0.208 -0.042 -29.20% 
Miami 0.393 0.456 0.063 16.03% 0.246 0.318 0.072 -17.40% 
Naples 0.000 0.250 0.250 25.00% 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00% 
Ocala 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00% 0.270 0.100 -0.170 -44.00% 
Orlando 0.202 0.302 0.100 49.50% 0.264 0.384 0.120 -14.40% 
Panama City 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00% 0.119 0.000 -0.119 -23.80% 
Pensacola 0.000 0.100 0.100 10.00% 0.180 0.262 0.082 -9.80% 
Punta Gorda 0.000 0.200 0.200 20.00% 0.133 0.053 -0.080 -21.30% 
Sarasota 0.016 0.122 0.106 662.50% 0.237 0.437 0.200 -3.70% 
Tallahassee 0.089 0.124 0.035 39.33% 0.372 0.314 -0.058 -43.00% 
Tampa 0.222 0.341 0.119 53.60% 0.331 0.418 0.087 -24.40% 
Palm Beach  0.312 0.373 0.061 19.55% 0.296 0.359 0.063 -23.30% 
    
 
   
 
Summary 
Measures 
     
 
 Mean 0.119 0.220 0.101 0.497 0.243 0.249 0.006 0.237 
Median 0.008 0.215 0.084 0.184 0.267 0.250 0.022 0.234 
STD Dev 0.152 0.143 0.099 1.453 0.114 0.158 0.108 0.155 
 
% Change = (1999 level-1995 level)/1995 level 
 
The managed care variables correlated at a statistically significant level (<0.05) 
are the three measures of penetration. It is logically consistent that the Medicare and 
Medicaid managed care penetration scores are highly correlated with the overall 
penetration score as they are embedded. It is important to note that penetration is not 
correlated with either of the other two measures of managed care activity and they are 
not correlated with each other, making their inclusion in a regression model more 
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meaningful and useful for prediction of the outcomes of interest here. 
Managed Care Market Stages 
The difference in managed care activity among Florida MSAs again 
demonstrates the variability across the state. The median total managed care 
penetration across Florida during the period was 21.2% with median Medicare managed 
care penetration of 11.8% and Medicaid managed care penetration median of 28.7%.  
The median IOC across the period was 0.777. This level is considered to be 
moderate, with IOC above 0.85 considered to be highly competitive markets. This places 
six Florida MSAs in highly competitive markets with the Naples and Panama City MSAs 
as outliers for both the number of plans and the index of competition with levels of 
competition in the lowest quartile. The levels of managed care penetration place nine 
MSAs in Stage I of the proposed model of managed care activity (Table 17) in 1995 
defined as demonstrating less than 10% managed care market penetration. In 1999 only 
four MSAs were in Stage I. Six MSAs were in Stage II at 10% to 30% penetration in 
1995 and that number had increased to nine in 1999. Stage III is defined as 30% to 50% 
market penetration and was observed in five MSAs in 1995 and seven in 1999. No 
Florida MSAs had reached Stage IV of the model at more than 50% managed care 
market penetration by the end of the study period.  
Although the data are informative and support the geographic variability 
assumption, the research questions here require the analysis of the changes over time 
and the identification of the most sensitive managed care predictor of the relationship 
between surgical volume over the time; consequently, the changes in managed care 
activity for each of the managed care variables is of value and will be addressed to 
understand the statewide aggregate managed care activity. Table 17 reflects the change 
in the core measures of managed care activity across Florida during the study period.  
148 
 
 
Table 17. Managed Care Activity Measures and Differences 1995 to 1999 
                                             
                                                 Penetration                             Index of Competition                   Concentration 
      MSA                          1995       1999           Diff       1995         1999        Diff           1995       1999          Diff    
Daytona  0.265 0.296 0.031 0.712 0.742 0.031 0.80 0.77 -0.032 
Ft. Lauderdale 0.361 0.440 0.079 0.873 0.895 0.023 0.46 0.41 -0.05 
Ft. Myers 0.093 0.263 0.170 0.864 0.772 -0.092 0.51 0.76 0.247 
Ft. Pierce 0.051 0.176 0.125 0.715 0.763 0.049 0.89 0.77 -0.114 
Ft. Walton  0.042 0.048 0.006 0.498 0.637 0.139 1.00 0.98 -0.019 
Gainesville 0.171 0.217 0.046 0.626 0.705 0.079 0.84 0.87 0.039 
Jacksonville 0.341 0.335 -0.006 0.851 0.818 -0.033 0.58 0.63 0.042 
Lakeland  0.131 0.248 0.117 0.849 0.892 0.043 0.60 0.44 -0.164 
Melbourne 0.071 0.245 0.174 0.711 0.801 0.09 0.78 0.54 -0.237 
Miami 0.411 0.446 0.035 0.905 0.888 -0.018 0.42 0.46 0.046 
Naples 0.002 0.029 0.027 0.034 0.547 0.513 1.00 1.00 -0.002 
Ocala 0.073 0.081 0.008 0.798 0.864 0.066 0.86 0.68 -0.188 
Orlando 0.270 0.361 0.091 0.836 0.843 0.008 0.64 0.61 -0.039 
Panama City 0.046 0.073 0.027 0.331 0.002 -0.329 1.00 1.00 0.000 
Pensacola 0.189 0.226 0.037 0.691 0.628 -0.063 0.84 0.84 0.002 
Punta Gorda 0.032 0.147 0.115 0.613 0.705 0.091 0.91 0.89 -0.016 
Sarasota 0.090 0.23 0.140 0.667 0.734 0.068 0.77 0.81 0.045 
Tallahassee 0.429 0.478 0.049 0.584 0.404 -0.179 0.97 1.00 0.030 
Tampa 0.288 0.374 0.086 0.86 0.893 0.033 0.59 0.47 -0.117 
West Palm  0.303 0.392 0.089 0.896 0.862 -0.034 0.75 0.72 -0.032 
Summary Measures 
        Mean 0.183 0.255 0.072 0.696 0.720 0.024 0.760 0.732 -0.028 
Median 0.151 0.247 0.064 0.714 0.768 0.032 0.787 0.761 -0.018 
STD Dev 0.139 0.136 0.054 0.216 0.212 0.156 0.185 0.198 0.104 
 
 
Difference = 1999 levels – 1995 levels 
 
Managed care penetration 
Managed care penetration in Florida at the study baseline varied from a low level 
of two percent in the Naples MSA to a high of 43% in the Tallahassee MSA, where the 
seat of state government is located (calculated using the Florida Department of 
Insurance Database, 2003 and the FHA HMO MonoTrend Reports for each study year). 
The statewide total managed care penetration increased each year through 1998, when 
it reached a plateau. The change in total market penetration during the study period 
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increased from nearly 25% in 1995 to 32% in 1999. The statewide penetration of 
commercial managed care plans when considered separately was slightly higher than 
the penetration for all plans at 28% and 34% respectively.  In 1995 nine MSAs 
demonstrated penetrations of less than 10%, or stage I of the proposed managed care 
market model. Six of the 20 MSAs were in stage II of managed care market 
development, with penetration of 10% to 30%; only five populous and relatively 
advantaged MSAs demonstrated penetration above 30%, with only Miami and 
Tallahassee MSAs experiencing penetration rates in excess of 40%.  
Changes in penetration observed between 1995 and the end of 1999 resulted in 
reductions observed in six MSAs ranging from a loss of 4.6% in the Orlando MSA to a 
loss of 28% in the Panama City MSA. The most significant increases in managed care 
penetration on a percentage basis were in those MSAs with minimal penetration in 1995. 
The Naples MSA, as an example, increased managed care penetration by more than 
200%, but the increase was negligible when considering the initial level of less than 1%. 
The range of managed care penetration in 1995 spans from a low of 0.2 % to a 
maximum of 49.9%; whereas, in 1999 the minimum observed penetration was 2.9% with 
a maximum of 47.8% and a mean of 36.3% across the period. Only one MSA 
experienced a reduction in managed care penetration over the study period which was 
minimal at 0.6% in the Jacksonville MSA. No Florida MSA moved beyond the 50% level 
in managed care penetration during the study period as observed in major managed 
care markets. Penetration in those Florida counties not meeting criteria for inclusion in 
one of the 20 designated primary MSA’s is listed as the ‘non-MSA’ area with 9.9% 
managed care penetration, predominately in the form of primary care services.  
Statewide penetration of all managed care plans can be assessed using mean level of 
penetration, which in 1995 was 18.3% compared with 25.5% in 1999, resulting in a 
150 
 
mean difference of 7.2% over the period. MSA level trends over the study are depicted 
in Figure 12.  
 
 
Figure 12. Managed Care Penetration in 1995 and 1999 
Calculated from data extracted from the Florida Department of Insurance Database and Florida Hospital 
Association HMO and Market Share Trend Reports for the period. 
 
Penetration by government managed care plans 
The levels of enrollment and penetration in government programs assume a 
modestly different penetration curve over the study period when abstracted from the total 
managed care activity. Consistent with the early adoption of the managed care model for 
Medicaid recipients, the penetration and enrollment rose initially and reached a plateau 
around the 30% level. Medicare enrollment assumed levels consistent with the overall 
managed care market, rising over the study period with enrollment becoming flat while 
market penetration increased slowly year over year as marketing and program revisions 
occurred to target the elderly (figure 19). In 1995, ten MSAs had no Medicare managed 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
1995
1999
151 
 
care penetration and that was reduced to just two: Panama City and Ft. Walton MSAs in 
1999.  
 
  
Figure 13. Comparisons of Penetration by Managed Care Plan Types 1995 to1999 
 
The penetration ranged from zero to 42.4% in 1995 and zero to 49.1% in 1999, 
with the greatest penetration occurring in metropolitan areas with the greatest population 
density as reflected in the population tables. Both have lower populations over the age of 
65 than other Florida MSAs, with fewer than 20,000 elderly compared with an MSA 
mean of 126, 460 as reflected in subsequent population tables. Mean Medicare 
penetration in 1995 was 11.9% in contrast with 1999 in which it was 15.6%.  
Only two MSAs did not experience penetration by Medicaid managed care plans 
in 1995 and they did not have measurable Medicaid managed care penetration by 1999. 
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is one of the poorest areas of the state with an inflation adjusted annual income of 
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$20,030 in 1999. Eight MSAs experienced a reduction in Medicaid penetration. It was 
during this period of time that welfare reform was undertaken across the United States 
such that the growth in Medicaid enrollment dropped substantially. The levels of 
government activism in the form of Medicaid and Medicare managed care penetration in 
1995, 1999 and the differences are summarized in Table 18 (Medicare and Medicaid 
Penetration and Difference Scores 1995 to 1999). 
Seven Medicaid managed care plans closed during the study period and five 
were merged, demonstrating the volatility and one of the reasons that the IOC and 
concentration were not feasible to be measured for purposes of this study. Competition 
among these programs was not a factor and most frequently only one plan was active 
within the majority of MSAs. The Medicaid penetration change from 1995 to 1999 was 
moderately correlated with total population (Spearman correlation coefficient 0.584, p 
<0.006) and both changes in Medicare penetration (Spearman correlation coefficient 
0.549, p <0.121) and slightly negatively correlated with changes in population over the 
age of 65 (Spearman correlation coefficients -0.023 and p <0.009, respectively). 
This very small negative relationship is likely influenced by dually enrolled elderly who 
are in both programs. No correlation was observed between changes in inflation 
adjusted income and Medicaid penetration within the MSA, with a slight positive 
Spearman coefficient of 0.131 which was not significant at the p = 0.05 level. 
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   Table 18. Medicare and Medicaid Penetration and Difference Scores 1995 to 1999 
     Medicare   Medicaid  
  Penetration Penetration 
MSA 1995 1999 Difference 1995 1999 Difference 
Daytona  0.353 0.356 0.003 0.285 0.237 -0.048 
Ft. Lauderdale 0.424 0.491 0.067 0.310 0.374  0.064 
Ft. Myers 0.000 0.300 0.300 0.316 0.400  0.084 
Ft. Pierce 0.000 0.173 0.173 0.146 0.190  0.044 
Ft. Walton  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 
Gainesville 0.162 0.131 -0.031 0.339 0.167 -0.172 
Jacksonville 0.213 0.228 0.015 0.383 0.231 -0.152 
Lakeland  0.000 0.260 0.260 0.378 0.522  0.144 
Melbourne 0.000 0.201 0.201 0.250 0.208 -0.042 
Miami 0.393 0.456 0.063 0.246 0.318 0.072 
Naples 0.000 0.250 0.250 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Ocala 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.270 0.100 -0.170 
Orlando 0.202 0.302 0.100 0.264 0.384  0.120 
Panama City 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.119 0.000 -0.119 
Pensacola 0.000 0.100 0.100 0.180 0.262  0.082 
Punta Gorda 0.000 0.200 0.200 0.133 0.053 -0.080 
Sarasota 0.016 0.122 0.106 0.237 0.437  0.200 
Tallahassee 0.089 0.124 0.035 0.372 0.314 -0.058 
Tampa 0.222 0.341 0.119 0.331 0.418  0.087 
Palm Beach 0.312 0.373 0.061 0.296 0.359  0.063 
Summary Measures 
Mean 0.119 0.220 0.101 0.243 0.249 0.006 
Median 0.008 0.215 0.084 0.267 0.250 0.022 
STD Dev 0.152 0.143 0.099 0.114 0.158 0.108 
    Difference = 1999 levels – 1995 levels 
 
Managed care index of competition (IOC) 
The IOC ranged from a low of 0.034 in the Naples MSA with the smallest number 
of managed care plans to a high of 0.895 in the Ft. Lauderdale MSA. Mean statewide 
IOC in 1995 was calculated to be 0.696 and 0.720 in 1999 which are both moderately 
high levels of competition. The mean change or difference score for IOC at the state 
level was 0.024 with seven MSAs experiencing a reduction in managed care competition 
over the period with the majority of MSAs experiencing an increase. Among MSAs that 
become more competitive the mean increase was a modest 0.095 and not statistically 
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different from the mean reduction experienced in less competitive MSA. That change 
was an average change in IOC of -0.1069. The mean index of competition changed over 
the study period and the variance among MSAs narrowed substantially. Like managed 
care penetration, the mean statewide index of competition accelerates sharply between 
1995 and 1996, and increases more modestly from 1996 to 1998 when there is an 
increase in market exit among managed care plans. Competitiveness at the state level 
drops sharply after the mergers and consolidations observed in 1998 resulting in a 
decline in the IOC as would be expected if the measure captures the construct well. The 
data provide additional evidence that the study period captures the managed care 
changes being tested. The mean IOC across Florida over the study period is reflected in 
Figure 18. 
Managed care concentration 
Managed care concentration is the proportion of managed care enrollment held 
by the three plans with the largest enrollment at the MSA level of analysis. The 
consolidation of managed care plans over the study period ranged from 46.2% to 100% 
in 1995 and 41.2% to 100% in 1999. Thirteen MSAs experienced a reduction in 
consolidation ranging from -0.2% to -23.7%. Where concentration increased, the change 
ranged from a low of 0. 2% to a peak of 24.7%.  Four MSAs were found to be highly 
concentrated at the end of the study period with levels in excess of 0.90 and four 
remained relatively competitive with levels less than 0.50.   Median concentration across 
the study period across all MSAs was 72.4% with a mean reduction in managed care 
consolidation of -0.2.8% across the entire state by 1999. Mean managed care 
concentration/ consolidation when aggregated at the state level and plotted over the 
study period demonstrates substantial consolidation at the beginning of the study period 
which drops as more plans enter the market. (Figure 14) The Relationship between the 
155 
 
Mean Index of Competition and Mean Managed Care Concentration Statewide) 1996 
and1997 were characterized with substantially lower and flat consolidation which 
increased annually for the remainder of the study period.  The relationship or interaction 
between the mean IOC and level of managed care concentration can further be 
understood utilizing a simple plot of the performance measured over the study period. 
The mean level of competition dropped from the outset of the study period to its lowest 
level between 1996 and 1997 and rebounded without reaching its initial peak level in 
1995. Conversely, managed care concentration was low at the outset, rising at an 
annual rate to a peak in 1998 when it intersected with the IOC and drops as the IOC 
rebounds with both measures assuming a new level in 1999. 
 
 
Figure 14. The Relationship between the Mean Index of Competition and Mean 
Managed Care Concentration Statewide 
 
These measures of managed care activity behave differently over this period, 
supporting the assumption that they measure different constructs of managed care 
activity and providing evidence that they are likely to have an independent predictive 
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ability.  In addition, the figure serves to support the premise that the period 1995 to 1999 
captures managed care market behavior across the continuum of its development and 
refutes the conventional wisdom that these variables measure the same aspects of 
managed care and are interchangeable in their influence on outcomes and research 
applications.   
Of importance is the relationship between changes in the respective measures of 
managed care activity and changes in the performance of the procedures in the 
population 65 years or age or older, as those most likely to require them. On a statewide 
level of analysis, the bivariate associations between managed care covariates and the 
rate of each of the study procedures demonstrate the only statistically significant finding 
among these correlations to be a negative Spearman’s correlation coefficient for the 
association between carotid endarterectomy and managed care concentration at the 
level of -0.531 (p = 0.016).  Thus, contrary to conventional wisdom, managed care 
activity could not be demonstrated to correlate with reductions in procedure rates for 
these procedures as reflected in Table 19 which follows. 
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Table 19.Correlations among Managed Care Covariates and Procedure Rates in the  
Population Older than 65 Years 
 
  
Procedure 
 
 
        Penetration  
 
 
      Competition  
   
Concentration  
Abdominal Aortic 
Aneurysm Repair 
 
0.208 (0.380) 
 
0.262 (0.265) 
 
0.009 (0.970) 
Carotid 
Endarterectomy 
 
0.186 (0.431) 
 
0.111 (0.641) 
 
-0.531 (0.016)* 
Coronary Artery 
Bypass Graft 
 
0.200 (0.398) 
 
0.149 (0.531) 
 
-0.365 (0.1131) 
Lower Extremity 
Vascular Bypass 
 
-0.143 (0.548) 
 
-0.227 (0.336) 
 
0.1098 (0.645) 
Pancreatic Resection -0.253 (0.283) 0.098 (0.682) 0.026 (0.915) 
Esophageal 
Resection 
 
0.078 (0.743) 
 
0.272 (0.246) 
 
0.116 (0.627) 
Cerebral Aneurysm 
Repair 
 
-0.015 (0.951) 
 
0.040 (0.869) 
 
-0.367 (0.111) 
 
Calculated correlation coefficient for the correlation between managed care variables and procedure rates for the 
specific procedure;(Spearman’s correlation coefficient (Prob > │r │under Ho= 0 with statistical significance of ≤ 
0.05); statistically significant correlation at ≤ 0.5 level  
 
MSA Level Socio-Demographic Data   
Population 
Changes in population density, age distribution, and income have been 
demonstrated to have an independent impact on changes in procedure volume and 
rates. They were analyzed as explanatory variables, as well as to facilitate interpretation 
of the final study models. The data in Table 20 are provided for context to examine the 
socio-demographics in play during the study period that may have had an influence on 
managed care evolution, procedure volume or population based rates. The data 
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demonstrate significant variability among Florida MSAs in the total population, as well as 
the population over age 65.  
 
Table 20.Total Population and Population over Age 65  
                                                           Total Population                      Population Over 65 
MSA Counties       1999 Difference       1999 Difference 
Daytona  2 486,692 33,260 111,008 5,793 
Ft. Lauderdale 1 1,594,130 147,006 258,033 -8,853 
Ft. Myers 1 431,981 40,158 102,530 5,920 
Ft. Pierce 2 316,232 25,705 76,811 6,324 
Ft. Walton 1 169,054 6,154 20,252 2,819 
Gainesville 1 215,847 12,147 20,168 1,185 
Jacksonville 4 1,088,376 88,227 118,907 13,302 
Lakeland 1 478,047 30,865 87,873 2,734 
Melbourne 1 472,138 20,828 93,832 10,711 
Miami-Dade 1 2,220,961 134,675 310,642 18,296 
Naples 1 245,094 45,455 52,999 7,265 
Ocala 1 254,964 24,353 62,122 30,193 
Orlando 4 1,607,993 179,578 207,154 19,773 
Panama City 1 148,149 6,048 19,766 1,444 
Pensacola 2 410,026 29,821 51,798 4,867 
Punta Gorda 1 140,240 9,509 46,317 2,306 
Sarasota 2 581,892 40,134 160,763 2,800 
Tallahassee 2 280,988 14,402 24,274 959 
Tampa 4 2,369,105 143,069 450,163 -5,304 
Palm Beach 1 1,116,913 103,132 253,796 12,095 
Summary Measures 
Mean             1.7 731,441 56,726 126,460 6,731 
Median          1 452,060 32,063 90,853 5,330 
STD Dev          1 696,102 54,759 115,107 8,866 
 
Counties = counties in each MSA 
Diff = change from 1995 population 
 
   Almost one third of the State's population resided in South Florida within 
Broward, Miami-Dade and Palm Beach counties. The Tampa Bay MSA, consisting of 
four counties, accounts for approximately 15% of the total State population. The 20 
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metropolitan statistical areas account for 95% of the State's population. The median 
MSA population is 452,060, but varies widely from 140,240 to 2,369,105 residents. Ten 
Florida counties have populations of fewer than 20,000 residents (Calculated from US 
Census Bureau Florida Consensus Estimating Conference Book data, 2003). The 
largest changes in population over the study period occurred within the boundaries of 
the State’s largest MSAs.  While the largest MSAs experienced the most rapid growth in 
population, growth as a percent of 1990 population was largest in Naples. Ranked by 
growth rates, Naples grew by 65%, followed by Orlando, Ocala, Ft. Myers and West 
Palm Beach. Nine MSAs experienced population growth at or above the State average.  
In contrast to the United States growth rates, Florida demonstrated faster growth, with a 
rate in excess of eight percent observed during the study period.  
As expected, Florida had a disproportionate number of elderly, at 18% compared 
with a national average of 13%; however, the elderly are concentrated in counties along 
the west coast and southern portion of the State and significant growth rates were 
evident in rural counties in which managed care organizations are not active.  
The overall population growth rate has been the greatest in counties with 
populations from 100,000 to 200,000, with the largest counties observing growth rates 
21% to 26%. More than 80% of the growth during this period was the result of net 
migration. The most significant growth in Florida's population occurred in the 50 to 54 
year-old age group and the old, old population, i.e. over the age of 85. These adults are 
among the most likely candidates to undergo the procedures with demonstrated volume 
and outcome endogeniety, and were captured within the parameters of this sampling 
frame, in contrast to those studies using databases limited to Medicare recipients over 
the age of 65. All else equal, the volume of study procedures in this enlarging age group 
would be expected to increase proportionately, absent any intervention or ecologic 
160 
 
changes. The overall population growth rate has been the greatest in counties with 
population bases between 100,000 and 200,000, with the largest counties observing 
growth rates 21% to 26%. More than 80% of the growth during this period was the result 
of net migration.   
 The most significant growth in Florida's population occurred in the 50 to 54 year-
old age group and those over the age of 85. These adults are among the most likely 
candidates to undergo the procedures with demonstrated volume and outcome 
endogeniety, and were captured within the parameters of this sampling frame, in 
contrast to those studies using databases limited to Medicare recipients over the age of 
65. All else equal, the volume of study procedures in this enlarging age group would be 
expected to increase proportionately, absent any intervention or ecologic changes. 
Inflation adjusted annual income 
Mean income during the base year of 1995 was $22,671 with a range of $18,190 
to $34,694. Median income at baseline was $21,033. When adjusted for inflation tagged 
to 1995 dollars, the mean increase in annual income was 6.8%, with a range of 1.2% 
increase in the Ft. Lauderdale MSA and 10.5% in the Panama City MSA. The Tampa 
MSA was the only area that experienced a reduction in inflation adjusted income over 
the study period. The Naples, West Palm Beach and Sarasota MSAs exhibited mean 
income throughout the study period that was significantly higher than the statewide 
average exceeding $30,000. Conversely, Daytona and Ocala MSAs demonstrated 
incomes that were in the lowest quartile remaining below $20,000 by the end of the 
study period. These MSAs differ substantially in location, primary business types and 
rurality. 
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  Figure 15. Change in Inflation Adjusted Income 1995 to 1999 
 
Market (MSA) Level Hospital Data 
The 161 hospitals that met study criteria are Appendix 4 (Study Hospital Beds, 
Ownership, Type and Share of Managed Care Procedure Volume). These organizations 
were selected based on study criteria and classified by type, ownership and size. In 
1995 there were 319 hospitals listed in the FUHRS data, of which 228 were community 
hospitals. These numbers included long- term acute care facilities that were not eligible 
for inclusion, as well as 28 hospitals designated as rural and were not included in a 
primary MSA. The procedures performed in these hospitals are addressed separately, 
because at least one of the study procedures was performed in each but could not be 
appropriately allocated to an MSA based on the study criteria. 
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Non-MSA hospitals  
These hospitals are smaller than their counterparts in urbanized areas with a 
median of 137 inpatient beds and are geographically disparate across the State. These 
hospitals are neither designated MSA nor rural in 1995 and were excluded after analysis 
of the procedures they performed during the study period. No coronary artery bypass 
graft or cerebral aneurysm repair procedures were performed in any of them. Of the 
study procedures, 4,473 were performed over the 5 year period in non-MSA hospitals, 
which were less than 2% of the total number of procedure performed during the study 
period (0.176%). The majority of the procedures performed in non-MSA hospitals were 
those that may be performed by several different surgical specialists; for example, AAAR 
may be performed by either a vascular surgeon or general surgeon, and lower extremity 
and carotid procedures were be performed by a vascular surgeon or an interventional 
radiologist. These specialties are more available in smaller rural areas than are the 
cardiac surgeons or neurosurgical specialists. The hospitals and the salient 
characteristics follow in table 21.  
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Table 21. Study Procedures Performed in Non MSA Hospitals 1995 through1999  
 
Hospital                             Beds AAAR Diff CENDAR Diff     LEXTR   Diff   PAN    Diff   ESO Diff 
 
Citrus Memorial Hospital 171 
 
67 -5 458 -68 194 -5 67 -5 3 2 
Highland Regional 
Medical Center 
126 
 
41 2 259 -25 84 -1 41 2 3 1 
Twin Cities Hospital 65 
 
1 1 25 -7 16 -8 1 1 1 1 
Indian River Memorial 
Hospital 
335 
 
206 -1 806 39 309 9 206 -1 1 0 
Florida Hospital 
Heartland 
161 
 
36 13 135 31 46 4 36 13 1 0 
Lower Keys Medical 
Center 
167 
 
14 1 63 14 40 -5 14 1 0 0 
Lake City Medical Center 67 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sebastian River Medical 
Center 
129 51 1 196 0 76 -10 51 1 0 0 
Putnam Community 
Medical Center 
141 25 10 185 29 119 8 25 10 2 0 
Seven Rivers Community 
Hospital 
128 45 4 215 25 109 14 45 4 6 2 
Raulerson Hospital 101 5 1 2 -1 13 -2 5 1 2 -1 
Florida Hospital Lake 
Placid 
50 5 0 34 11 3 2 5 0 0 0 
Summary Measures            
Total 1,641 496 27 2,378 48 1,009 6 496 27 19 5 
Mean 137 41 2 198 4 84 1 41 2 2 0 
Median 129 31 1 160 6 61 -1 31 1 1 0 
Standard Deviation 75 56 5 233 29 91 7 56 5 2 1 
Diff = 1999 levels -1995 levels 
Total Procedures = Sum of all procedures performed 1995 through 1999 
AAAR = Abdominal Aortic Aneurysm Resection 
CENDAR = Carotid Endarterectomy 
CABG = Coronary Artery Bypass Graft 
LEXTER = Lower Extremity Vascular Bypass 
PAN = Pancreatic Resection 
ESO = Esophageal Resection 
CAN = Cerebral Aneurysm Repair 
  
164 
 
Hospital Market Variables at the MSA Level  
The hospital market variables are described and measured, as they may have an 
impact on a hospital’s surgical volume independent of managed care and must be 
controlled in the development of the predictive models. The derived variables are 
summarized in Table 22. Hospital supply as measured by the number of hospitals and 
the bed capacity experienced only modest change over the study period whereas 
ownership of those assets changed at the hospital level as many as five times.  The 
change in the number of licensed beds in the official AHCA data base changed at the 
hospital level  between 1995 and 1999; however, these beds tended not to be 
eliminated, but were reallocated to other uses within the hospital; for example, acute 
care beds were most frequently reallocated and thus re-designated as skilled nursing 
beds (SNF) or rehabilitation beds. These changes in use meet the need for timely 
disposition of inpatients and the use of excess inpatient capacity. Consequently, bed 
supply at the MSA level did not change significantly.  
The designation of licensed beds in the AHCA data sets related to bed capacity 
and system ownership control were validated using the Florida Hospital Association 
compilation for the period in their annual update FHA Eye on the Market:  HealthCare in 
the Sunshine State (2001), and nine organizations were contacted to verify the 
information where there was differing information. This was necessitated as some 
hospitals had undergone as many as five ownership changes between 1990 and 2000.  
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Table 22. Hospital Market Factors and Changes 1995 to 1999  
MSA Hospitals       Beds 
 HHI 
1999    Diff 
 Use  
Rate 
1999 Diff 
MC         
Share 
1999 Diff 
Daytona  9 1,657 2,503 -189 0.115 0.013 0.296 0.032 
Lauderdale 16 8,875 1,070 60 0.129 0.006 0.414 0.083 
Ft. Myers 6 804 2,378 -1282 0.141 0.006 0.247 0.209 
Ft. Pierce 4 593 2,895 -756 0.132 0.013 0.183 0.092 
Ft. Walton  2 5,895 5,651 -86 0.092 0.011 0.413 0.073 
Gainesville 3 609 3,608 -219 0.233 -0.022 0.187 0.066 
Jacksonville 8 1,758 2,201 -290 0.071 0.007 0.267 0.116 
Lakeland  6 658 4,003 130 0.123 0.006 0.188 0.136 
Melbourne 5 2,282 2,910 -345 0.118 0.003 0.287 0.142 
Miami 24 975 716 -108 0.138 0.003 0.360 0.059 
Naples 3 8,500 4,356 -2978 0.131 -0.005 0.417 0.144 
Ocala 2 5,490 5,302 82 0.14 0.029 0.456 0.127 
Orlando 18 3,676 1,149 -937 0.109 -0.015 0.411 0.106 
Panama City 2 1,792 5,108 -109 0.155 0.008 0.310 0.198 
Pensacola 6 975 2,862 -64 0.131 -0.017 0.237 0.142 
Punta Gorda 3 357 3,385 -135 0.164 0.007 0.266 0.126 
Sarasota 6 1,727 2,439 -164 0.139 0.008 0.380 0.101 
Tallahassee 3 1,983 6,380 18 0.133 0.004 0.404 0.128 
Tampa 30 1703 2100 -397 0.139 0.008 0.295 0.072 
Palm Beach 13 1,234 1,305 -77 0.116 0.018 0.350 0.160 
Summary 
Measures 
Mean 8 2,577 3,116 -224 0.132 0.005 0.318 0.116 
Median 6 1,715 2,879 -109 0.132 0.006 0.303 0.121 
STD Dev 7 2,575 1,605 778 0.031 0.012 0.086 0.045 
  
Hospital = Acute care general short stay, non-federal hospitals in the MSA; study total is 161 hospitals and additional 
hospitals tallied include acute care hospitals not meeting study criteria. 
HHI = Herfindahl - Hirschman Index calculated as the sum of the market shares of inpatient admissions 
Use Rate = annual inpatient admissions per 100,000 population 
MC Share = Proportion of inpatient acute care admissions with MC plan as primary payer 
Beds = Number of licensed inpatient acute care beds 
Surgeons = Number of uniquely identified licensed surgeons performing any of the study procedures 
  
166 
 
Managed care share of procedure volume 
The final column in Table 22 (Hospital market Factors and Changes 1995 to 
1999) summarizes the share of study procedures for which managed care plans were 
the primary payer within each MSA. The variable serves as a measure of the degree of 
market power demonstrated by the managed care contracting arrangements and the 
data demonstrate that the level of managed care share is not correlated with level of 
managed care penetration at the MSA level of analysis. As an example, the Naples MSA 
consistently experienced the lowest levels of managed care penetration over the study 
period. However, the managed care share of procedures with volume and outcome 
endogeneity in the Naples MSA is above the statewide mean of 31.8% at 41.7%, largely 
associated with Medicare managed care payers. The data support the premise that 
managed care penetration alone does not capture meaningful changes in the managed 
care markets, especially at the small area level. The change in managed care share 
over the study period ranged from an increase of 3.2% in the Daytona MSA to 20.9% in 
the Ft. Myers MSA. None of the study areas experienced a reduction in managed care 
share over the period. The correlation matrices among the healthcare market variables 
used to predict volume and market share are presented in discussion of the model 
components.  
Ownership and control changes  
The number of community hospital closures during each year of the study period 
was three, two, five, two and eight respectively, largely associated with mergers and 
acquisitions for the purpose of horizontal integration and consolidation. Not only did 
hospital closures peak in 1999 but the number of hospital ownership changes peaked in 
1999 at 12.  Of the hospitals meeting study criteria, 76 were in the not-for-profit category, 
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accounting for 47.2% of hospitals but 51.6% of the inpatient beds as summarized in 
Figure 16 Hospital Ownership and Control Changes 1995 to 1999. 
       Seventy hospitals controlling 15,359 inpatient beds lost procedure volume over the 
study period, losing an average of 57 cases for a total of 3,958 procedures. The mode 
was only 11 cases.  Thirty of these hospitals were in the not-for-profit sector, 34 were 
investor owned and the remainder was in the government sector. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Figure 16. Hospital Ownership and Control Changes 1995 to 1999   
  Data extracted from the Florida AHCA FUHRS dataset for the period  
 
 
The mean number of beds was 340, with a median of 285 beds and included five 
of the state’s six accredited medical teaching hospitals.  Much of the system formation 
during the study period occurred in this sector. The Bay Care System in the Tampa MSA 
(4% of the 1999 total), the Shands University System (3.7% of the 1999 total) and the 
Orlando Regional Healthcare System (3.7% of the 1999 total) evolved in the late 1990’s, 
acquiring through merger or acquisition smaller hospitals in their markets.  The Adventist 
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system achieved the greatest market share for the religiously supported hospitals, 
integrating 14 hospitals into their system across the state and controlling nearly 8% of 
Florida hospitals. The not-for-profit sector utilizes the largest number of the specialty 
surgeons who perform the study procedures. The numbers of surgeons specified for 
each hospital are unique counts for that hospital, but those surgeons may also practice 
Seventeen hospitals were controlled by government or public entities such as cities and 
hospital/health care districts controlling 8,040 of acute care beds, or 16% of the total 
supply in 1999. These hospitals tended to be larger than their counterparts with a mean 
number of beds at 473 (median 301). Jackson Memorial Hospital in Miami-Dade serves 
as the only public teaching hospital in the state.  The MSA, study hospitals in 
alphabetical order, licensed beds, beds converted from acute care designation over the 
study period, ownership/control (not-for-profit, proprietary or government owned),hospital  
type (teaching or general), the number of specialty surgeons who perform study 
procedures in the hospital, and the change from 1995 to 1999 and the managed care 
share of inpatient admissions within each MSA are summarized in Appendix 4 in that all 
161 study hospital characteristics included as control variables in the hospital regression 
models are listed in detail.   
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 
         The HHI measures the extent of hospital concentration within the MSA. Using the 
definitions of the Department of Justice Anti-Trust Division guidelines, only the Miami 
MSA demonstrates low levels of concentration with an HHI less than 1,000 in 1999. It is 
inherent in the HHI that the MSAs with the greatest number of hospitals have the lowest 
levels of concentration and are relatively more competitive. The deviation from this 
observation is the Tampa MSA with 30 acute care hospitals. This MSA experienced a 
greater degree of system formation during the study period with single corporate 
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ownership by the Bay Care System. The system formation in the other MSAs was 
experienced later.  The majority of MSAs in Florida are considered concentrated and 
therefore less competitive in their hospital markets demonstrating an HHI which exceeds 
1,800. The most concentrated and least competitive MSAs are those with few hospitals 
such as Naples, Ocala Panama City and Ft. Walton. It is important to note that those 
MSAs also demonstrate the lowest in managed care penetration at the end of the study 
period at levels ranging from 1.6% to 7.3% with a moderately negative correlation 
between HHI and managed penetration at -.57. Approximately half of the MSAs 
appreciated a reduction in HHI over the study period, primarily associated with a change 
of ownership reducing the concentration of ownership in a few providers. For example, 
the Naples MSA, with the greatest reduction in HHI, experienced a reduction in the 
market concentration when a new hospital with a new corporate owner and 120 acute 
care inpatient beds were added. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17. The Relationship between HHI and Managed Care Penetration in 1999  
Each data point on the X axis is associated with each MSA in the order presented in prior tables beginning with the 
Daytona MSA and ending with the Palm Beach MSA 
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Hospital use rates 
The hospital use rates vary among the MSAs ranging from 0, 07 to 0.23 in 1999 
demonstrating small area variation in the propensity for hospital admission. The mean 
and median are the same at 0.13. The correlation between use rates and the population 
over the age of 65 most likely to necessitate inpatient admission is low at -.016 at the 
MSA level of analysis. The differences in hospital use rates between 1995 and 1999 are 
negligible with a mean difference of 0.005. Three MSAs demonstrated a reduction in use 
rates, the greatest experienced by the Gainesville MSA in which the university hospital 
experienced an overall reduction of inpatient admissions associated with regional 
referrals. The paired two sample t test for mean differences between 1995 and 1999 
resulted in a t critical of 2.09 and p (T ≤ t) = 0.10 failing to reject the null hypothesis that 
the mean difference is zero. Fixed price government programs and discounted managed 
care arrangements accounted for 90% of admissions across the state during the study 
period.   
Surgeons  
         The count of the discrete number of specialty surgeons performing any of the study 
procedures is summarized in Table 23 (Changes in the Number of Specialty Surgeons 
1995 to 1999).  Overall the state gained 154 specialty surgeons; however, six MSAs lost 
specialty surgeons. The MSAs that lost specialty surgeons both on the basis of counts 
and population ratios do not demonstrate any obvious similarities in socio-demographics 
or in basic correlation analyses. The correlation between the change in the number of 
specialty surgeons and the change in the number of study surgical procedures is modest 
at 0.35. Of greater utility to understand the potential impact of changes in access to 
specialty physicians may be the number of specialty physicians per 10,000 population 
over the age of 65. The statewide mean was 12.1, with a range of 5.04 to 40.66 in the 
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Gainesville MSA, which is reflective of the aggregation of specialists associated with the 
University of Florida medical school and teaching hospital. Without this outlier, the range 
remains variable with the top of the range at 19.22 in the Panama City MSA. In smaller 
MSAs like Ft. Walton a small reduction of two specialty surgeons is a 13% change in 
supply, whereas in the Jacksonville MSA the reduction of two specialty surgeons 
resulted in a reduction of less than 2% of the providers. 
 
Table 23. Change in the Number of Specialty Surgeons 1995 to 1999 
 
MSA AA    ∆    CE    ∆ LEX      ∆ CB    ∆ PA    ∆ ES   ∆ 
     
C ∆ 
     
Tot 
     
∆ 
Daytona 22 -3 28 -3 16 10 33 3 12 5 9 7 0 0 56 12 
Lauder 81 -6 102 -5 93 -33 129 -48 23 -8 17 -1 1 1 268 -20 
Myers 42 8 59 9 29 5 47 0 17 2 7 -3 0 0 83 -11 
Pierce 18 0 27 1 2 2 27 2 5 -4 3 -1 0 0 42 12 
Walton 6 -1 9 -3 0 0 12 2 2 2 2 1 0 -1 15 -2 
Gaines 14 -3 13 -4 18 -6 21 2 11 -3 14 5 1 -1 82 1 
Jackson 23 6 38 10 34 0 44 17 12 -7 10 -1 0 0 119 -2 
Lake 16 3 23 8 17 10 21 8 8 2 4 -1 0 0 59 9 
Mel 18 -1 23 -11 21 -8 29 2 9 -6 3 -3 0 0 67 -19 
Miami 79 -14 136 -3 100 16 157 -41 58 -15 19 -24 0 -1 395 -16 
Naples 14 2 16 3 11 11 19 2 8 2 5 3 0 0 46 18 
Ocala 24 8 36 15 26 8 30 5 8 4 3 -1 1 1 66 22 
Orlando 74 3 131 20 157 50 115 3 30 -5 8 -10 0 -1 306 2 
Panama  7 0 11 -1 11 6 19 6 13 7 3 0 0 0 38 16 
Pens 19 0 31 6 24 7 31 -1 13 0 6 -4 0 0 76 2 
Punta  17 5 29 14 20 15 26 14 7 4 3 1 0 0 68 26 
Sara 62 1 82 23 71 40 75 14 17 -1 1 -5 0 -1 171 54 
Talla 9 -1 18 -2 11 -5 13 1 5 -2 1 -3 0 0 45 2 
Tampa 164 1 259 -18 153 2 250 -7 53 -15 36 -9 0 -1 469 36 
Palm  54 -2 79 9 36 15 80 1 19 0 5 -6 0 0 158 12 
                
Total 763 6 1,150 68 850 145 1178 -15 330 -38 159 -55 3 -4 
2,62
9 
15
4 
Mean 38 0 58 3 43 7 59 -1 17 -2 8 -3 0 0 131 8 
Median 21 0 30 2 23 7 31 2 12 -1 5 -1 0 0 72 6 
39 5 61 10 47 17 61 16 15 6 8 6 0 1 128 18 
 
∆ = 1999 levels – 1995 level; Some MSA names abbreviated for space considerations;                                                                                                                             
AA= abdominal aortic aneurysm repair; CE = carotid endarterectomy; LEX = lower extremity bypass; CB = coronary artery 
bypass graft; PA = pancreatic resection; ES = esophageal resection; C = cerebral aneurysm repair Total = the total 
number of specialty surgeons performing study procedures; change as % of total = 1999 levels-1995 levels/1995 levels; 
net losses are reflected as a negative %;   
  
STD Dev 
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The greatest increase in specialty surgeons statewide were those performing 
lower extremity vascular bypass procedures (145 were added) and carotid 
endarterectomy, for which 68 surgeons performing these procedures were added. The 
numbers of physicians performing AAARs procedures remained stable over the study 
period on a statewide basis, although eight MSAs lost specialists performing these 
procedures. The statewide reduction in the number of cardiac surgeons was observed 
almost exclusively in the contiguous MSAs of Ft. Lauderdale and Miami-Dade where 89 
cardiac surgeons left the area. The Ft. Lauderdale MSA experienced a greater loss of 
specialty physicians than did other MSAs but continued to increase the volume of 
procedures including CABG, suggesting that factors other than the number of specialty 
surgeons were involved.   
Hospital Level Descriptive Data 
Procedure volume 
Table 24 lists the number of study procedures performed in each of the 161 
study hospitals (Hospital Volume and Change in Volume of Study Procedures 1995 to 
1999). Eighty-eight hospitals gained procedure volume over the study period with a 
mean increase of 240 procedures over the five years. The hospitals that gained volume 
performed 21,101 of the total performed across the State and experienced a mean 
increase in specialty surgeons who perform the procedures to 5.9 providers. All of the 
five teaching hospitals gained in total volume albeit having sporadic reductions in some 
especially cardiac surgery procedures. Forty-two of the net gainers were in the not for 
profit sector, 13 in the government sector and 30 were investor owned hospitals. These 
hospitals tended to be larger than those that lost volume with an average 368 inpatient 
licensed beds compared with 226 beds for those hospitals that lost procedure volume. 
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Seventy hospitals controlling 15,359 inpatient beds lost procedure volume over 
the study period, losing an average of 57 cases for a total of 3,958 procedures. The 
mode was only 11 cases.  Thirty of these hospitals were in the not-for-profit sector, 34 
were investor owned and the remainder in the government sector. 
 
Table 24. Hospital Volume and Change in Volume of Study Procedures 1995 to 1999 
Hospital AA  ∆ CE ∆ LEX  ∆ CB  ∆ PA ∆ E ∆ CA  ∆ 
Tot  
∆ 
Aventura  4 -11 16 1 16 -18 0 -16 3 3 0 0 0 -3 -44 
Baptist  15 -9 65 5 110 39 229 164 8 -4 4 0 0 -8 187 
Miami 61 10 120 7 135 0 383 263 10 -6 2 -4 0 -10 260 
Gulf  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Beaches 3 3 31 18 12 0 0 -31 0 -2 1 1 0 0 -11 
Nassau 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Bartow  0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 
Bay   32 -17 161 19 87 24 388 227 11 7 1 -1 0 -11 248 
Bayfront l  28 11 68 -38 55 -1 264 196 4 -4 5 1 0 -4 161 
Bert Fish  7 2 18 12 30 19 1 -17 0 0 2 2 0 0 18 
Bethesda  23 10 100 5 113 2 0 -100 8 0 2 -2 0 -8 -93 
Blake  37 -10 179 66 57 0 175 -4 2 0 0 -2 0 -2 48 
Boca 
Raton  25 -15 175 -6 64 1 0 -175 2 -2 0 -1 0 -2 -200 
Bon Seco  17 5 34 -2 28 12 0 -34 7 7 2 2 0 -7 -17 
BSVeni  39 -12 82 -15 75 0 0 -82 5 -5 0 -3 0 -5 -122 
Brandon  20 12 86 20 67 29 0 -86 3 2 1 0 0 -3 -26 
Brooksvl  3 -2 11 -1 5 -8 0 -11 1 -1 0 -1 0 -1 -25 
Broward  22 10 37 -2 46 6 398 361 3 -1 4 0 0 -3 371 
Canavl  7 -2 43 -14 15 1 0 -43 1 -3 0 0 0 -1 -62 
Cape Co  24 8 107 8 64 17 0 -107 5 2 2 -1 0 -5 -78 
Cedars   11 -7 34 -9 29 -36 286 252 10 3 6 -7 0 -10 186 
Central Fl  22 8 123 59 43 2 362 239 1 -2 0 -1 0 -1 304 
Charlotte  18 -12 144 -10 64 55 337 193 0 0 0 0 0 0 226 
Clevel Cl  29 6 65 -53 34 10 0 -65 11 6 4 1 0 -11 -106 
Columbia  7 -6 41 -5 18 -3 0 -41 0 -3 1 1 0 0 -57 
Coral Ga 2 2 1 1 3 -11 0 -1 0 0 1 1 0 0 -8 
Coral 
Springs  4 -5 24 -3 19 2 0 -24 0 -3 0 -1 0 0 -34 
Delray  25 7 78 6 38 5 690 612 3 2 0 -1 0 -3 628 
Doctors  33 13 93 4 126 35 0 -93 5 1 0 -1 0 -5 -46 
Douglas  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
E Pasco  32 5 92 27 87 49 0 -92 1 1 2 -1 0 -1 -12 
Ed White  6 -2 16 -21 9 -10 0 -16 2 1 0 0 0 -2 -50 
Engle  13 7 63 41 11 -1 0 -63 1 1 2 1 0 -1 -15 
Fawcett  30 12 101 38 66 -7 0 -101 2 -2 2 -1 0 -2 -63 
Florida  130 -19 460 41 302 -20 2,070 1,610 11 -4 2 -7 0 -11 1,590 
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Hospital AA  ∆ CE ∆ LEX  ∆ CB  ∆ PA ∆ E ∆ CA  ∆ 
Tot  
∆ 
Ormond  32 -7 139 30 98 36 443 304 2 1 4 3 0 -2 365 
Deland 11 -3 41 9 27 -17 0 -41 1 0 0 0 0 -1 -53 
Fish  7 -7 37 21 22 9 0 -37 3 2 1 1 0 -3 -14 
Flagler 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Oceans 1 0 4 -8 6 -3 0 -4 0 0 0 0 0 0 -15 
Water 7 -8 45 9 20 5 0 -45 3 1 1 1 0 -3 -40 
Altamont 17 17 57 57 47 47 0 -57 3 3 0 0 0 -3 64 
East Orl 9 9 6 6 25 25 0 -6 0 0 0 0 0 0 34 
Kissimme 1 1 10 10 11 11 0 -10 1 1 0 0 0 -1 12 
Fl Medl  57 31 162 35 145 50 572 410 1 1 0 -2 0 -1 524 
Ft Walton  19 -2 104 12 40 -15 0 -104 5 5 2 -1 0 -5 -110 
Gadsden  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Good Sa  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Gulf 
Coast  0 0 0 -23 0 -2 0 0 1 -2 0 0 0 -1 -28 
Gulf 
Coast  2 2 5 -9 12 5 0 -5 10 5 2 1 0 -10 -11 
Halifax  34 -7 128 12 95 -12 446 318 7 -1 4 3 0 -7 306 
Health 
Centl 0 -2 5 -2 4 -4 0 -5 0 0 0 0 0 0 -13 
Medical  28 28 105 105 34 34 579 474 3 3 10 10 0 -3 651 
Health  3 -4 7 -5 15 9 0 -7 2 2 0 0 0 -2 -7 
Heart Fl  8 7 26 26 30 28 0 -26 0 0 0 0 0 0 35 
Helen Ell 12 -10 32 -21 16 -8 0 -32 2 1 0 0 0 -2 -72 
Hialeah  3 0 7 3 11 -1 0 -7 2 -2 0 -2 0 -2 -11 
Holly  4 3 18 10 21 11 0 -18 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 
Holmes  58 2 224 -23 228 -15 683 459 6 -4 3 0 0 -6 413 
Holy Cr 28 -9 88 4 60 -12 574 486 7 -1 1 -4 0 -7 457 
Homest  0 0 1 -1 0 0 0 -1 1 0 0 0 0 -1 -3 
Imperial  7 0 9 2 8 -14 0 -9 1 -1 0 0 0 -1 -23 
Jackson  20 3 49 14 66 27 204 155 
10
0 23 32 -1 1 -99 122 
Jacks So 4 1 11 1 28 9 2 -9 0 -4 0 -2 0 0 -4 
Jay  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
JFK  57 -7 185 46 103 14 558 373 6 2 1 -6 0 -6 416 
Jupiter  4 -8 27 -26 19 -2 0 -27 4 4 0 -1 0 -4 -64 
Kendall l  15 5 29 14 25 1 166 137 2 1 0 -1 0 -2 155 
Wales  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 -1 
Lakeland  63 13 281 -17 139 -47 675 394 5 1 2 0 0 -5 339 
Largo  31 4 200 -30 91 20 264 64 5 -3 2 -1 0 -5 49 
Larkin  0 0 0 0 1 -2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -2 
Lawnwo  12 -2 147 22 58 25 139 -8 2 -2 1 -2 0 -2 31 
Lee   49 -14 168 -117 119 -13 1 -167 7 -5 0 -7 0 -7 -330 
Leesburg  48 9 193 48 66 24 564 371 6 3 4 3 0 -6 452 
Lehigh  0 -1 7 4 0 0 0 -7 0 -1 0 0 0 0 -5 
Lucerne  4 -14 55 -41 42 -24 159 104 2 1 0 -1 0 -2 23 
Manatee  33 -23 149 22 77 7 337 188 3 -1 0 0 0 -3 190 
Martin M  3 3 5 5 1 1 0 -5 3 3 0 0 0 -3 4 
Martin  37 15 268 144 104 9 0 -268 4 -1 3 0 0 -4 -105 
Country 28 28 115 115 47 47 0 -115 6 6 0 0 0 -6 75 
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Hospital AA  ∆ CE ∆ LEX  ∆ CB  ∆ PA ∆ E ∆ CA  ∆ 
Tot  
∆ 
Mease  9 -30 34 -66 12 -86 0 -34 0 -6 0 -2 0 0 -224 
Mem Tp 7 -1 29 7 31 5 0 -29 4 0 3 0 0 -4 -22 
M Pembr 17 1 47 19 51 5 0 -47 2 1 0 -2 0 -2 -25 
Mor Plant 56 -19 240 37 96 -13 716 476 8 0 5 1 0 -8 474 
Morton  3 -2 11 4 7 2 0 -11 0 -1 0 -1 0 0 -9 
Mt Sinai  58 29 139 5 144 -10 699 560 17 -1 1 -1 0 -17 565 
Munroe  81 9 386 241 149 19 698 312 4 4 1 -1 1 -3 581 
Naples  63 7 216 62 132 84 506 290 11 8 1 1 0 -11 441 
N Brow  26 5 64 36 102 53 0 -64 1 -1 1 0 0 -1 28 
Collier  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
No Fl  29 -8 141 -4 59 -15 277 136 3 -1 3 -5 0 -3 100 
No Okal  1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
No Ridge  32 -11 66 -75 65 -19 787 721 8 4 1 1 0 -8 613 
No Shore  3 0 8 -4 17 -8 0 -8 1 1 0 -1 0 -1 -21 
Northside  18 1 106 17 57 -1 272 166 1 0 4 3 0 -1 185 
Northwes  15 8 24 13 17 -1 0 -24 0 -8 0 -1 0 0 -13 
Oak Hill  33 -4 236 15 95 7 0 -236 1 0 1 -1 0 -1 -220 
Ocala  42 -8 219 86 120 -2 360 141 6 0 3 0 0 -6 211 
Or Park  6 3 47 -23 46 2 0 -47 1 1 0 -1 0 -1 -66 
ORMC  65 8 289 92 215 53 1145 856 25 11 4 -6 0 -25 989 
Osceola  13 2 26 -24 20 -19 0 -26 2 1 0 0 0 -2 -68 
Commun  1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 -1 2 
Palm B 55 11 266 71 116 19 1035 769 0 -1 0 0 0 0 869 
Palm Sp  0 -3 10 7 20 12 0 -10 1 -2 0 0 0 -1 3 
P West  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Palmetto  15 7 16 -5 24 -9 0 -16 5 2 0 -3 0 -5 -29 
Palms  11 -17 114 -7 28 -20 0 -114 4 1 1 -4 0 -4 -165 
Pan Ame 7 4 10 0 26 -6 0 -10 3 -1 0 -2 0 -3 -18 
Parkway  3 1 11 -5 25 -13 0 -11 2 -1 0 -1 0 -2 -32 
Parrish  15 2 50 2 34 5 0 -50 3 2 0 0 0 -3 -42 
Pasco  10 -4 40 18 33 1 0 -40 0 -1 2 -1 0 0 -27 
Bayonet  46 17 202 89 74 12 1248 1046 3 -1 5 4 0 -3 1164 
Sacred  26 5 132 4 82 27 534 402 11 5 2 -14 0 -11 418 
Saint An 28 -5 179 25 139 9 0 -179 3 -3 1 -2 0 -3 -158 
St Lucie  9 -11 55 -36 37 -1 0 -55 0 -4 0 0 0 0 -107 
St Luke  56 18 109 -19 94 20 229 120 17 5 2 -2 0 -17 125 
St Mary 6 -1 23 -28 37 9 0 -23 1 -3 1 0 0 -1 -47 
St Vince 78 51 364 93 216 92 951 587 3 -2 13 5 0 -3 823 
Santa Ro  0 0 0 0 5 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 -1 1 
Sarasota  91 6 281 -5 228 -19 1406 1125 7 2 1 -1 0 -7 1101 
Sh AGH 11 -8 75 -13 38 -35 137 62 0 -3 5 4 0 0 7 
Sh UF 80 32 41 -26 133 32 172 131 31 -1 30 10 11 -20 158 
Sh. Jacks  12 7 51 1 109 -14 172 121 8 -5 3 -1 0 -8 101 
South B  6 -6 37 -9 25 5 0 -37 0 -1 0 0 0 0 -48 
South Fl  4 2 21 -10 12 -11 0 -21 1 -3 0 0 0 -1 -44 
So Miami  15 4 62 -1 80 16 181 119 7 2 1 -2 0 -7 131 
So Sem  3 0 3 -26 1 -9 0 -3 0 0 0 0 0 0 -38 
So Shore  0 0 0 0 5 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 
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Hospital AA  ∆ CE ∆ LEX  ∆ CB  ∆ PA ∆ E ∆ CA  ∆ 
Tot  
∆ 
Southwe  57 -18 193 -76 121 -52 337 144 7 3 3 1 0 -7 -5 
Jacksone 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Springhill  10 6 59 13 38 3 0 -59 0 -1 0 0 0 0 -38 
St Cloud  0 0 3 3 4 4 0 -3 1 1 0 0 0 -1 4 
St Jos  57 19 201 42 122 3 510 309 8 3 11 4 0 -8 372 
St Pete  8 -13 42 -97 39 -25 0 -42 2 -1 0 -3 0 -2 -183 
Sun Coa  10 5 60 33 43 17 0 -60 0 0 0 -1 0 0 -6 
Talla  10 3 46 -2 28 9 154 108 1 -2 0 -1 0 -1 114 
Talla M  26 -10 122 -34 85 19 514 392 5 -2 4 -5 0 -5 355 
Tam Gen  53 19 84 0 150 -1 583 499 43 -3 9 2 0 -43 473 
Town &  6 4 15 3 24 17 0 -15 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 
U Comm 37 1 136 41 114 47 592 456 2 0 3 2 1 -1 546 
Carroll 2 0 24 9 27 7 0 -24 0 0 0 0 0 0 -8 
Univers  7 0 45 -6 28 5 0 -45 0 0 0 0 0 0 -46 
U  Miami  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Wellingn  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
West 
Boca W 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Florida  37 -6 86 16 64 -38 351 265 3 -2 4 3 0 -3 235 
Westche  0 0 2 2 1 0 0 -2 1 1 0 0 0 -1 0 
Westside  12 5 44 22 39 21 0 -44 1 -2 0 0 0 -1 1 
Winter H 28 -7 171 60 67 3 0 -171 6 2 3 1 1 -5 -117 
Winter P 20 9 42 8 29 7 0 -42 1 -3 0 -1 0 -1 -23 
Wuesth  29 12 133 38 60 -8 290 157 6 -1 0 -3 0 -6 189 
Total 
Change 
 
         
Summary  
Mean 20 1.1 76 8.0 50.8 3.9 173 97 4.2 0.2 1.7 -0.3 0.1 -4 106 
Median 11 0 43 1 33 1 0 -3 2 0 0 0 0 -2 0 
STD Dev 22 10 87 38 52 22 318 258 9.4 3.3 4.0 2.5 0.9 9 274 
Alphabetical list and some hospital names were abbreviated for fit  
∆ = procedure volume in 1999 – procedure volume in 1995                                                                       
AA = Abdominal Aortic Aneurysm Repair 
CE = Carotid Endarterectomy  
CB = Coronary Artery Bypass Graft 
LEX = Lower Extremity Vascular Bypass  
PA = Pancreatic Resection 
E = Esophageal Resection 
CA = Cerebral Aneurysm Repair 
TOT ∆ = change in the aggregate number of procedures performed from 1995 to 1999 
  
   17,011 
177 
 
Inherent in this study is the premise that volume is endogenous with clinical 
outcomes for the study procedures. Referring to the volume and quality cut points, Table 
25 summarizes the volume status of Florida hospitals for these procedures at the 
beginning of the study period in 1995 and at the end in 1999. 
 
Table 25.  Low Volume Study Hospitals: 1995 Compared to 1999 
                                                            1995                          1999                
                                                         Low Volume                 Low Volume 
                                                             Hospitals /Hospitals        Hospitals/Hospitals 
                                                          Providing the Procedure    Providing the Procedure 
 Procedure (Low Volume Cut Point)                                                                                                            (t Stat (pr > |t|)) 
 
Abdominal Aortic Aneurysm Repair (<31) 
 
84/135 (62.2%) 
 
92/142 (64.8%) 
 
-1.39 (0.08) 
Carotid Endarterectomy (<101) 78/136 (57.4%) 86/147 (58.5%) -2.52 (0.01)* 
Coronary Artery Bypass Graft (<500) 31/52 (59.6%) 34/61 (55.7%) -1.71 (0.04)* 
Lower Extremity Artery Bypass Graft (<20)  32/140 (22.9%) 36/151 (23.9%) -2.31 (0.01)* 
Pancreatic Cancer  Procedures (<6) 79/104 (76.0%) 81/111 (73.0%) -0.96 (0.17) 
Esophageal Cancer Procedures (<6) 80/104 (76.9%) 65/73 (89.0%)  1.73 (0.04)* 
Cerebral Aneurysm Repair (<30) 0/6 (100%) 0/6 (100%)    No change 
 
(%) = the percent of hospitals performing the procedure which are in the low volume category as identified by Dudley et 
al. (2000).  
Paired samples t test to test Ho: µ1995 = µ1999 with significance at p ≤ 0.05 in two tailed test  
 
 
Utilizing Dudley’s volume cut points, a quality outcome differential exists for 
AAAR at 31 procedures (Dudley, Johansen, Brand, Rennie, Milstein, 2000). Hospitals 
performing fewer than 31 procedures are deemed to be low volume providers with a 
potential for higher risk to patients. Eighty-four of the 135 hospitals that performed the 
procedure in 1995 (62.2%) did not achieve the recommended 31 procedures.  That 
number increased to 92 of the 142 hospitals performing the procedure in 1999; thus, 
64.8% of those Florida hospitals did not meet minimum volume requirements to 
maximize outcomes.  
For cancer resection and cerebral aneurysm repair 75% to 100% of hospitals did 
not meet the minimum volume recommendations for these complex operations. Four of 
the seven procedures were performed in low volume hospitals in 1999, indicating a 
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worsening situation for patients; generalized statewide volume increases observed in the 
CABG procedure accounted for a drop in the percentage of low volume providers at the 
end of the study period. With the exception of pancreatic resection these procedures 
increased over the study period and were distributed across the state.  Most of the 
increases in procedure volume were observed in markets with many competitive 
hospitals resulting in a greater number of hospitals performing complex procedures, but 
few achieving the requisite number of cases to meet the minimum volume cut points. In 
the Miami-Dade MSA seven hospitals within less than a 20 mile performed CABG 
procedures in 1999 with only one achieving the desired volume levels. By comparison, 
eight hospitals in the Tampa MSA performed the procedure and five achieved the quality 
cut point of 500 procedures. In the West Palm Beach MSA all three of the hospitals 
performing the CABG procedure performed the recommended level of procedures. 
Other vascular procedures demonstrated greater distribution among geographically 
proximate hospitals. 
        The greatest variability is observed for carotid endarterectomy, a procedure 
surrounded by controversy related to indications. In the Miami-Dade MSA for example, 
20 hospitals performed this procedure surgically and only two achieved the 100 
procedure cut point, with nine hospitals performing twenty or fewer procedures. In the 
most contiguous MSA in West Palm Beach, half of the eight hospitals performing the 
procedure met Dudley’s volume criteria. These MSAs also have the greatest level of 
managed care penetration in the state.  The majority of cerebral aneurysm repairs 
performed on an elective basis have been performed at the Shands University Hospital. 
The low prevalence of the diagnosis in living patients and the small number of 
neurosurgical specialists in the State creates a natural referral pattern. The small and 
decreasing number of the esophageal and pancreatic resection procedures makes it 
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difficult for any hospital to achieve the optimal volume without a similar process, if not on 
a State level, at minimum at the regional level.   The mean number of esophageal 
procedures performed in each hospital is only 4.2 and 1.7 for the pancreatic procedures, 
which have declined in aggregate over the study period.     
Hospital level market share  
Changes in hospital market share over the study period is the measure which 
estimates any re-distributional impact managed care selective contracting arrangements 
have had on procedures with volume and outcome endogeneity. The market share for 
study procedures was calculated for each hospital within each study year, as was the 
difference between 1995 and 1999.  
The mean statewide market share in 1995 was not different from market share in 
1999 at 12.2% and 12.3% respectively. Eleven hospitals experienced no change in 
market share over the study period, 47 increased their market share while 25 hospitals 
lost market share. The range of increase for those hospitals improving market share is 
less than 1% to a maximum of 43.6%, with a mean of 3.2% (counting only those 
hospitals with market share during the period > 0); the range of decrease for market 
share losing hospitals was from less than 0.5% to a maximum of 34.9%, with a mean of 
3% and with a variance of less than 1%. 
        Of importance is the number of hospitals that lost market share while gaining in 
procedure volume (25 hospitals) and the converse observation that 17 hospitals gained 
market share while losing procedure volume. Table 26 summarizes the findings for those 
hospitals that experienced a change in market share over the study period.  
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Table 26. 2 X 2 Table of the Number of Hospitals 
Demonstrating a Change in Market Share Associated with 
Change in Procedure Volume between 1995 and 1999 
 Market Share 
Increase 
Market Share 
Decrease 
Procedure Volume 
Increase 47 25 
Procedure Volume 
Decrease 17 46 
 
 
  Given these findings a Chi Square (X2)   statistic was calculated to test the null 
hypothesis that the change in market share is independent of the change in procedure 
volume. Given one degree of freedom in the 2 x 2 table and a 0.05 level of statistical 
significance, the calculated X2 of 19.72 exceeds the critical value of 2.706 - 3.841. Given 
the calculated value exceeds the critical value, as is the case for this data, the null 
hypothesis that volume and market share are independent is rejected at the hospital 
level of analysis. Market share at the hospital level of analysis is further tested as a 
dependent outcome in subsequent multivariate models.  
Bivariate Data Analysis 
Bivariate measures of association conducted between each of the study 
predictive and explanatory study variables were informative, independent of their utility in 
testing and interpretation of the final hypothesis testing models. The full correlation 
matrix for the variables at the MSA level of analysis is provided in Appendix 5.  
Bivariate correlations at the MSA level 
Total procedure scores were moderately and negatively correlated with managed 
care concentration. They were positively correlated with IOC and both total population 
and population over the age of 65, although the Pro >|τ| value for total population 
exceeds the 0.05 level by 0.0046. It is of importance that none of the other variables 
181 
 
were correlated with changes in procedure volume in this data set. Particularly, change 
in managed care penetration, as the most commonly used measure of managed care 
activity, was not associated with change in procedure volume at the market level of 
analysis. Both have been frequently identified in the literature as proxy variables for 
access to care and would be expected to have a positive and moderate to large 
influence on procedure volume. Neither personal income, nor access to Medicaid 
managed care was correlated with procedure volume in the bivariate measures of 
association. Spearman’s correlation coefficients for change in total procedure volume 
and changes in the proposed explanatory variables follow in Table 27.  
 
Table 27. Bivariate Correlations between Total Procedure Volume 
Difference Score and Study Covariate Difference Scores at the MSA Level  
 
                                                          Correlation                                                
Variable                                             Coefficient                           Pro >|τ|                
 
pen_score 
 
0.0135 
   
0.0941 
 
ioc_score 0.1925 0.0416 * 
con_score -0.4862 0.0299 * 
caid_score 0.1061 0.6563  
care_score 0.0316 0.8947  
hhi_score -0.1894 0.4237  
use_score 0.3233 0.1644  
mc_share_score 0.1759 0.4576  
totpop_score 0.4361 0.0546 * 
pop65_score 0.4827 0.0311 * 
inflat_score 0.3383 0.1445  
totsurg_score -0.1916 0.4183  
Pro >|τ| under Ho: Rho = 0  
*Statistical significance at Prob>|t| ≥ 0.05       
 
In this data, the totpop_score and pop65_score were not statistically correlated at 
the MSA level of analysis, as might be anticipated given the variability of the distribution 
of the elderly population across MSAs; however, both total population and population 
over the age of 65 are associated with changes in procedure volume with a stronger 
correlation with the elderly. Total population is moderately correlated with procedure 
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volume at the MSA level at 0.436 (Prob > |τ| = .0546) and the population over the age of 
65 demonstrates a stronger correlation at 0.483 at a 0.031 level of significance.  
Assumptions about the distribution and impact of the elderly population on Florida 
hospital markets in many studies embed an assumption that Florida's elderly population 
is equally distributed, a notion discredited in the analysis of population data previously 
reported in this study. This has often resulted in generalization of research utilizing 
Medicare patient data to the population as a whole, and ultimately to policy development 
which may in fact not be appropriate given this observation.  Consequently, both 
population level variables are included in initial model specifications in anticipation of 
their differing behaviors and predictive impact on procedure volumes and rates.  
Spearman's correlation coefficients were also calculated for the outcomes 
proc_rate_diff_score (change in procedure rates for the total population) and 
proc_rate_pop65_diff_score (change in procedure rates in the age group 65 years and 
older). Differences in procedure rates for the total population were also negatively and 
moderately correlated with managed care concentration at τ = -0.5053, at a 0.0231 level 
of significance. Changes in the population over the age of 65, was positively associated 
with changes in procedure rate at 0.4496 and 0.0467 respectively. No other associations 
were statistically significant in either population group. Neither Medicare nor Medicaid 
managed care penetration were associated with changes in procedure volume or rates, 
as was anticipated when Medicare C and the initiatives to increase access to Medicaid 
for the working poor were implemented.  
The managed care activity variables were not found to be correlated in this data. 
This is useful in that these three predictive variables have not previously been tested 
together. The concentration score correlation with IOC is negative at -.0342 with a Prob 
> |τ| of 0.141 which does not allow for the rejection of the underlying hypothesis of the 
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test statistic (Ho such that Rho = 0). Thus, IOC and concentration are not related in this 
data. Similarly, the correlation between IOC and penetration score is 0.072 (Prob > |τ| of 
0.762). Concentration and penetration were also negatively correlated with a non 
significant Prob > |τ| of 0.450.  The absence of bivariate correlation among the managed 
care variables reduces the likelihood of singularity in the multivariate models. The lack of 
correlation provides some early evidence that the managed care variables behave 
differently, which supports inclusion of each of them in the model specification.  
The government programs demonstrate predictable correlations. Penetration 
difference scores for Medicare managed care are moderately correlated with the 
difference scores for both Medicaid managed care penetration (τ = 0.549, Prob > |τ| of 
0.0121) and overall managed care penetration (τ = 0.542, Prob > |τ| of 0.014). Medicare 
managed care is correlated to a greater extent with overall managed care penetration as 
it is embedded in this metric and has a larger contribution to it. (τ = 0.809, Prob > |τ| of < 
0.0001). Each are included in the regression model with anticipation that those terms 
that do not contribute to the prediction of the outcome variables will be dropped from the 
final model through the stepwise elimination process.  The Spearman correlation for 
Medicaid managed care difference score variable and the difference score for population 
over the age of 65 is statistically significant but very low level with a coefficient of -0.023 
making it likely that the influence on overall models will be limited. 
The mc_share_score variable that is a measure of change in the proportion of 
hospital admissions attributable to managed care payers within the MSA is moderately 
and positively associated with change in the managed care index of competition at τ = 
0.4286 and Prob > |τ| = .0594. The relationship between managed care share and 
procedure volume is small and not meaningful at the 0.05 level of statistical significance. 
The mc_share_score is also negatively correlated with the HHI at a moderate level of  
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-0.5775.  It is an uncontested, albeit insufficiently tested, notion in the managed care 
literature that markets with high levels of managed care penetration also tend to have 
high levels of hospital concentration (Kongstvedt, 2001).  In this analysis, neither 
managed care penetration nor any of the other managed care variables, were correlated 
with HHI, which is consistent with the descriptive data displayed in Figure 17.  
This difference is further supported by the observed correlation between the 
population and the number of surgeons in a hospital market. The correlation between 
the difference score for the number of surgeons performing study procedures and 
changes in total population was moderate and negative at -0.5568, with a significance 
level of 0.0108. There was no observed correlation between population differences for 
the over 65-age group and changes in the surgeon population. As is consistent with the 
studies of the market distribution of surgical specialists, these physicians tend to migrate 
to urban population centers, rather than following the demand for these procedures 
created by the elderly who disproportionately live in the rural areas. Consequently, it is 
reasonable to conclude that MSAs will differ on this basis and the inclusion of the 
surgeon difference scores in the multivariate models is appropriate. 
Bivariate correlations at the hospital level 
The associations between the hospital specific variables thought to influence the 
organization’s procedure volume was conducted in order to understand their potential 
interactions or redundancy in subsequent model development. A moderate association 
between the number of surgeons performing study procedures and procedure volume 
was also observed on the hospital level of analysis (0.48, Prob >|τ| =<.0001). Hospital 
market share was also found to be correlated with procedure volume, which is 
subsequently tested as a unique outcome variable in the regression models. 
  
185 
 
Table 28. Bivariate Correlations between Hospital Procedure Volume Difference 
Scores and Hospital Explanatory Variable Difference Scores 
 
                                                              Correlation                                                   
Variable                                                 Coefficient                         Pro >|τ|   
pen_score 0.123 0.120 
ioc_score 0.127 0.109 
con_score -0.335 0.087 
hhi_score -0.017 0.830 
use_score 0.083 0.203 
mc_share_score 0.005 0.954 
totpop_score 0.007 0.934 
pop65_score 0.054 0.104 
inflat_score 0.104 0.189 
totsurg_score 0.477 <.0001* 
bed_99 0.116 0.141 
control_change   -0.051 0.517 
cont_99 -0.057 0.473 
type_99 -0.075 0.346 
MS_tot_score 0.362 <.0001*                                   
 
Pro >|τ| under Ho: Rho = 0  
*Statistical significance at Prob>|t| ≥ 0.05     
 
Of greater significance is that the population levels were not associated with 
procedure volume as may be expected, all other factors being equal, should there be 
consistency in the application of evidenced based surgical decisions across hospital 
settings. The lack of statistically significant correlation with hospital procedure volume 
change among the other predictive and explanatory variables is informative, but will be 
validated as potentially redundant variables are eliminated through the model building 
process. 
The Spearman’s correlation coefficients for the market share outcome variable 
with the managed care predictors and control variables. 
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Table 29. Bivariate Correlations between Hospital Market Share 
Difference Scores and Explanatory Variable Difference Scores  
 
Pro >|τ| under Ho: Rho = 0   
*Statistical significance at Prob>|t| ≥ 0.05  
 
Correlations of 0.31 and 0 .36 were calculated for the number of surgeons and 
the number of acute care beds at a statistically meaningful level, but the direction of the 
correlations is in opposite direction. The hospital type was significant at Prob >|τ|= 0.059. 
The number of beds and the type are structural rather than market considerations and 
their influence on hospital market share will be further estimated in the regression and 
GEE analyses.  
Test of Model Assumptions 
Screening of continuous variables for normality demonstrated that variables 
measured within individual study years at the MSA level were found to have a non-
normal distribution, as was anticipated for count data a small sample size of 20 MSAs; 
however, the use of difference scores converted most of these annual distributions to a 
normal distribution acceptable to meet the assumptions for use of linear regression 
analysis. In addition, variables that were non-normal in distribution after conversion to 
difference scores were successfully transformed to normal distribution using the square 
Variable Correlation           
Coefficient 
  Prob   >|τ| 
pen_score   0.121 0.879 
ioc_score  -0.004 0.958 
con_score  -0.468 0.556 
hhi_score   0.006 0.943 
use_score  -0.076 0.335 
mc_share_score  -0.056 0.479 
totpop_score   0.049 0.534 
pop65_score   0.038 0.635 
inflat_score   0.014  0.859 
totsurg_score   0.362   <.0001* 
bed_99  -0.305 <.0001* 
control_change  -0.030  0.703 
cont_99  -0.085  0.284 
type_99  -0.148  0.059 
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root, with the exception of HHI and IOC. Consequently, separate regression models 
were estimated using both the transformed and non-transformed variables in addition to 
the GEE analysis which does not rely on the normal distribution for inference as 
summarized in the following table: 
 
Table 30. Normality and Transformation of Study Outcome and Control Variables 
                                                          Shapiro-Wilk  
Variable                                             Statistic (W)             Pr< W             Skewness         Kurtosis 
 
totproc_score  
 
0.8996 
  
 0.041* 
 
1.151 
 
 1.630 
totproc_score_SQRT  0.9647     0.642 0.227     1.009 
proc_rate_diff_score 0.9263  0.1316 -0.377  2.236 
totproc_hosp_score 0.7036  <0.0001* 1.384  5.094 
totproc_hosp_score SQRT 0.9575 0.496 0.265  0.297 
tot_ms_score 0.9403 0.243 0.432 0.871 
hhi_score 0.4317  <0.0001*    -3.880     15.884 
hhi_score_SQRT 0.4507  <0.0001*    -3.887     16.081 
totpop_score 0.8093   0.001* 1.118   5.697 
totpop_score_SQRT  0.9204     0.101  0.716   0.276 
pop65_score 0.9306 0.159  0.911   1.565 
inflat_score 0.9845 0.978  0.312   0.348 
mc_share_score 0.9752 0.858  0.278   0.401 
totsurg_score 0.9563 0.472  0.657   0.843 
Ho for the Shapiro-Wilk statistic: the data are normally distributed; If Pr <W ≤ 0.05 Ho is rejected and the distribution is non-
normal. 
*indicates a non normal distribution considered for transformation in multivariate models; all variables found to be non-
normal are followed by the value resulting from square root transformation (SQRT) of that variable 
 
When difference scores were tested, managed care concentration, managed 
care penetration, Medicaid and Medicare managed care penetration, population over the 
age of 65, inflation adjusted income, managed care share and total number of surgeons 
at the MSA level were normally distributed, with generally linear pair-wise plots with the 
response variables.   The MSA level data are grouped data, and the outcome of interest 
here is the change in volume from 1995 to 1999, not the distribution in a given study 
year. For grouped data, it is the sampling distribution of the means of the variables that 
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is to be normally distributed in order to utilize tests predicated on the assumption of 
normality. The transformation of non-normal distributions were employed to determine if 
they improved basic model fit with the recognition that  log and square root 
transformations, when applied to grouped data tend to increase both type I and type II 
errors, as well as make interpretation of parameter estimates more difficult (Tabachnick 
& Fidell, 1996); however, to assure a conservative approach to the estimates,  the 
regression models are run with procedure volume both transformed and non- 
transformed for comparison and the GEE post hoc analysis completed, which is not 
reliant on the normal distribution . 
Exploration of the specified linear regression models at the MSA level 
demonstrated the efficacy of this approach, since there were no MSA outliers when 
subjected to model diagnostics. Examination of the residual scatter plots, studentized 
residuals, and Cook's Distance for the basic model specifications served to satisfy the 
assumptions for least squares linear regression and are subjected to diagnostics for 
linearity and homoscedasticity, the results of which are reported with each model.   
At the hospital level of analysis, the preliminary tests for normality demonstrated 
the same low levels of positive skew and leptokurtosis; however, the range varied more 
among the variables and did not improve when difference scores were tested to the 
extent observed in the grouped MSA level data. In large samples, a few univariate 
outliers were to be expected, and their degree of influence was tested. For each model, 
univariate outliers were identified and models tested both with, and without them. Where 
they were sufficient to influence the size or direction of parameter estimates they were 
specified, described and deleted in lieu of re-scoring or transformation. In this way, post 
hoc modification of model specifications based on multiple iterations for persistent 
outliers is avoided (Pedhazur, 1997).  
189 
 
Least Squares Regression Results 
Models were estimated for each of the study hypotheses. The results of the 
statistical tests for each are summarized in tables 31, 32, 35, 36 and 40 respectively.  
Hypothesis 1: The Relationship between managed care activity and 
procedure volume at the MSA level 
Using multiple regression, each of the difference scores for procedure volume at 
the MSA level were regressed on the linear combination of managed care activity 
(penetration, IOC and concentration, Medicare and Medicaid penetration), healthcare 
market factors (HHI, hospital use rates and total surgeons, managed care share) and 
socio-demographic control variables (total population, population over age 65 and 
inflation adjusted income). After elimination of those variables that were neither 
statistically significant nor contributed to the predictive power of the model (using 
stepwise elimination procedures), the parsimonious subordinate model was fitted, 
producing the results in Table 31 (Regression Models for Total Procedure Volume 
Difference Scores at the MSA Level, Non-Transformed). 
The full model with 12 explanatory variables accounts for 88% of the variation in 
procedure volume at the MSA level and the reduced subordinate model contain the four 
variables that account for 83% of the variation in procedure volume. Both models are 
statistically significant, with the subordinate model achieving p values such that the 
chance of observing a similar result by chance is less than one in 1,000. The beta 
weights (β) demonstrate that changes in managed care concentration (-37.8), Medicaid 
penetration (-19.7), the number of specialty surgeons (29.8) and the total population 
(0.18) exert the greatest predictive influence on procedure volume. With the exception of 
Medicaid penetration, these variables are also predictive in the saturated model.  
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Table 31. Regression Models for Total Procedure Difference Scores at the MSA Level 
(Non-Transformed Variables) 
 
 
Saturated Model Optimal Subordinate Model 
DF 19 19 
  Model SS 23452424 3369452 
  Root MSE 388.047 474109 
  R-Square 0.957 0.8766 
  Adj R-Square 0.883 0.8326 
  F Value 12.98 19.9 
  Pr>F 0.0012 <0.0001 
  
  Parameter SE t Pr > │t│ Parameter SE t Pr > │t│ 
Estimate 
 
Estimate 
  Intercept -699 522.6 -1.27 0.2457 -573 175.02 -3.28 0.0055 
Managed Care 
      pen_score 6.672 39.02 0.17 0.8673 
  IOC _score 632.616 912.8 0.69 0.5106 
  con_score -32.736 11.89 -2.75 0.0283* -37.875 8.41 -5.51 0.004 
care_score 6.353 24.29 0.26 0.8012 
  caid_score -20.535 12.49 -1.64 0.1442 -19.67 9.17 -2.14 0.0489 
  Hospital Market  
  HHI_score -0.079 0.056 -1.43 0.1954 
  use_score 0.01 0.091 0.11 0.9183 
  mc_share_score -2232 4007 -0.56 0.5949 
  totsurg_score 20.97 7.37 2.85 0.0248 29.78 4.93 6.04 <0.0001 
General Market 
  totpop_score 0.019 0.003 6.92 0.0002 0.018 0.002 10.3 <0.0001 
pop65_score 0.0008 0.001 0.84 0.4289 
  inflat_score 0.316 0.201 1.57 0.1601 
  DF = corrected degrees of freedom 
Model SS = model sum of squares 
MSE= root mean sum of errors 
Best model based on concurrence between progressive F tests and stepwise elimination utilizing *p values of < 0.05;  
Output values are rounded                                     
 
      Managed care penetration and IOC were not statistically significant in the 
model, whereas managed care concentration demonstrates a significant downward 
influence on study procedure volume at the MSA level. Changes in total population and 
the number of specialty surgeons demonstrate a positive impact on the change in 
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procedure volume over the study period. The interpretation of the regression β weights 
and model diagnostics are approached conservatively by repeating the regression model 
and stepwise model reduction process using the transformed variables as follows: 
 
Table 32. Regression Models for Total Procedure Difference Scores at the MSA Level 
 (SQRT Transformed) 
 
 
Saturated Model Optimal Subordinate Model 
DF 19 19 
  Model SS 303.236 287.394 
  Root MSE 2.538 2.086 
  R-Square 0.871 0.8251 
  Adj R-Square 0.649 0.7626 
  F Value 3.92 13.21 
  Pr>F 0.0395 <0.0001 
  
  Parameter SE t Pr > │t│ Parameter SE t Pr > │t│ 
Estimate 
 
Estimate 
  Intercept -6.143 3.935 -1.56 0.1625    -7.595 1.714 -4.43 0.0006 
Managed Care 
      pen_score -0.0167 0.263 -.06 0.9513 
  IOC _score 8.267 6.036 1.37 0.2131 
  con_score -0.178 0.078 -2.27 0.0572     -0.211 0.048 -4.39 0.0006 
care_score 0.1428 0.176 0.81 0.4445 
  caid_score -0.0646 0.087 -0.74 0.4809 
Hospital Market  
  HHI_score 0.0002 0.0003 0.48 0.6472 
  use_score 22.310 54.971 0.41 0.6958 
  mc_share_score -30.776 27.372 -1.12 0.2979 
  totsurg_score 0.059 0.309 1.91 0.0977 0.0631 0.022 2.91 0.0114 
  General Market 
  totpop_score 0.190 0.050 3.75 0.0072 0.1730 0.036 4.87 0.0002 
pop65_score 0.00003 0.00009 0.39 0.7055 
  inflat_score 0.0036 0.0015 2.42 0.0458 0.003 0.0009 3.34 0.0049 
DF = corrected degrees of freedom 
Model SS = model sum of squares 
MSE= root mean sum of errors  
SQRT = Transformation of non normal variables by square root transformation in the SAS Proc Reg procedure 
Best model based on concurrence between progressive F tests and stepwise elimination utilizing *p values of < 0.05;  
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Consistent with the non-transformed model, the transformed model remains 
highly significant with an adjusted R-square demonstrating that 76.3% of the variation of 
the procedure volume change can be explained by the model covariates; therefore it is 
reasonable to reject the null hypothesis that change in managed care activity has no 
impact on change in procedure volume. Managed care concentration, as the only 
significant measure of managed care activity in the model, has a negative impact on 
procedure volume, but the size of the parameter estimate is smaller in the transformed 
model (-0.21). In addition, the transformed subordinate model continues to demonstrate 
the positive influence of total population change (0.17) and specialty surgeons to a 
smaller degree of influence (0.06). Medicaid penetration is no longer statistically 
significant in the reduced model and a very small influence of change in inflation 
adjusted income on change in procedure volume at a parameter estimate of 0.003. 
The transformation of the procedure volume score makes direct interpretation of 
the magnitude of the parameter estimates more challenging; however, the standardized 
β for the non-transformed measure of magnitude is -19.5 with a total population β weight 
of 23.2. The relative contribution of predictive and explanatory variables to the change in 
the volume of procedures is reflected in their respective partial contributions to the 
progressive model R2 as observed in Table 33, which reflects the result of the stepwise 
elimination procedure (Contribution of Retained Variables in the Procedure Volume 
Subordinate Model).  
With respect to the hypotheses of this research, both the non-transformed and 
transformed models at the MSA level of analysis demonstrate that the null hypothesis 
that managed care activity has no impact on procedure volume can be rejected. The 
change in managed care concentration has significant and negative influence on study 
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procedure volume while changes in penetration and IOC did not offer a major 
contribution to the predictive power of the model. 
Table 33.Contribution of Retained Variables in the Procedure Volume Subordinate 
Model 
 
Variable          Partial R2               C (p)      F Value         Pr>F              
con_score     0.2456 24.79 5.86 0.0263  
totpop_score_SQRT 0.2332 14.19 7.61 0.0134  
totsurg_score 0.1869 6.08 8.94 0.0087  
  inflat_score 0.1264 1.25 9.12 0.0086  
pop65_score 0.0330 1.455 2.64 0.1263  
Partial R2 = R2 of a model with the variable as the singular explanatory variable  
C (p) = contribution of the variable to the overall model R2; SQRT= square root transformation  
 
The direction of the parameter estimates for the control variables in the 
subordinate model is positive, such that increases in population, inflation adjusted 
income, and surgeons are associated with an increase in procedure volume. This is 
consistent with the results of the bivariate analysis, and the prior research. In addition to 
demonstrating the assumptions of normality have been met in each model, the linearity 
constraints were addressed for each of the data sets. The bivariate plots for each of the 
variables were examined for outliers, as well as the linearity of the saturated composite 
procedure volume model. A specialized macro in Excel was utilized for each of the four 
models to graphically assure that requite linearity assumption for use of the least 
squares approach is met (Business Spreadsheet, 2011). Figure 18 depicts the best fit 
line for the MSA procedure change model which is consistent with those generated for 
the other models for the best fit subordinate model. The specific application of this macro 
takes into account lag time applied to the annualized data and was tested with and 
without the 1995 levels of penetration as a control variable. The results did not differ in a 
material fashion resulting in the same size and direction of the parameter estimates. 
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Figure 18. Predicted and Observed Values for Total Procedure Volume  
Difference Scores Model 
 
 
MSA procedure volume model diagnostics 
The model diagnostics are important given the small sample created by the 20 
MSAs to assure that the assumptions for the use of linear regression are met. In the 
subordinate model, four general market covariates and the managed care concentration 
difference score, account for approximately 76% of the variation observed in the change 
in procedure volume. Although the R2 is adjusted, it is likely to remain somewhat inflated 
as the result of the relatively small sample size of 20 MSAs; however, the MSA data is 
grouped data, with the cumulative impact of a quarter of a million procedures. The 
grouping of the large number of observations, along with the likelihood that the variables 
actually influencing procedure volume has in fact been identified and included in the 
model tends to increase the power of the sample size.  In addition, the final model 
covariates are assessed to determine whether collinearity or singularly persist within the 
subordinate model after the elimination process which is designed to manage them. 
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Table 34. Means, Standard Deviation, and Correlations for Variables Influencing 
Procedure Volume at the MSA Level of Analysis  
 
 
Variable                                    Mean       SD                              Correlations 
 
1. tot_proc_score_SQRT 2.6071  4.282   0.2632 0.3925 0-.0966 
2. con_score -2.7950 10.499 -0.5173   -0.0416 0.2407 
3. inflat_score 1548 544  0.2632 0.0842  -0.1083 0.1003 
4. totpop_score_SQRT 31 18  0.3925 -0.4060 -0.1083   -0.5394 
5. totsurg_nocangio_score -16 30 -0.9660 0.2407 0.1003 -0.5394  
        
N = 20 *p≤ 0.01; ** p ≤ 0.10 
SD = standard deviation 
 
The failure of any of these variables to achieve statistically significant correlation 
coefficient supports the efficacy of the final model. The collinearity diagnostics for both 
the saturated and subordinate models reveal no variables achieving a condition index in 
excess of 1.5 with respect to the other variables in the model (Appendix 4). Condition 
indices of thirty or less provide confidence that multivariable collinearity is not a factor in 
the model. The subordinate model demonstrates a range of standardized studentized 
residuals between -1.266 and 1.987, well within the two standard deviations 
recommended to assure the assumptions for least squares linear regression are met. 
Residuals reflect the size of the discrepancy between observed and predicted values 
that remains after the data have been fitted to a linear model, and serve to identify 
potential outliers in the data that can influence the size and direction of parameter 
estimates in the final solutions (Kleinbaum, Kupper, Muller & Nizam,1998). Among 
continuous variables, observations with studentized residuals in excess of 3.29 (p< .001 
utilizing a 2-tailed test) are potential outliers. Initial model specification at the MSA level 
resulted in standardized residuals that were less than one, with exception of MSA two at 
-2.297. In order to determine the degree of influence such a residual may have on the 
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model, the Cook's Distance (Cook's D) is calculated to estimate the extent to which a 
potential outlier is in line with other cases. Observations with a Cook's D greater than 
one are potentially influential outliers (Pedhazur & Schmelkin, 1991). At the MSA level, 
the range of Cook's D for the preliminary saturated model was 0.00 to 0.445, again 
supporting the notion that a least squares linear regression model is reasonable for the 
MSA level data.   
Although the population over age 65 variable was not statistically significant in 
the model at p = 0.12, its addition served to stabilize the data and achieve a Cook's 
Distance score (Cook's D) substantially less than one for each of the MSA observations. 
Both the studentized residuals and Cook's D diagnostic tools serve to provide 
confidence that there are no statistically significant outliers in the data at the MSA level 
of analysis that might exert substantial leverage on the parameter estimates, thereby 
violating the statistical assumptions and or adversely affecting the interpretation of the 
output. Although the contribution of the population over 65 to the overall model is not 
statistically significant in the reduced model, it adds stability to the parameter estimates 
and reduces the overall error of the model by its inclusion. Repeating the diagnostic 
analysis conducted with the non transformed procedure volume model demonstrates 
similar results with no outliers apparent with a Cook’s distance of more than two 
standard deviations from the predicted mean although the sum of squared residuals and 
predicted residual sum of squares were substantially higher at 1,539,077 and 4,004,920 
respectively.  The same analytic approach and diagnostic evaluation was conducted for 
the remaining models to test procedure rate at the MSA level and the procedure volume 
and market share at the hospital level of analysis. 
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                          Student                         Cook's 
                    Obs  Residual      -2-1 0 1 2           D 
                      1    1.644    |      |***   |       0.066 
                      2  -0.0422    |      |      |       0.000 
                      3   -1.266    |    **|      |       0.445 
                      4    0.996    |      |*     |       0.019 
                      5   -1.601    |   ***|      |       0.319 
                      6   -0.434    |      |      |       0.005 
                      7   -1.074    |    **|      |       0.050 
                      8   -1.003    |    **|      |       0.068 
                      9   -0.169    |      |      |       0.002 
                     10    1.242    |      |**    |       0.927 
                     11    1.987    |      |***   |       0.283 
                     12   -0.761    |     *|      |       0.105 
                     13   -0.109    |      |      |       0.002 
                     14    1.258    |      |**    |       0.054 
                     15   -0.487    |      |      |       0.003 
                     16    1.046    |      |**    |       0.023 
                     17  -0.0298    |      |      |       0.000 
                     18   -0.382    |      |      |       0.004 
                     19   -1.195    |    **|      |       0.165 
                     20   -0.120    |      |      |       0.000 
                    Sum of Residuals                          0 
                    Sum of Squared Residuals            60.93394 
                    Predicted Residual SS (PRESS)      156.94985 
Figure 19. Studentized Residuals and Cook’s Distance Diagnostics for the MSA 
Transformed Procedure Volume Model 
Obs= each Florida MSA in the sample 
 
Hypothesis 2: The Relationship between managed care activity and 
procedure rate at the MSA level 
The procedure rate model tests the null hypothesis that changes in managed 
care activity is not associated with changes in procedure rates over the study period. 
The procedure rate difference score at the MSA level meets the criteria for and is 
entered directly into the model without transformation.  The hypothesized model for 
prediction of change in procedure rate was also sequentially regressed on the linear 
combinations of managed care activity, controlling for hospital market characteristics and 
socio-demographic differences at the MSA level of analysis. The results of the SAS proc 
reg procedure for the saturated model with procedure rate change as the outcome of 
interest are reflected in the Table 35. 
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Table 35.Regression Models for Total Procedure Rate Difference Scores at the MSA 
Level          
 
 
Saturated Model Optimal Subordinate Model 
DF 19 19 
  Model SS 12.178 0.0578 
  Root MSE 0.736 062619 
  R-Square 0.7628 0.607 
  Adj R-Square 0.3561 0.5334 
  F Value 1.88 8.24 
  Pr>F 0.20 0.0015 
  
  
  Parameter SE t Pr > │t│ Parameter SE t Pr > │t│ 
Estimate 
 
Estimate 
  Intercept -1.105 1.141 -0.97 0.3648 -1.343 0.4535 -2.96 0.0092 
Managed Care 
      pen_score -0.058 0.076 -0.76 0.4741 
  IOC _score 1.709 1.749 0.98 0.3610 
  con_score -0.462 0.227 -2.04 0.0812 -.0437 0.0141 -3.10 0.0068 
care_score 0.0375 0.0511 0.73 0.487 
  caid_score -0.0043 0.0252 -0.17 0.870 
  Hospital Market  
  HHI_score 0.00006 0.0001 0.58 0.5781 
  use_score 16.858 15.9315 1.06 0.3251 
  mc_share_score -3.017 7.933 -.0.38 0.7150 
  totsurg_score 0.0068 0.00895 0.76 0.4709 
General Market 
  totpop_score 
pop65_score 0.00003 0.00002 1.98 0.0656 
inflat_score 0.0007 0.0003 2.79 0.0132 
DF = corrected degrees of freedom; Model SS = model sum of squares; MSE= root mean sum of errors 
SE = standard error 
Best model based on concurrence between progressive F tests and stepwise elimination utilizing; Output values are 
rounded 
 
The initial model was tested utilizing procedure rates for the total population. The 
procedure rate variable at the MSA level was normally distributed, and did not require 
transformation to meet the assumptions for linear regression. Model diagnostics for 
collinearity and residual analysis added to the confidence of the results. The full model is 
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not statistically significant with an F value of 1.88 and Pr>F of .20 and is therefore not 
useful for prediction of the procedure rate in this data. 
The reduced model is statistically significant with three explanatory variables 
responsible for the prediction of 53% of the variation in procedure rate over the study 
period. The managed care concentration variable again is negatively and significantly 
associated with procedure rate. Although inflation adjusted income is significant in this 
model, the parameter estimates are very small at 0.0007. The population over 65 
continues to be retained in the stepwise selection process although the p value exceeds 
the 0.05 level as its inclusion reduces the overall model error, stabilizing the parameter 
estimates.    
Of the hypothesized predictive variables, managed care concentration again is 
the only one which is significant statistically at a p value of 0.0069 and accounts for the 
majority of the explanatory power of the model, as presented in the summary of the 
relative contribution of the retained variables. 
 
Table 36. Contribution of Retained Variables in the Subordinate Procedure Rate 
Model 
Variable Partial R2 C (p) F Value Pr>F 
con_score 0.341 6.558 9.32 0.0069 
Inflat_score 0.170 2.736 5.91 0.0264 
Pop65_score 0.096 1.452 3.91    0.0656 
Partial R2 = R2 of a model with the variable as the singular explanatory 
 
This model explains more than one half of the variation observed in procedure 
rate change, while performing very well in tests of singularity, multivariate collinearity, 
and standardized studentized residual analysis for outliers.  Based on the overall 
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subordinate model F test the null hypothesis that changes in managed care activity are 
not related to changes in the procedure rate can be rejected with manage care 
concentration continuing to have significant predictive value at the MSA level of analysis. 
A summary of the model diagnostics relying on the prior definitions of outliers and 
leverage identifies the Naples MSA studentized residual is a potential outlier at a 
residual of 2.693; however, the Cook’s D does not exceed one for any of the MSAs in 
this data. In that a substantial number of the study procedures are performed in patients 
over the age of 65, and the procedure rates in this population are greater than the rate in 
the population as a whole, change in the population over the age of 65 would be 
expected to contribute to the explanatory power of the model. The positive direction of 
the parameter estimate is also intuitive; however, the contribution of the population over 
age 65 to the change in procedure rates remains much smaller than might be anticipated 
from the prior research.   
Separate models were regressed with the population procedure rate as the 
outcome of interest utilizing the same explanatory variables as used in prior model 
building. The overall saturated model was neither significant nor predictive for procedure 
rate in the elderly. A subordinate model eliminated all variables except changes in 
Medicaid enrollment and inflation adjusted income. Although the reduced model 
generated an F value of 3.78, with Pr >F of 0.439, the p values of the explanatory 
variables were not significant at the p < 0.05 level. Although the relationship between the 
predictive variables and procedure rates in this population was not hypothesized 
specifically in this research, the data demonstrates that additional measures are required 
to explain the variation in procedure volume and rates for the elderly. 
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                                   Output Statistics 
                          Student                         Cook's 
                    Obs  Residual      -2-1 0 1 2              D 
 
                      1     1.061    |      |**    |       0.038 
                      2     1.008    |      |**    |       0.108 
                      3    -0.667    |     *|      |       0.161 
                      4     0.549    |      |*     |       0.007 
                      5    -1.794    |   ***|      |       0.381 
                      6    -1.632    |   ***|      |       0.069 
                      7   -0.0093    |      |      |       0.000 
                      8    -0.278    |      |      |       0.005 
                      9    -0.844    |     *|      |       0.076 
                     10    0.0255    |      |      |       0.000 
                     11     2.693    |      |***** |       0.429 
                     12    0.0458    |      |      |       0.000 
                     13    -0.564    |     *|      |       0.021 
                     14     0.939    |      |*     |       0.024 
                     15    -0.330    |      |      |       0.002 
                     16     0.822    |      |*     |       0.012 
                     17    0.0595    |      |      |       0.000 
                     18    -0.711    |     *|      |       0.014 
                     19    -0.854    |     *|      |       0.050 
                     20    0.0980    |      |      |       0.000 
                  Sum of Residuals                           0 
                  Sum of Squared Residuals             6.27385 
                  Predicted Residual SS (PRESS)       10.05237 
 
Figure 20. Studentized Residuals and Cook’s Distance Diagnostics for the MSA 
Procedure Rate Model 
 
 
The relationship between changes in inflation adjusted annual income procedure 
rates is consistent with prior research; however, it is not the primary driver of access to 
these procedures with volume and outcome endogeniety. The conventional wisdom 
concerning the relationship between income and access to high cost procedures has 
often been utilized to justify income redistribution as a policy mechanism to achieve 
equity in access, but cannot be supported by these results.  
Neither changes in Medicare managed care penetration nor Medicaid managed 
care penetration was statistically associated with changes in procedure volume or rate. 
Increased enrollment in Medicaid managed care plans was specifically promoted during 
the study period, under the auspices of increasing access to medical care services. 
Despite the consistent annual increases in the Medicaid managed care plan enrollment 
reported in the descriptive data, the increase was not associated with either increased 
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study procedure volume or rates for this population over the study period. Likewise, 
Medicare managed care market penetration grew, achieved a plateau in enrollment, and 
ultimately lost enrollment during the study period; however, these changes were not 
associated with any changes in either procedure volume or rates. Despite substantial 
market penetration as the result of government activism in managed care markets, the 
changes were not statistically associated with changes in either procedure volume or 
surgical utilization rates for procedures with demonstrated volume and outcome 
endogeneity.     
Hypothesis 3: The Relationship between managed care activity and 
procedure volume at the hospital level 
Models were fit to test the hypotheses that managed care activity was/was not 
associated with procedure volume for individual Florida hospitals. Hospital procedure 
volume was regressed on the linear combination of the managed care activity variables, 
health care market variables and socio-demographic variables known to influence 
hospital procedure volume in a similar fashion to the MSA level model; however, hospital 
characteristics also known to impact surgical utilization were added to the prediction, 
including the number of licensed beds, a change in ownership and control and a change 
in the type of hospital (general versus teaching status).  
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Table 37. Regression Models for Total Procedure Difference Scores at the Hospital 
Level  
                        
 
Saturated Model Optimal Subordinate Model* 
DF 160 160 (158) 
  Model SS 9710664 1736283 (75938) 
  Root MSE 303.951 139.03 (295.1) 
  R-Square 0.4219 0.3699 (0.360) 
  Adj R-Square 0.3577 0.3411(0.3476) 
  F Value 6.57 12.83(29.06) 
  Pr>F <0.0001 <0.0001 
  Parameter SE t Pr > │t│ Parameter SE t Pr > │t│ 
Estimate Estimate 
  Intercept -110.751 163.135 -0.71 0.4778 -43.56 31.72  -1.37 0.1717 
Managed Care 
      pen_score -9.5418 12.959 -0.68 0.4983 
  ioc _score 513.4908 378.895 1.36 0.1775 
con_score -5.259 4.0253 -1.31 0.1935 -4.088 1.3413 -3.05 0.0027 
care_score 1.3499 8.718 0.15 0.8772 
caid_score -4.710 4.4867 -1.05 0.2949 
Hospital Market  
  hhi_score 0.0109 0.01139 0.96 0.3401 0.00572 0.0032 1.79 0.0750 
use_score 0.0313 0.0286 1.10 0.2746 
  mc_share_score 756.388 1140.90 0.66 0.5084 
  General Market 
  totpop_score_SQRT 0.00109 0.0007 1.53 0.1273 1.6456 0.6479 2.54 0.0121 
pop65_score 0.00023 0.00033 0.69 0.4923 
  inflat_score 0.05003 0.04866 1.03 0.3056 
Hospital Variables 
bed_99 0.2471 0.1191 2.08 0.0397 0.0842 0.0407 2.07 0.0402 
cont_99 -48.3766 39.2715 -1.23 0.0767 -30.556 17.328 -1.76 0.0798 
type_99 -292.913 164.294 -1.78 0.0767 
totsurg_score 15.2658 2.1258 7.18 <0.0001 7.1424 0.8842 8.08 <0.0001 
cont_change -204.440 101.993 -2.00 0.469 -60.066 34.441 -1.74 0.0832 
Values in parentheses are the results of the model with potential outliers removed. DF = corrected degrees of freedom; 
Model SS = model sum of squares; MSE= root mean sum of errors; SE = standard error; Best model based on 
concurrence between progressive F tests and stepwise elimination utilizing *p values of < 0.05; Output values are 
rounded            
 
The saturated model containing all of these variables and 160 corrected degrees 
of freedom accounted for 42% of the variation in the change in hospital volume for 
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procedures with volume and outcome endogeneity. After adjustment, the R-square value 
reduced to 35.6%.  The overall model was highly significant with an F value of 6.57 and 
Pr>F = <0.0001. In the saturated model ‘total surgeons’ was the only control variable 
with an independent statistically significant contribution with a positive parameter 
estimate of 15.2 procedures for each additional surgeon.  
The stepwise elimination procedure was applied resulting in a highly significant 
model with seven variables, four of which were statistically significant at the <0.05 level 
and HHI, control and change in control significant at the Pr>F = > 0.1 level. The reduced 
model sustained an adjusted R-square indicating that the model accounted for 34.1 % of 
the variation in procedure volume at the hospital level. Again the number of surgeons 
was positively predictive of procedure volume change at a parameter estimate of 7.14. 
The number of beds was statistically significant in this model with a small but positive 
parameter estimate (0.08). The change in managed care concentration again was 
statistically significant with a negative association with hospital procedure volume at  
 - 4.09 (Pr > F = 0.0027).  The relative importance of these variables in the predictive 
power of the reduced model that resulted from the stepwise elimination process is 
summarized in Table 38 which follows (Contribution of Retained Variables in the 
Hospital Procedure Volume Subordinate Model). The change in the number of specialty 
surgeons makes the greatest contribution to the reduced model. Prior to drawing 
inferences for the analysis, multiple levels of model diagnostics were employed to 
evaluate the validity of the model. In the subordinate model none of the surviving 
variables resulted in a condition index greater than 6.6 (Eigen values ranging from a high 
of 1.103 to 0.0713. Of the 160 hospital observations, three demonstrated studentized 
residuals in excess of 3.29, although the Cook’s distance for these observations did not 
exercise leverage in excess of two standard deviations from the mean. 
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Table 38. Contribution of Retained Variables in the Hospital Procedure 
Volume Subordinate Model 
Variable Partial R2 C (p) F Value         Pr>F      
totsurg_score 0.2735 16.8910 59.85 <0.0001 
con_score 0.0296 11.8104 6.71 0.0105 
totpop_score_SQRT 0.0185 0.3215 4.27 0.0403 
hhi_score 0.0115 8.6484 2.68 0.1037 
control_change 0.0118 7.8359 2.78 0.0975 
bed_99 0.0124 6.8730  2.97 0.0871 
cont_99 0.0128 5.8082 3.11 0.0798 
Partial R2 = R2 of a model with the variable as the singular explanatory variable    
C (p) = contribution of the variable to the overall model R2       
 
These three hospitals were Morton Plant North Bay, St. Cloud Medical Center 
and Cape Canaveral Hospital demonstrating a Cook’s distance of 0.044, 0.057 and 
0.028 respectively. Models were regressed after elimination of these potential outliers 
and the results of the analysis of variance added to the model results in parentheses in 
Table 37(Regression Models for Total Procedure Difference Scores at the Hospital 
Level). No material improvements in the model were observed and the parameter 
estimates were relatively unchanged in size or direction. In that the managed care 
concentration variable remained consistently significant and negative irrespective of the 
appropriate maneuvers to improve the model the null hypothesis that managed care 
activity has no relationship to hospital procedure volume is rejected in this data. 
Hypothesis 4: The relationship between managed care activity and hospital 
market share 
Hospital market share scores were regressed on the linear combination of the 
same variables estimated in the hospital procedure volume models. This regression 
tests the null hypothesis that managed care activity has no relationship to a hospital’s 
share of the market for study procedures, while controlling for other factors that influence 
market share.  
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Table 39. Regression Models for Changes in Hospital Market Share  
 
Saturated Model Optimal Subordinate Model* 
DF 160 160(155) 
  Model SS 0.1077 0.1985 (0.060) 
  Root MSE 0.0558 0.0687 (0.039) 
  R-Square 0.1938 0.2122(0.2096) 
  Adj R-Square 0.1042 0.1920(0.1940) 
  F Value 2.16 10.51(13.44) 
  Pr>F 0.0086 <0.0001 
  Parameter SE t Pr > │t│ Parameter SE t Pr > │t│ 
Estimate 
 
Estimate 
  Intercept -0.0155 0.0301 -0.51 0.6089 -0.0198 0.0122 2.62 0.1075 
Managed Care 
      pen_score -.0.0008 0.0024 -0.35 0.7289 
  ioc _score 0.0659 0.0689 0.96 0.3404 0.10049 0.0627 3.84 0.0518 
con_score 0.0001 0.0007 0.20 0.8453 
care_score -0.0009 0.0016 -0.62 0.5389 
caid_score 0.0004 0.0008 0.53 0.5956 
Hospital Market  
  hhi_score -6.905 0.000002 -.03 0.9734 
  use_score -0.3879 0.5228 -0.74 0.4594 
  mc_share_score 0.29118 0.2087 1.40 0.1651 
  General Market 
  totpop_score SQRT 0.000398 0.00034 1.19 0.2379 0.0005 0.0003 4.04 0.0461 
pop65_score -1.2526 5.4798 -0.23 0.8195 
  inflat_score -0.000009 0.000001 -1.05 0.2966 
Hospital Variables 
bed_99 -0.00003 0.00002 -1.38 0.1710 -0.00002 0.00002 2.66 0.1049 
cont_99 -0.00886 0.00719 -1.23 0.2197 
type_99 0.00872 0.02995 0.29 0.7714 
totsurg_score 0.00158 0.00037 4.30 <0.0001 0.0015 0.00035 18.09 <0.0001 
cont_change -0.0196 0.1419 -1.38 0.1698 -0.0200 0.0661 2.20 0.1404 
DF = corrected degrees of freedom; SE = standard error; Model SS = model sum of squares 
MSE= root mean sum of errors; best model based on concurrence between progressive F tests and stepwise elimination 
*values in parentheses = results when potential outliers removed; output values are rounded       
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The overall saturated model was statistically significant with an adjusted R-
square of 19.2%. The only variable resulting in a significant p value in the full model was 
the change in the number of specialty physicians, although the parameter estimates 
were smaller than that observed in the prior models (β= 0.00158).  Five of the 161 
hospitals in the sample had the potential to be outliers in the saturated model based on a 
studentized residual greater than 3.29, although the leverage was not problematic based 
on Cook’s Distance of less than 0.5. The full model was subjected to the stepwise 
selection process which resulted in a reduced model of five variables with IOC, surgeons 
and total population rising to the level of statistical significance. The relative contributions 
of the retained variables are summarized:  
 
Table 40.Contribution of Retained Variables in the Hospital Market Share 
Subordinate Model  
Variable Partial R2 C (p) F Value Pr>F 
totsurg_score 0.1193 5.7575 22.12 0.0001 
ioc_score    0.0235 14.395 9.06 0.0031 
bed_99 0.0411 8.2766  7.90 0.0056 
totpop_score_SQRT 0.0143 4.9870 3.43 0.0657 
control_change 0.0132 5.8243 2.64 0.1064 
Partial R2 = R2 of a model with the variable as the singular explanatory variable  
C (p) = contribution of the variable to the overall model R2    
 
 The reduced model demonstrated an improved F value, an improvement in 
significance to the level of < 0.0001 and an improvement in the R-square.  Collinearity 
diagnostics resulted in Eigen values from 1.96 to 0.07 with a maximum condition index 
of 5.14, reducing concerns about multicollinearity influencing the parameter estimates.  
The change in the number of specialty surgeons contributed the most to the variance in 
market share  with a C(p) level of  22.1, followed by the managed care index of 
competition contributing  at 14.39 with a Pr> F level of 0.0031. The parameter estimates 
for both of these variables are positive at 0.0014 and 0.1019 respectively. Although the 
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estimates are small, the positive direction of the IOC parameter estimate in prediction of 
change in hospital market share is a material finding. 
To assure that a conservative approach was taken to inference, the models were 
regressed without the five hospitals with residuals greater than 3.29. The changes 
resulting from their exclusion are listed in the model variance section in parentheses 
after the subordinate model results. When the potential outliers were removed, the mean 
square error improved less than 2% and the adjusted R square improved by 0.02. None 
of the parameter estimates changed materially in size or direction and the model 
continued to be significant at the <0.0001 level. The overall significance of the model, 
with no limitations noted in the model diagnostics supports the rejection of the null 
hypothesis that managed care activity is not related to hospital market share. The 
direction is opposite that of managed care concentration observed in prior models which 
provides support for the notion that these constructs behave differently when estimating 
procedure volume at the MSA level. The size of these parameter estimates is less 
meaningful from a policy perspective than is their direction and overall significance in the 
respective models.   
In summary, models were built to test whether managed care activity (as 
measured by penetration, IOC and concentration) was associated with changes in 
procedure volume and procedure rate at the MSA level and changes in procedure 
volume and market share at the hospital level. Contrary to conventional wisdom, 
managed care penetration, and its subsets of government program penetration in the 
Medicare and Medicaid programs were not found to be predictive in any of the models 
estimated. Managed care concentration was consistently associated with procedure 
volume and rate, demonstrating a negative parameter estimate at both at the MSA and 
hospital levels of analysis. The change in the number of specialty surgeons was 
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consistently and positively associated with the outcome in each of the models. Hospital 
market share was found to be favorably influenced by the competitiveness of the 
managed care market, as measured by the IOC, contrary to conventional wisdom. 
Perhaps of equal importance, are those variables not found to contribute in a meaningful 
manner to the model predictions?  The HHI, bed supply and hospital use rates were not 
predictive of volume or market share in this data, nor was a change in ownership/control 
which have been identified consistently in the literature as driving demand for surgical 
care.  Although the total population was predictive in these models, the population over 
65 was not statistically significant or contributory.   
The use of the difference scores to capture changes in the evolution of managed 
care across time is a rarely used approach to answering the questions posed in this 
research. In order to further test the results resulting from the use of this technique, a 
generalized estimating equation (GEE) is fitted post hoc to employs all of the counted 
observations over the five year period  in a log linear regression model .Criticisms of the 
use of difference scores regressed using normalized variables at the MSA level are 
addressed by the use of GEE and Poisson regression which does not rely on the normal 
distribution of count data recurrently measured annually over the study period.  The GEE 
is estimated at the MSA level as the target population for the policy implications of this 
research and at the hospital level to inform the hospital strategic planning process. 
Log Linear Regression Model Results 
The benefit of the log linear models in the post hoc analysis of the procedure 
score difference methodology is that they are most useful when the count data is multi-
dimensional and measured repeatedly over time, as is the case here.  The log linear 
approach is used not only to validate the prior models, but to measure the strength of 
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simultaneous relationships between the hypothesized managed care exposures over the 
study period.   
The PROC GENMOD procedure in the SAS software permitted the fit of a 
sequence of models measuring the importance of each variable added to each 
successive model, as well as all potential interactions. The power of progressive entry of 
multiple interaction terms permitted the identification of those regressors that may not be 
significant when tested independently, but become significant when tested together.  
The full saturated models are fit using all five years of data for the predictive and 
explanatory variables. The ‘repeated’ statement is used in the PROC GENMOD 
specifications to take into account the recurrent measurements adjusting for potential 
heterogeneity in the model. Optimum subordinate models were fit to assure maximally 
robust standard errors for the Poisson regression coefficients and identify the orthogonal 
regressors.  Prior to fitting the main effects model a model is fitted with no covariates 
(null model). The deviance statistic from the null or intercept only model was employed 
to ascertain the total amount of variability that is present and attributable to the 
sequentially added covariates.   The reduced regression models were considered 
adequate for prediction if  the overall model was significant and both the model deviance 
and Pearson’s chi-square coefficients were equal to, or close to, one (Pedan, 2000). 
Appropriate corrective action was taken when the model required improvement for 
optimal fit as the result of over-dispersion among the counts. Over-dispersion in the 
models is managed as recommended by Pedan through the introduction of a dispersion 
parameter Φ into the relationship between the population variance and the mean. This 
method permits estimation of parameter estimates and model testing without full 
understanding of the probability distribution of the data (2000).  
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To estimate the dispersion parameter the option ‘Dscale’ was entered into the 
model specifications, as was the use of the exchangeable covariance structure. The 
working correlation matrix was specified in the SAS program in order to produce both 
empirical and model based standard error estimates. The model based estimates are 
considered naive and empirical covariance matrices are used as they are more robust in 
the parameter and error estimates and therefore the more conservative in statistical 
inference.    
Procedure volume at the MSA level 
The MSA level outcome of procedure volume was regressed utilizing the same 
set of explanatory variables used in the ordinary least squares approach but using all 
five years of the change data.  The model resulted in a log likelihood of 769 with scaled 
deviance of one and scaled Pearson Chi square/degrees of freedom at 0.84.  The model 
was checked through the generation of standardized residuals including raw values, 
Pearson residuals and deviance residuals which were plotted and reviewed to identify 
outliers. The model was checked through the generation of standardized residuals 
including raw values, Pearson residuals and deviance residuals which were plotted and 
reviewed to identify outliers. The deviance residuals (StdResdev) and the Pearson’s 
residuals (Reschi) were close in value as is expected when the counts are of sufficient 
size and the model is reliable; however, the identification of what number constitutes 
“sufficient size “has not achieved consensus in the literature (Zelterman, 2002).   Review 
of the standardized residuals, interactions and outliers in the covariance matrix resulted 
in the decision to constrain the data with the Dscale and ‘repeated ‘ statements in the 
model specifications to control for potential over-dispersion in the data and the 
homogeneity associated with measures taken from the same sample each year.  This 
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specification in the model resulted in goodness of fit log likelihood of 567 and improved 
scaled Pearson’s chi square of 0.94.    
Although the log linear model permits substantially more data points to be 
computed, the number of MSAs in the study remains limited to 20. This limitation made it 
important to fit the model with the smallest number of predictive variables in preference 
to a highly significant but potentially over parametized solution; therefore, variables with 
robust error terms, but not contributing to the predictive value of the model were dropped 
through programming specifications to produce the best nested model with optimized fit 
to the data. That model successfully converged with both scaled deviance and scaled 
Pearson’s chi-square values approximating one with a dispersion scale adjustment of 
15.23. The optimal scale parameter selected to best fit the data by the genmod 
application of the log linear link was the square root of the deviance/degrees of freedom. 
The use of the SQRT transformation to fit the distribution of the data is consistent with 
the use of the SQRT used previously in the least squares regression approach to 
normalizing the data.  The SAS PROC GENMOD output for the best fit to the prediction 
of procedure volume, while controlling for the over-dispersion phenomenon is 
summarized in Figure 21 (Optimal Subordinate Log Linear Model of Procedure Volume 
at the MSA Level). 
  Three predictive variables survived the model reduction procedure with p values 
< 0.05.  Managed care concentration continues to be negatively associated with 
procedure volume at the MSA level while total population and the number of specialty 
surgeons continue to positively influence procedure volume at the MSA level. The 
managed care concentration parameter estimate demonstrates that the expected 
change in log procedure count for one unit increase in concentration is -0.0296 at the 
0.0433 level of statistical significance.   
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                  Criteria for Assessing Goodness of Fit 
          Criterion                 DF           Value        Value/DF 
          Deviance                  15       3478.4666        231.8978 
          Scaled Deviance           15         15.0000          1.0000 
          Pearson Chi-Square        15       3279.3805        218.6254 
          Scaled Pearson X2         15         14.1415          0.9428 
          Log Likelihood                      567.0980 
                        Analysis of Parameter Estimates 
                            Standard      Wald 95%        Chi- 
 Parameter       Estimate    Error   Confidence Limits   Square    Pr > ChiSq 
 Intercept        5.7309    0.2283    5.2834    6.1784   630.13      <.0001 
 CON_score       -0.0296    0.0147   -0.0584   -0.0009     4.09      0.0433 
 TOTPOP_score     0.0000    0.0000    0.0000    0.0000    49.31      <.0001 
 TOTSURG_score    0.0178    0.0053    0.0074    0.0283    11.19      0.0008 
 Scale                 0   15.2282    0.0000   15.2282   15.2282 
 
Figure 21. Optimal Subordinate Log Linear Model of Procedure Volume at the MSA 
Level. 
Imported from the SAS proc genmod program output. 
The scale parameter was estimated by the square root of deviance/degrees of freedom; the algorithm converged 
 
 
When all data is considered over the study period and subjected to the proc 
genmod procedure, the same variables proved predictive as was the case in the 
ordinary least squares models at the MSA level of analysis. The other managed care 
covariates have not been shown to influence procedure volume for these high risk, high 
cost surgical procedures when considered separately or together in interaction terms at 
the MSA level.  Checking of the standardized residuals of the model deviance (Table 41) 
resulted in the identification of the Ft. Myers MSA as an outlier as its behavior varied 
substantially from other MSAs as evident in the descriptive data for procedure volume. 
With that exception, the standardized residual error was consistent among the retained 
variables within other MSAs.  
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Table 41. Standardized Residuals of the Model 
Deviance (StdResdev) 
 
 
MSA           
 
    Con 
            
Totpop 
           
Totsurg 
1 0.4866  0.5082 0.4872 
2 -0.8699 -0.8269 -0.8573 
3 1.1017          0.1979 -0.0923 
4 0.1054 0.1063 0.1055 
5 -1.7718 -1.2528 -1.7411 
6 -0.5516 -0.0509 0.5483 
7 0.7475 0.7942 0.7532 
8 -1.196 -1.0778 -1.1749 
9 0.1548 0.1568 0.1555 
10 0.1834 0.1857 0.1839 
11 1.6179 1.8374 1.6379 
12 1.6103 1.7730 1.6579 
13 0.1143 0.1147 0.1145 
14 -0.9427 -0.0833 -0.9342 
15 -0.6297 -0.5824 -0.6266 
16 -1.1448 -1.0043 -1.1310 
17 -0.2064 -0.2041 -0.2053 
18 -0.6032 -0.5529 -0.5988 
19 -1.4818 -1.4401 -1.451 
20 1.4074 1.5285 1.4176 
Con = managed care concentration 
Totpop = total population 
Totsurg = Total surgeons 
 
In addition to the scaled goodness of fit statistics for deviance and Pearson chi-
square, model confidence intervals and p values, Type 3 GEE computations and 
residual analysis were used to determine overall predictive efficacy of the model.  An 
advantage of the log linear approach is the ability to further test the significance of the 
nested subordinate models in situations in which there are many terms and a 
conservative estimate is preferred. In this situation, the Type 3 GEE method avoids a 
serious source of error in log linear models because all important interactions among 
model variables are included in the computations. In addition, the Type 3 score 
procedure does not rely on the order in which the model variables are entered into the 
model, as is the case with the other scoring alternatives.  
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Type 3 analyses are accomplished by specifying a model and computing 
likelihood ratio statistics for contrasts associated with each term in the model. The 
contrast is the linear function of model parameters that includes the effect and any 
interaction of those effects. The Type 3 scoring analysis tests the significance of a main 
effect in the presence of interactions or Ho: the difference between the main effect and 
contrast term = 0 (SAS Institute, 2002).  
 
                 Source         Chi-Square  Pr > ChiSq 
 
                 CON                5.90      0.0152* 
                 PEN                1.12      0.2903 
                 IOC                1.72      0.1894 
                 CAID               0.10      0.7567 
                 CARE               0.15      0.0716 
                 HHI                0.03      0.8553 
                 USE                2.61      0.1059 
                 INFLAT             2.39      0.1222 
                 BED                0.16      0.6931 
                 MC_SHARE           3.55      0.0595 
                 TOTPOP             6.67      0.0098* 
                 POP65              0.69      0.4046 
                 TOTSURG           14.13      0.0002* 
 
Figure 22. Score Statistics for the Type 3 GEE Model Analysis at the MSA Level. 
Output from the SAS genmod program; * = significant at Pr > ChiSq ≤ 0.05; degree of freedom =1  
 
 
Type 3 analyses for the variables and contrast interaction terms summarize the 
results for all possible combinations of main effects and contrasts within the dataset 
(SAS Institute, 2011). The score statistics from the Type 3 analysis remained stable as 
did the error terms in the reduced model. The model diagnostics provide evidence that 
the model at the MSA level is sufficient to provide confidence in the resulting predictions 
and parameter estimates.  
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Procedure volume at the hospital level 
Procedure volume was regressed using all of the predictive and explanatory 
variables previously entered into the linear regression models at the hospital level. The 
variables were with entered with the proposed predictive managed care covariates first. 
No adjustment or accommodation for outliers was specified in the initial saturated model. 
In the overall model the Pearson chi-square values and standardized residuals 
demonstrated greater variability than would be anticipated from the Poisson distribution 
(scaled Pearson Chi-square = 338,232 with value/degrees of freedom = 1.34).  This 
phenomenon is common and anticipated in repeated measures of count data that are 
not independent, as is the case in this data set. The initial goodness of fit results and 
review of the standardized empirical and model error estimates suggested the presence 
of over-dispersion in the hospital data as it did at the MSA level. The overall result is 
show in Figure 23. 
 
                         Hospital Saturated Model with 
                       Exchangeable Covariance All Years 
                       Over dispersion Control with DSCALE 
 
                      Criteria for Assessing Goodness of Fit 
 
               Criterion                DF         Value          
Value/DF 
Deviance                 787     298709.9322        379.5552 
Scaled Deviance          787        787.0000          1.0000 
Pearson Chi-Square       787     338782.2645        430.4730 
Scaled Pearson X2        787        892.5771          1.1342 
      Log Likelihood                     6810.4018 
          
Figure 23. Goodness of Fit for the Log Linear Hospital Procedure Volume Model 
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The dscale specification within the exchangeable covariance structure was used 
in order to generate a conservative estimate of standard errors and in a “practical sense” 
modify parameter estimates to accommodate them (Hanneman, 2006).  
The model fits the data well based on the scaled goodness of fit criteria with the 
scale correction of 19.48. Error estimates were computed for each variable and 
combination of variables generating both model-based and empirical error estimates.  
Although the parameter estimates are essentially the same in each of these models as 
reflected in Figure 24, the standard errors differ. The most robust and conservative 
specifications are fitted consistent with the approach used throughout to defer to the 
most conservative and robust standard error estimates in model selection . The model 
using empirical standard error estimates  reflects statistically significant z scores at the ≤ 
0.05 for managed care concentration (Pr > z = 0.0296), total population (Pr > z = 
<.0001) and specialty surgeons at the hospital level (Pr > z = 0.0006) which was 
consistent with prior models.  
Managed care penetration and IOC were significant in the naïve model but not in 
the empirical model error estimates in which they are not significant and demonstrate 
larger standard error terms (SE) in the robust model (SE for PEN = 0.0069 and 0.2403 
compared with 0.0035 and 0.1593 for IOC). Parameter estimates for penetration are 
negative in both models whereas the parameter estimate for IOC has a positive and 
greater influence on hospital procedure volume in both (PE = 0.4272 and 0.4765 
respectively).  The measures of government activism in the form of Medicare and 
Medicaid penetration have not been shown to be significant in either the MSA or hospital 
level models. Hospital ownership control is significant in the naïve model with a negative 
parameter estimate.  
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                        Empirical Standard Error Estimates 
 
                              Standard   95% Confidence 
        Parameter    Estimate   Error       Limits          Z    Pr > |Z| 
 
        Intercept     5.9285   0.8597   4.2436   7.6134    6.90   <.0001 
        tot_proc     -0.9999   0.0000  -1.0000  -0.9998  -24866   <.0001* 
        CON          -0.0040   0.0018  -0.0076  -0.0004   -2.18   0.0296* 
        PEN          -0.0083   0.0069  -0.0219   0.0052   -1.21   0.2280 
        IOC           0.4272   0.2403  -0.0438   0.8982    1.78   0.0754 
        CAID         -0.0005   0.0019  -0.0043   0.0032   -0.28   0.7765 
        CARE          0.0015   0.0039  -0.0062   0.0091    0.38   0.7056 
        HHI           0.0000   0.0000  -0.0000   0.0000    1.67   0.0940 
        USE           1.7379   2.0670  -2.3133   5.7891    0.84   0.4005 
        INFLAT        0.0000   0.0000  -0.0000   0.0001    0.87   0.3831 
        BED          -0.0003   0.0005  -0.0012   0.0006   -0.58   0.5629 
        TYPE      0   0.1063   0.4717  -0.8182   1.0308    0.23   0.8216 
        TYPE      1   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000     .      . 
        CONTROL   0  -0.3505   0.2092  -0.7605   0.0595   -1.68   0.0938 
        CONTROL   1  -0.2987   0.1796  -0.6507   0.0533   -1.66   0.0963 
        CONTROL   2   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000     .      . 
        MC_SHARE      0.9512   0.5337  -0.0949   1.9973    1.78   0.0747 
        TOTPOP       -0.0000   0.0000  -0.0000  -0.0000   -4.08   <.0001* 
        POP65         0.0000   0.0000  -0.0000   0.0000    0.34   0.7376 
        TOTSURG       0.0123   0.0036   0.0053   0.0193    3.44   0.0006* 
           
 
Figure 24. Empirical Model Estimates of Error for the Saturated Log Linear Hospital 
Volume Model 
The scale parameter was held fixed; the algorithm converged; The data is output imported from the SAS genmod output 
 
 
The modestly negative influence on procedure volume associated with ownership 
change has been noted in prior iterations, although not rising to the level of statistical 
significance. Changes in population over the age of 65, inflation adjusted income, 
hospital use rates or HHI have not proven significant in prediction of procedure volume 
in any of the models tested.  As an additional option for checking and confirmation of the 
full hospital level models and interaction terms, the type 3 GEE analysis was again 
employed and output reported in Figure 25(GEE Type 3 Scoring of the Saturated 
Hospital Procedure Volume Model).  After a full exploration of pair wise and three way 
interaction terms, managed care concentration, total population and number of specialty 
surgeons continue to be predictive of procedure volume, and the relative size and direction 
of the parameter estimates remain stable across the respective models and model reduction 
procedures.  
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                         Chi- 
Source           DF     Square    Pr > ChiSq 
 
tot_proc          1       6.49        0.0108* 
CON               1       3.73        0.0534* 
PEN               1       1.08        0.2991 
IOC               1       2.12        0.1451 
CAID              1       0.08        0.7800 
CARE              1       0.13        0.7225 
HHI               1       3.29        0.0698 
USE               1       0.54        0.4644 
INFLAT            1       0.61        0.4356 
BED               1       0.13        0.7173 
TYPE              1       0.04        0.8327 
CONTROL           2       2.53        0.2829 
MC_SHARE          1       2.66        0.1026 
TOTPOP            1      13.61        0.0002* 
POP65             1       0.16        0.6911 
TOTSURG           1      15.00        0.0001* 
 
Figure 25. GEE Type 3 Scoring of the Saturated Hospital Procedure Volume Model 
 
Other managed care and healthcare market covariates were not individually 
significant in the full model, but interactions among them were further tested.  Although 
these interaction terms did not rise to the level of significance in the overall model, their 
identification is useful by their exclusion, consistency with prior studies and consideration 
for future research.  
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                   Chi- 
Source                     DF     Square    Pr > ChiSq 
CON*HHI                    1       5.92        0.0149 
CARE*USE                   1       7.02        0.0081 
CON*BED                    1       4.84        0.0279 
PEN*BED                    1       8.92        0.0028 
BED*logpop                 1       3.97        0.0464 
CAID*logpop65              1       9.24        0.0024 
HHI*logpop65               1       8.08        0.0045 
BED*logpop65               1      10.00        0.0016 
MC_SHARE*logpop65          1       3.75        0.0527 
PEN*TOTSURG                1       6.47        0.0110 
CAID*TOTSURG               1       6.08        0.0137 
CARE*TOTSURG               1       4.59        0.0321 
BED*TOTSURG                1      21.01        <.0001 
logpop*TOTSURG             1      13.09        0.0003 
logpop65*TOTSURG           1       7.52        0.0061 
 
Figure 26. Pair Wise Interaction Terms in the Saturated Hospital Model                             
Results of the GEE Type 3 Scoring Analysis using the SAS genmod Procedure. 
 
 
In summary, the log linear approach to testing the hypotheses in this research 
produces results which are consistent with the ordinary least squares approach using 
difference scores to capture changes over time. The managed care covariate that is 
consistently and negatively associated with procedure volume at both the MSA and 
hospital level is concentration, which is rarely utilized in managed care market research. 
Conversely, managed care penetration is not predictive in any of the models tested and 
where IOC is significant, the impact on procedure volume or market share is positive.  
The post hoc comparison of results achieved using the least squares approach 
with the log linear approach was designed to test the methodologies in the prediction of 
procedure volume. The ordinary least squares regression modeling approach produced 
its results under the assumption that model errors are independently and identically 
distributed normal random variables. The descriptive analysis of the count data collected 
about the 254,000 procedures in 161 acute care hospitals over a five year period 
demonstrates that the data tends to become increasingly skewed as the count 
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increases. At low levels of the mean for procedure volume, rate and market share the 
distribution tends to be sharply skewed; however, as the frequency distribution of the 
counts increase, the results from log linear modeling using the Poisson distribution will 
be very close to the ordinary least squares normal model fit, as was observed here 
(Flynn, 1999).     
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Chapter 5 
Key Findings, Policy Implications and Study Limitations  
 This study was designed to answer four specific questions about the impact of 
managed care on procedure volume, rate and hospital market share, as well as to 
identify which measure of managed care best serves to predict those outcomes.  This 
study offers several advancements over prior research. First, the sample includes the 
entire population in the state of Florida, not limited to the elderly or the Medicaid 
population. Second, it includes all licensed managed care plans in the state including 
PPO and government plans as compared with the majority of studies limited in the 
managed care sampling frame. Third, three potential managed care predictive variables 
are included in the statistical models. This is in contrast to prior research which relies on 
managed care penetration, and a small number of studies that consider IOC or 
concentration as the measure of managed care activity. An important consideration in 
this study is that it tests the use and expansion of the difference score methodology to 
measure and understand changes over time within health care markets.  In addition to 
the potential benefits of the methodology in predicting surgical utilization, the inherent 
limitations in the methodology that may impact the validity and generalizability of the 
results are addressed. Finally, the health care policy and hospital strategic planning 
implications of the study are presented and summarized.  
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Key Findings 
 The key study findings of strategic importance include: 
1. Study procedure volume increased in Florida for all procedures except 
esophageal resection. 
2. Statewide procedure rates for both the population and the population over age 
65 were stable over the study period. 
3. Substantial small area variation was present in both managed care activity and 
surgical procedure utilization. 
4. The greatest reduction in both volume and rate of study surgical procedures was 
observed in those MSAs with low managed care penetration. 
5. Change in managed care concentration has a substantial, consistent and 
negative relationship to the change in volume and rate of study procedures at 
both the market and the hospital level of analysis.   
6. Neither change in managed care penetration nor change in managed care IOC 
was predictive of change in procedure volume at the market level.  
7. Change in the total population and the number of specialty surgeons had a 
substantial, consistent and positive relationship to change in procedure volume 
at both the market and hospital level. 
8. Change in managed care consolidation has a negative impact on hospital 
procedure volume whereas more managed care competition had a positive 
relationship with change in hospital market share reflecting the impact of 
managed care selective contracting. 
9. Medicare managed care tends to behave in a manner similar to commercial 
plans, whereas Medicaid managed care plans assume different patterns of 
market behavior.  
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10. A significant and growing number of procedures with demonstrated volume and 
outcome endogeniety are performed in low volume hospitals in Florida. 
11. The managed care variables penetration, competition and concentration are 
separate constructs, measure different behaviors and exercise different 
influence on market behaviors.  
12. The increase in for-profit hospitals was not associated with change in the 
volume of high risk surgical procedures in Florida.    
13. Consideration of the stage of managed care market development is essential in 
managed care research. 
14.  The difference score is a useful, reliable and valid method to measure change 
in health care markets over time.  
Implications of procedure volume findings 
This study demonstrates that the number of procedures for which volume is 
important to outcome increased on an annual basis in Florida and remained consistent 
as a percent of the total number of procedures performed.  In addition, the population 
rate of these procedures did not change significantly and was stable year to year. While 
procedures decreased in four MSAs the losses were small and the volume increased 
proportionately in other geographically contiguous MSAs within relatively short 
commuting distances. The Ft. Myers MSA experienced a change in the volume of 
cardiac procedures which was meaningful; however, the nearest competitor in the 
Naples MSA initiated a cardiac surgical program which shifted the volume to that 
hospital which was experiencing the lowest levels of managed care penetration in the 
state. These observations demonstrate the tremendous variation in healthcare markets 
within the state and the supports an important premise that this geographic variation 
permits comparisons of those markets as separate entities. The variability also supports 
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the necessity to understand the markets at the local level  before utilizing state level data 
to generate policy decisions.   
The increase in the number of procedures performed at low volume hospitals in 
Florida has serious outcome implications at the population level, particularly since the 
trend increased for all procedures except CABG on a percentage basis. Based on the 
research by Dudley the state is experiencing substantial excess morbidity, mortality and 
cost for these procedures as the result (Dudley, Johansen, Brand, Rennie, Milstein, 
2000).   
 Procedure rate models were designed to estimate the impact of managed care 
on rate, but more importantly to understand whether the observed changes in procedure 
volume were merely the result of changes in population. Procedure rates did not change 
over the study period at a statistically meaningful level; however, findings in this study 
are consistent with those of Wennberg and others that substantial small area variation 
exists, both for the individual study procedures and for the procedures in aggregate 
(Wennberg, 1999). Even in MSAs considered to be peers, the rates differed substantially 
and were not associated the percent of the population over the age of 65 as may have 
been predicted based on prior seminal research (Balla, 1999; Anderson, Grumbach, 
Luft, Roos, Mustard & Brook,1993; Anderson,1973).  
 The procedure rate least squares model adds to the understanding of managed 
care influence, but explained less of the variation in rate than did the procedure volume 
models. Change in managed care concentration was the only managed care variable 
found to be a significant predictor of procedure rate change. Clearly, there are additional 
variables influencing procedure rates that were not identified by the prior research and 
were not included in the predictive models. Identification of these factors and their 
inclusion in future research would be of benefit.  Changes in hospital use rates, older 
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age and the number of surgeons were not predictive in changing the procedure rates on 
a population level, as has been suggested in other studies (Miller & Luft, 1994; Detmer & 
Gelijns, 1994; Cohen & Weinick 2000; de Jong, Westert, Noetscher, & Groenewegen, 
2004).  Again, the importance of the measurement of change over time is important, as 
Florida has higher use rates than other states when measured at a given point in time or 
in aggregate over a period of time. After demographic and other variables are controlled, 
the differential between Florida and the rest of the United States is 25 % for healthcare 
utilization among whites ages 65-84 (Fuchs, 2003).   
 The Fuchs study data reporting favorable mortality for whites demonstrates that 
although procedure rate did not decrease for the population as a whole in Florida, the 
possibility exists for different levels of access to these procedures for members of certain 
underserved subgroups (i.e. minorities or women). The target population here is at the 
hospital and market level, but the impact on subgroups within the population is possible 
and the question would benefit from further research. Those sub groups may be 
represented in the government programs. Changes in hospital use rates, older age and 
number of surgeons were not predictive in changing the procedure rates on a population 
level, as has been suggested in other studies (Miller & Luft, 1994; Detmer & Gelijns, 
1994; Cohen & Weinick 2000; de Jong, Westert, Noetscher & Groenewegen, 2004).   
Implications of managed care activity findings  
Bivariate analyses, least squares linear regression models and post hoc log 
linear models each isolated the change in managed care concentration as the predictive 
variable with a strong, consistent, significant and negative influence on change in 
procedure volume when other influences on utilization are controlled.  Each of the 
models explains a large portion of the variation in procedure volume and managed care 
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concentration contributed more to the models than do any of the other statistically 
significant explanatory variables.  
Conversely, managed care penetration and IOC has a positive association with 
procedure volume when measured at a single point in time on an annual basis within 
each study year. It is only when the when difference scores are used to measure change 
in procedure volume and rate over time that the importance of managed care 
concentration is isolated as the single managed care driver of the observed change. 
Unlike managed care concentration, there was no evidence in this data that market entry 
(penetration) and competition (IOC) among managed care plans suppressed procedure 
volume or enrollee access to these specific operations at the market or hospital level, as 
has been the conventional wisdom supported by some well publicized early studies 
(Robinson & Luft, 1985, Robinson, 1996).  
 To the contrary, change in IOC was associated with a positive change in hospital 
market share for some hospitals while others lost market share.  This was observed with 
the level of managed care share of total procedures controlled at the MSA level which 
was a limitation cited in prior studies. The data provide evidence to support the premise 
that hospitals benefit from a competitive managed care market, and that some hospitals 
enjoyed an increase in volume in an environment of high levels of managed care 
concentration. Although the statistical models for market share only explain 
approximately 20% of the variation the overall model is highly significant. Although 
inferences must be made with care, it is reasonable to conclude that selective 
contracting with managed care plans played a role for the 47 hospitals that grew market 
share at the expense of the 25 that lost share, in spite of some increase in procedure 
volume, in an environment of stable procedure rates.   Health care executives and 
legislators who actively worked to create barriers to entry or facilitated the exit of 
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managed care plans in their markets likely contributed to the creation of the current 
highly consolidated market and contrary to their self interest, shifted market power to the 
remaining managed plans over time.   
The trend to consolidation in health plans has continued after the period of time 
in this study. The top 10 health plans in 1995 held 27% of the national market. Ten years 
later the top 10 plans controlled 57% of the market and it is projected that by 2015 that 
number will be 75%. Of the 400 plan mergers between 1995 and 2005, 95% took place 
in metropolitan areas in which a single plan controlled more than 30% of the market 
(Carroll, 2007) and that number increased to 99% by 2009 (Serafini, 2010).  
Implications of the government managed care findings 
 Changes in Medicare managed care penetration did not predict procedure 
volume change in the statistical models. Enrollment rates assumed a strong pattern of 
increase across the state over the study period when the program was morphed to the 
Medicare Advantage plan. The evolution to market concentration in contrast to market 
competition has acted in the same manner as commercial plans, consistent with prior 
research. (U.S. Office of Management of Budget, 2009). The Commonwealth Fund 
estimates that 71.5%, or 2,114 counties are highly concentrated for Medicare Advantage 
with low levels of competition based on their HHI. A single plan (Humana) dominates the 
market in the 100 largest counties. The finding is consistent with the trend in Medicare 
managed care in this study of Florida where 10 of the 100 most concentrated counties in 
the U.S. are located (Biles, Pozen & Guterman, 2009).  
 Assuming a different pattern of behavior, Medicaid penetration in the data 
produced a significant and negative parameter estimate in the non- transformed 
regression model. The difficulty in interpretation of transformed models is one of the 
limitations to be addressed. The mean annual enrollment in Medicaid managed care was 
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relatively flat over the study period but with peaks and valleys in enrollment year to year. 
Unlike Medicare which captures older Americans who consistently remain in the 
federally managed program, the Medicaid population tends to be more transiently 
enrolled as the program is subject to legislative and funding changes at the state level 
that influence participation. This was an extremely volatile period in the Medicaid 
program, characterized by many changes in managed care plan ownership and control. 
This likely created difficulty in the management of an ongoing patient level medical plan 
for enrollees or long term follow up.   
Implications of the socio-demographic market factors 
The models utilized in the study also provide useful information about the 
relationships of the control variables to procedure volume, rate and hospital market 
share.  The change in total population over the study period consistently contributed to 
the prediction of the market level outcomes.  Of note, however the change in the 
population over age 65 was not found to be a significant predictor of change in 
procedure volume or rate.   Prior assumptions about the distribution and impact of the 
elderly population on utilization of health care services assumes that the elderly in 
Florida are uniformly distributed, an assumption not supported by the MSA level findings. 
The generalization of research findings resulting exclusively from the Medicare patient 
data to the Florida population as a whole and to policy development may not be 
appropriate given this data.   
The only model in which inflation adjusted income was a statistically significant 
predictor was the subordinate model estimating procedure rate at the MSA level of 
analysis, but at a very low positive parameter estimate. This association is complex in 
conflicting theories of the relationship between income and surgical rates of utilization. 
Whether low income individuals are willing to trade choice for lower premiums or 
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whether managed care development is more likely in areas of high income where 
healthy people receive insurance as a fringe benefit of employment is not clear and few 
studies have been done examining this particular question (Balla, 1999). In Florida, it 
may be a function of the rurality of the central portion of the state where agriculture is the 
primary income source. These MSAs have higher concentrations of poor with lesser 
access to Medicaid, primary care and hospital services. This would be important to 
understand in that the procedures being studied here are those that have life limiting 
consequences should access to them be constrained. During the study period, eight 
counties in Florida had no hospital at all and managed care penetration is at the stage 1 
level of penetration.  
The hospital models designed to estimate volume and market share explain less 
of the variation in these outcomes than do the population based models. This is to be 
expected given the variability of hospital characteristics and complexities of the market 
interactions; however, the models do provide significant insight into the relationship of 
managed care selective contracting arrangements. The estimates of the change in 
managed care concentration and change in hospital level procedure volume produced a 
large negative parameter estimate indicating that as managed care became more 
concentrated, overall hospital volume decreased in the model explaining 34% of the 
observed variation. Conversely, change in managed care concentration was not 
predictive of change in hospital market share. An increase in managed care competition 
demonstrated a favorable relationship to hospital market share.  This may provide 
evidence that managed care plans have not shifted their patients to the hospitals with 
the highest volume for these procedures. This finding is consistent with that of other 
investigators examining Florida data generated during the same period of time (Escarce, 
1997; Chernew, Hayward, & Scanlon, 1996; Mitchell, 1999). Hospital specific variables 
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entered into the volume and market share models demonstrate a statistically significant 
relationship between the number of licensed beds and a positive change in hospital 
procedure volume, but not on a hospital’s market share.   
In addition, the size of the hospital and the number of surgeons working at the 
hospital had an influence on the procedure volume it generates and reflects capacity. 
The bed variable is not a change score since the number of licensed beds rarely 
changes and staffed bed numbers are not available. The parameter estimates 
demonstrate the strength of those relationships in that for each increase in bed capacity 
of one the procedure volume is predicted to increase by 0.8 whereas for each increase 
in operating surgeons procedure volume is predicted to increase by 7. These findings 
are consistent with the met-analysis of more than 400 studies over 40 years confirming 
that  the  number of hospital beds was found to be a positive statistically significant 
predictor of procedure volume for the individual hospital; in addition, most research on 
the relationship between health system capacity and utilization of health care services 
identifies a positive correlation between the number of available providers of services 
and utilization rates for those services (Baker, 2008). Baker found these observations to 
be so consistent in the best peer reviewed literature that he asserts that the criteria for 
causality have, at least in part, been met.   
   The relationship between the number of specialty surgeons and procedure 
volume was inconsistent in the descriptive data, but strongly predictive at both the MSA 
and hospital level of analysis in the regression models. The observation that some MSAs 
lost surgeons and yet increased procedure volume may be explained by volume and 
outcome contours developed by Studnicki et al.  The investigators examined CABG data 
in Florida for the period 1998 to 2002 and also found the distribution of hospital and 
surgeon volume to be highly skewed. The top 10 % of surgeons (by volume) accounted 
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for 25 % to 50 % of procedures (Studnicki, Berndt, Luther & Fisher, 2004). The 
differences in the number of surgeons and resultant procedure volume can potentially be 
explained by the productivity of the surgeons involved; however, the explanation is not 
sufficient to explain all of the observed differences on the MSA level.  For example, in 
the Ft. Lauderdale MSA the number of procedures increased while the procedure rate 
and number of surgeons decreased; whereas in neighboring Miami-Dade MSA all three 
measures decreased. In Tampa the volume increased as did the number of surgeons 
but the procedure rate decreased. Although severity of illness is not a consideration in 
this study, the data demonstrate that population parameters like age and income that 
have been shown to drive demand for surgical procedures is not as influential as 
hospital and surgeon supply when overall use hospital use rates are controlled.  
Other hospital measures demonstrated to influence volume and market share 
were retained in the subordinate models as they stabilized the output and contributed to 
the models, although not at the 0.05 level of statistical significance. Ownership and 
control changes were brisk during the study period. The conversion to for-profit control 
was associated with a reduction in surgical volume of 60 cases and a market share 
parameter estimate of -.02 but only at the 0.08 and 0.14 level of significance 
respectively.   
The impact of managed care penetration on hospital consolidation has frequently 
studied (Dranove, Simon, & White 2002; Town, Wholey, Feldman, & Burns, 2007; Vogt, 
2009); however recognition that consolidation and resultant power of managed care 
plans is a significant factor in the market has been rare in health services research. The 
HHI as a measure of hospital market consolidation was not significant in the models 
estimated at the MSA level; however, there was a strong inverse relationship between 
HHI in an MSA and the extent of managed care penetration in the descriptive data 
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(Figure 17). HHI was more influential on hospital volume, although the p value for the 
small positive parameter estimate did not meet the 0.05 level of statistical significance (p 
= 0.075).  It is clear that managed care plans tend to enter markets which are more 
competitive for hospital care, which is consistent with the prior research. In that more 
hospitals are in populous areas, it is likely that the higher rates of managed care 
penetration are associated with total population, as well as the number of hospitals 
observed in these models and prior research.  
Implications of procedure specific findings 
The only study procedure performed less frequently from 1995 to 1999 was 
esophageal resection for cancer. It would be important to understand the reasons, as the 
national incidence of esophageal cancer during the study period remained approximately 
five per 100,000 population. The current trends in Florida are increasing for this cancer 
at the same time the incidence rates for other forms of cancer have been falling 
(National Cancer Institute 2011). Changes in the procedure volume and rate were not 
associated with any of the measures of managed care activity.  
More than 133,000 coronary artery bypass procedures were performed during 
the study period dominating the data and accounting for half of the volume of procedures 
performed in 48% of study hospitals. The study finding of higher than average CABG 
rates comport with those of Hannan, Wu and Chassin using the 1999 Healthcare Cost 
and Utilization Project data found that the Florida age and gender adjusted rates of 
CABG were at the highest level when compared with other states and 53% higher than 
the lowest rate. (2006). The new cardiac surgical programs were developed in Florida 
during the same period of time that the less invasive percutaneous cardiac 
revascularization procedures were being adopted; in addition, the programs were started 
in the same markets as existing programs where there was no evidence that supply was 
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insufficient to meet demand. In that 55% of Florida hospitals were found to be 
performing fewer than the recommended number of CABG procedures, the overall 
healthcare system cost and quality implications are substantial.  
  Among the individual study procedures AAAR and pancreatic resection differ in 
that the number of cases increased statewide, but the population procedure rate 
decreased. For pancreatic cancer surgical resection remains the only curative option 
and the disease has the highest mortality rate among cancers. The procedure rate 
decreased by only 0.0083/1,000 population and the change in volume between 1995 
and 1999 was not statistically significant. The data is consistent with an overall 0.05 
reduction in incidence of pancreatic cancer in the state through 2007 (National Cancer 
Institute, 2011). The condition is one which would benefit from research to examine the 
impact of disparate access, as the condition is more prevalent in  black men, but prior 
research has demonstrated that  that fewer of these patients are referred for surgery 
(Murphy, Simons, Hill & McDade, et al., 2009). It is unclear from this data whether this is 
the case in Florida as the state was not one of the seventeen tumor registries that 
participated in the National Cancer Institute’s Surveillance, Epidemiology, and End 
Results (SEER) program (Murphy, et al., 2009).   
Abdominal aortic aneurysm repair volume increased statewide by 184 cases 
which was not statistically different between 1995 and 1999; however, the population 
procedure rate decreased. This observation may be a result of the case selection for this 
study which only included elective (planned, non-ruptured) AAARs. Ruptured aortic 
aneurysm is the 10th leading cause of death for men over the age of 55 and 30% to 50% 
of patients experiencing a ruptured abdominal aortic aneurysm die before they reach a 
hospital (USC Center for Vascular Care, 2011). Emergency cases in which patients and 
providers cannot influence the choice of receiving hospital are not useful in evaluating 
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the influence of selective contracting relationships in hospital or surgical utilization, which 
is the focus of this study. The difference between elective and total AAAR procedure 
counts explains the observed difference in total incidence for the procedure and the 
reduction in population rate calculations.  
The question appropriate for further investigation is whether Florida experiences 
more emergency procedures and pre-hospital deaths from rupture (as a percentage of 
the total number of cases) than do other states, thus accounting for the lesser and 
decreasing rate of elective AAAR procedures. In 2004, the Society for Vascular Surgery 
(SVS) recommended baseline ultrasound screening for AAA patients deemed fit for 
interventions for men aged 60 to 85 years, women aged 60 to 85 years with 
cardiovascular risk factors, and men and women older than 50 years with a family 
history of AAA (Kent, Zwolak, Jaff, Hollenbeck, & Thompson,2004). Given the mortality 
rate for rupture and that most abdominal aneurysms are incidental findings (Natara & 
Mortimer, 2004) hospitalization for emergency repair should be considered as an 
‘avoidable hospitalization’. Thus, it can be used as a measure or proxy variable for 
access to primary care, as is the case with other conditions amenable to detection in the 
primary care setting.  
Correlations between the three measures of managed care activity with the 
volume of each individual procedure demonstrate a moderate negative relationship 
between managed care concentration and carotid endarterectomy (-0.531) as the only 
procedure with a statistically significant correlation.  According to the American Heart 
Association this procedure had been performed in patients with symptomatic carotid 
artery stenosis, based on “suggestive but inconclusive evidence for its effectiveness “. It 
was not until 1998 that randomized studies resulted in the first set of evidenced base 
guidelines (Biller, Feinberg, Castaldo, Whittemore, Harbaugh & Dempsey, et al., 1998).  
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Morasch found that the annual number of CEA procedures in Florida increased 74% 
between 1992 and 1996. A single large increase occurred during the second half of 
1994 after a clinical alert was issued on benefits to CEAs in asymptomatic patients.  
Thus, this procedure would be particularly amenable to careful procedural review by 
managed care plans to control the double digit increases in this costly elective procedure 
with controversial indications (Morasch, Parker, Feinglass, Manheim, & Pearce, 2000). 
Cerebral aneurysm repair is a rare procedure with estimated prevalence ranging 
from 5-10% with 50% rupturing in the pre-hospital setting. About 10% of patients who 
experience a rupture die before reaching medical attention and 25% die within 24 hours. 
In Florida the patients who were un-ruptured or survived rupture for surgery had their 
procedure performed almost exclusively in one university hospital by a small number of 
neurosurgical specialists. Although the frequency of cerebral aneurysms has not 
declined in recent years in the U.S, the number of procedures in Florida declined by 55 
procedures, but the population procedure rate remained stable. As with AAAR, 
investigation of the rate of pre-bleed diagnosis in Florida would be useful (Liebeskind & 
Lutsep, 2010).  Unlike AAA there is no standard mechanism for screening or early 
detection in the absence of a strong family history.   
Utility of Managed Care Staging Models  
 This study demonstrated that the consolidation of managed care plans in the 
Florida markets has suppressed the number and rate of procedures with volume and 
outcome endogeniety, while higher levels of managed care competition are associated 
with an increase in hospital market share. The ongoing managed care consolidation is 
consistent with evolution to stage 4 of the APM/UHC Model and stage 4 of Coile’s 
model of managed care market development. There is efficacy in using the concept of 
market stages to compartmentalize and understand differences observed in 
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communities based on the maturity of the managed care market. A review of the 
literature provides no more feasible explanation for the huge variations reported in 
managed care outcomes research and have typically studied managed care by 
aggregating the data for the study period or considering it only on an annualized basis. 
However, the benchmarks that hallmark transition from one stage to the other require 
more specification and better measures. 
 MSAs in Florida exhibit variation in the stages of managed care based on the 
level of managed care penetration defined in the UHC/APM and Coile models ranging 
from stage 1 to stage 3.  By 1999 five MSAs had transitioned from stage 1 to stage 2, 
three moved from stage 2 to stage 3 and seven had evolved to stage 3. A reduction in 
the IOC with a concurrent increasing trend in consolidation would likely better mark the 
transition to stage 3 than penetration levels alone.  The pattern and evolution of 
managed care observed in the Florida markets during the study period are consistent 
with the model as procedure volume was not suppressed by managed care penetration, 
but rather by managed care concentration occurring in the later stages. 
Although none of these MSAs would be considered to be in Stage 4 on the basis 
of managed care penetration alone, the market criteria and benchmarks measured in 
this study signal that the transition has occurred in several MSAs and the model 
benchmarks would be better specified by a combination of measures. Pawlson suggests 
that that labor market-adjusted HMO premiums may be a useful measure may provide 
improvement over the use of penetration, IOC, market staging in large MSAs. (Pawlson, 
Moy Kim, Griner, 2001). On the basis of the data and models tested in this study, a 
better solution may be to use a combination of measures to define the movement 
through the stages.  Competitive pressure is felt by the managed care plans and 
consolidation is generally observed in markets that have a lower level of penetration 
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than the 30% to 50% specified in the models for stage 4. Based on the analysis of all of 
the data for Florida MSAs and hospitals over the study period, it is reasonable to 
conclude that markets go through these stages at differing speed or pace  rather than 
the analysis offered by Burns in which he asserts that staging merely represents a 
snapshot in time. An alternative use of the staging models may be as a template to 
superimpose on the analysis of the interface between hospital and managed care 
markets. 
 Research based on a point or period in time or on a limited geographic area will 
not reflect reality for communities in a different locale or at a different stage of managed 
care evolution. Figure13 and Figure 14 clearly depict the unique behaviors of managed 
care penetration, IOC and concentration over time. This study results are contrary to the 
conclusions drawn by Burns in his assessment of the staging paradigms when he drew 
the conclusion that HMO penetration and HMO consolidation are ‘likely to be correlated 
with each other and with consumer activism.” (Burns, Bazzoli, Dynan, & Wholey, 1997)  
The lack of correlation observed among these variables when the difference scores are 
tested and the result of collinearity diagnostics for the statistical models indicate that 
these constructs differ and have separate influence on the outcomes and are not 
correlated with each other or with volume. These measures are not adequate to 
understand the complex changes in managed care markets over time when estimated 
independently, in a single year or aggregated over a period of time. Each must be 
considered if the maturity of the managed care markets being studied is to be 
understood. It is therefore essential that important policy decisions be based on data that 
measures change over a long enough period of time to have confidence that the 
observations are generalizable and will not change as the stage of market development 
changes.  
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Study Limitations 
This research measures the outcomes of a natural experiment in the evolution of 
managed care. Healthcare markets are tremendously complex moving targets in a 
continuous state of change.  The characteristics that make one hospital more efficient or 
more capable of attracting managed care contracts or patients are difficult to compare 
because the metrics used to measure financial performance and quality differ ranging 
from rudimentary hand counted data required by legislated mandate to the most 
sophisticated data warehousing. Market conditions are not possible to hold static and 
therefore not all of the latent complex factors potentially impacting a health plan or 
hospital’s performance can be captured in the predictive models.  The primary limitations 
that impact the generalizability of the study results are the data issues associated with 
the use of administrative secondary data and the validity of assumptions for the use of 
the selected statistical tests.  The study period of 1995 to 1999 was carefully and 
specifically selected to capture the full scope of the managed care business cycle which 
could be used to predict and plan for change in the future; follow up is appropriate to 
assess the efficiency, effectiveness and consistency of the models for predictions of 
managed care market development after that time frame.    
Limitations of the secondary data 
The conclusions drawn from population based studies in selective contracting by 
managed care plans must rely on publically available data as the specifics of managed 
care contracts are closely held proprietary information protected for competitive reasons. 
Consequently, the specific elements of these contractual agreements are not available 
to the researcher and must be imputed from primary payer designation in the financial 
data submitted to AHCA. Whether the nature of those agreements should be subject to 
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the Florida sunshine laws is yet another area of debate balancing business necessity 
with public protection.  
The disadvantage of the administrative data relied upon in this study is that it is 
self reported by hospitals and is not validated by accuracy or completeness.  The 
designations within the data were not sufficiently specific for some variables which would 
have been useful. The type of hospital, for example was only designated as ‘teaching’ or 
‘general’  and licensed beds rarely change year after year whereas staffed beds is a 
much more sensitive indicator of utilization. Although some elements of data can be 
validated through other sources, some data cannot be retrieved.  The data derived from 
the hospital billing system for two large hospitals in the West Palm Beach MSA was 
permanently lost by the billing vendor processing their data. The aggregate procedure 
volume for 1998 for that MSA was affected as was the total procedure volume for the 
state. This study depended upon the extraction of discharge data based on procedure 
codes. Hospital coding of procedures is notoriously error prone. Although procedure 
codes tend to be more reliable than medical diagnosis codes the errors in judgment 
associated with selecting primary codes are frequent.  The 9,200 codes adopted by the 
American Medical Association (AMA) in the 1960s are still being relied upon for 
designation of the primary and secondary procedure codes (Zane, 2008).  Although 
there are opportunities for improvement and limitations to the use of hospital discharge 
data it has been an established and essential tool in health services and health policy 
research (Schoenman, Sutton, Kintala, Love & Maw, 2005).   
The target of this research is those procedures that have strong evidence to 
support the endogeniety of volume with outcome; however, the representation of CABG 
procedures in the data is disproportionate in the data. In addition, the elective repair of 
cerebral aneurysm is such a rare procedure it is limited to a very small number of 
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physician and hospital providers. The analysis of the unique surgeons operating within 
each MSA was problematic. The surgeon counts in the study are unique to each 
hospital, but surgeons often practice in more than one hospital. Although every effort to 
assure that surgeon counts were also unique at the MSA level, the aggregate counts 
may be minimally overstated as physicians are credited for more than one type of 
procedure in the data set.  In addition, some surgeons perform procedures within 
multiple specialties and some procedures are performed by surgeons in different 
specialties. Surgical privileges are approved by each hospital or hospital system and the 
same surgeon may have different surgical privileges in one hospital than in another. A 
centralized repository of approved surgical privileges has been recommended but not 
funded or implemented at the state level.   Such a database would be useful in this type 
of research.  
The rate calculations in the study are derived variables utilizing the population 
estimates provided by the U.S. Census Bureau based on the 1990 census and 
anticipated population changes over the study period. There is a risk that the population 
estimates from which the rates were derived were not accurate.  A review of the 
estimates revealed that they were very consistent with the actual 2000 census counts. 
For example, the 1999 population estimate for the Orlando MSA was 1,607,993 and the 
2000 census count was 1,644,561. For the Tampa area the estimate for 1999 used to 
calculate the study rates was 2,369,105 and the actual 2000 reported census was 
2,395,997. The Miami-Dade MSA in which the population estimate was 2,220,961 for 
1999 was 2,253,362 in the 2000 census. A review of each MSA revealed similar 
differences on a percentage basis which are unlikely to have influenced the model 
results. However, population based studies in Florida can be influenced by the large 
numbers of seasonal residents who may receive care, but their residence may be 
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incorrectly accounted. The state averages 920,000 during the winter months. They are 
usually from New York, over 55, and wealthier than retirees who reside in Florida year-
round (Study, 2004.) In addition, the number of migrant farm workers in the state can 
either over or underestimate the population based on their immigrant status and 
movement across state lines. Overall immigration added 69,053 residents between 1995 
and 2000 and lost 58,599 due to outmigration for a change statewide of only 10,454 
(U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2003a). 
Limitations of the statistical methods 
This research is predicated on the measurement of change over time and the 
use of weighted least squares linear regression. Linear regression relies on a series of 
assumptions of the relationships between independent variables and the dependent 
variable and when those relationships are present shows optimal results. The further the 
deviation from these assumptions, the greater the likelihood of error. The first element 
that creates vulnerability in the use of the least squares approach is the small number of 
MSAs given the number of independent variables tested. The probability of erroneously 
forming a regression model increases as a function of the number of predictors and as 
the inter-predictor correlation increases, the probability of making errors increases as 
well. Stepwise elimination was used to reduce the number of predictors and thereby the 
likelihood of type I error (Pohlmann, 1979). However, the role of chance and a type II 
error may be increased (Munro & Page, 1993). If stepwise regression is used, a larger 
sample size is required. Although there are more than 250,000 procedures in the data 
set they are restricted to 20 MSAs. The model reduction to reduce the number of 
independent variables was helpful, but may overestimate the prediction. The log linear 
model was designed to address this issue as the Poisson distribution has been shown to 
produce reliable estimates with small sample sizes; however, the size under which it is 
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reliable is not specified. The sample size in the hospital models at 161 with three 
predictors in the reduced model demonstrates sufficient size to meet the assumptions 
and create precise parameter estimates. 
Initial exploration of the distribution of the model variables demonstrated the 
count data assumed a non-normal distribution which was managed by estimating 
models with and without square root transformation to stabilize the distribution of the 
variances. The transformation using the square root and use of difference score 
normalized the variables and transformation is least reliable in small samples. Although 
none of the standardized residuals in the MSA models technically exceeded three 
standard deviations from the mean to classify it as an outlier, the Naples MSA at 2.64 
has the potential for influence as the potential for influence of an outlier is greatest in a 
small sample (Kleinbaum, Kupper, Muller & Nizam, 1998).  Although there are inherent 
limitations in the sample size of 20 MSAs confidence in the results of the models is 
improved by the consistency between the bivariate associations at the MSA level, the 
linear least squares regression and the log linear models.   
Although least squares regression often gives optimal estimates of the unknown 
parameters, it is very sensitive to the presence of unusual data points in the data used to 
fit a model. One or two outliers can sometimes seriously skew the results of a least 
squares analysis. The five outliers in the hospital data were retained in the overall 
hospital level models weighing the risks associated with their removal. Dropping outliers 
may lead to an underestimation of the variability and overly optimistic p values and their 
inclusion may contribute to model error.  The models were submitted with and without 
the outlier hospitals included and both were highly significant with an immaterial change 
in the adjusted R square or resultant parameter estimates. Three of the outliers were on 
the east coast of the state and the remaining two were in the Daytona MSA and they 
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varied in size and ownership. The statistical relationships between the error terms and 
the regressors play an important role in unbiased estimations.  Based on the residuals 
resulting from their removal they did not create systematic model error.  Failure of 
linearity in the residuals created by the outliers does not invalidate the analysis, but 
rather potentially weakens it, or it fails to map the full extent of the relationships among 
the model variables (Tabachnick &Fidell, 1996).  Assuming the regression model is 
correct and the dependent variable really is a linear function of the independent 
variables, with independent and identically normally distributed errors the coefficient 
estimates are expected to be unbiased and their errors. The standard error of the 
estimated coefficient of the volume and rate the respective models is the "signal-to-noise 
ratio" for observing the effect of managed care.  The larger the standard error of the 
coefficient estimate, the worse the signal-to-noise ratio and the less precise the 
measurement of the coefficient (Nau, 2005).  The standard error of each of the predictive 
variables at the MSA level was substantially in the square root transformed model. The 
resultant parameter estimate for managed care concentration was consequently lower, 
but more precise. The hospital data was mildly heteroscedastic when the residuals were 
plotted graphically but improvement resulted when the difference scores were utilized. 
Heteroscedasticity also does not invalidate the models, but tend to weaken them 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996).  
 Concerns about the small sample size were managed by the use of the log linear 
procedure volume model fitting a Poisson distribution which is amenable to fitting a 
model with smaller sample size; however, what constitutes a small sample does not 
seem to be clearly defined in the literature (UCLA, 2011). Finally, a limitation is created 
by the use of dummy numerical coding for the nominal variables (Introduction, 2000). 
The resulting parameter estimates provide useful information related to variable 
245 
 
significance in the model and the direction of the relationship, but the translation of the 
parameter estimates can be unreliable.   
 In summary, MSAs and the hospitals within them differ with respect to each of 
the study variables and to the volume and rate of each of the study procedures. This 
phenomenon capitalizes on the geographic variation to compare and contrast these 
differences. The consistency among the bivariate analyses, weighted least squares 
regression models and the log linear models support the relationships between 
managed care concentration and procedure volume at the MSA and hospital level and  
procedure rate while controlling for other factors that influence volume and rate. The IOC 
predicts hospital market share. The use of difference scores effectively measures 
change over time in health care markets and overcomes many of the potential 
constraints inherent in the distribution of count data.  
Policy and Research Implications 
Managed care is no longer a revolution. It is an institution that dominates the 
delivery of health care services in the United States. Recent debates surrounding the 
implementation of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act demonstrate that the 
same policy concerns are at the core of the debate in 2011 as were present in the 
‘golden era’ of managed care growth. The provision of value based care integrated care 
across the life span and the continuum of health services remains the challenge. This 
research has demonstrated that the managed care industry has consolidated since the 
study period, increasing market power and its inherent influence on the utilization of 
acute care tertiary services. Unfortunately, the evidence about the criteria managed care 
plans have used for selecting hospital or surgical partners is no more definitive today 
than it was then.  Quality metrics that allow for clear comparisons of providers remain in 
their infancy, poorly understood and are not effectively disseminated.  Perhaps the 
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pervasiveness of managed care plans, and their various permutations have made it 
even more difficult to segment their impact on health care markets, but the peer 
reviewed literature has also dwindled making policy decisions even less well informed.  
Volume as a quality metric 
The overarching policy implications and opportunities for additional research 
generated by this study include whether the observed increase in managed care 
consolidation has an undesirable impact on market competition and patient access; or, 
have the utilization management techniques employed in the managed care business 
model reduced the necessity for these procedures or their un-indicated use as it was 
originally intended to do?  
The specific mechanism by which managed care utilization control methods 
influence procedure volume requires additional study and is at the core of the managed 
care debate. This research supports the hypothesis that managed care influences 
procedure volume in a material, as well as statistical manner; however, these results 
provide limited insight into whether the manner in which the reductions in procedure 
volume were achieved has been in the public interest.  
To ascertain whether the reductions in volume are advantageous to enrollees, 
(improved preventive care and screening, more consistent application of evidence 
based surgical guidelines or better medical management of chronic conditions) is not 
the intent of this research; however, since the relationship between managed care and 
procedure utilization has been demonstrated, the clinical circumstances driving those 
reductions requires further investigation. Validation that the association was present in 
the market was a predicate to answering the question. The appropriate use of volume 
as a measure of quality has significant implications for decision making at the patient, 
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health plan and state level with substantial potential for increasing the value of surgical 
care. 
The evidence that volume and outcome is endogenous is overwhelming for the 
procedures studied in this research. Patients do better in hospitals that do more of these 
procedures. Debate about whether the differential observed is the result of the surgeon’s 
skill, the skill of the other clinicians or the hospital’s organizational effectiveness may be 
important to policy makers and healthcare executives, but is irrelevant to the patient. 
There has been a persistent inability for health care organizations and policy makers to 
capture and report the elements of surgical quality in a manner that has meaning and 
allows consumers to make judgments about where to receive their care.  
That consumer is defined as the patient who may require a lifesaving surgical 
procedure or a managed care administrator who must decide which of the hospitals and 
surgeons in their market should receive the contract for those services. Given the 
revenue associated with these procedures, hospitals with margins to protect have not 
consistently behaved in a manner in the best interest of their communities or consistent 
with the evidence. A 12 % increase in hospitals performing CABG procedures while the 
demand for those procedures has been reduced by less invasive percutaneous 
procedures is but one example. By 2008, approximately 25% of hospitals offering CABG 
performed fewer than 100 of the surgeries a year, compared to about 10% of hospitals in 
2001. Hospitals that only perform 100 procedures annually demonstrate a significant 
quality differential compared with hospitals that perform 450 to 500 procedures annually. 
The evidence for the relationship between volume and CABG procedure outcomes has 
been documented for more than 20 years without effective value based policy 
intervention (Chernew, Hayward, & Scanlon, 1996; Dudley, Johansen, Brand, Rennie, & 
Milstein, 2000; Shahian, Yip, Wescott, & Jacobson, 2000; LeapFrog, 2008). Although 
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advances have been made in the publication of hospital and physician quality measures 
they have not been consistently mandated and are generally unknown to the average 
consumer. As an example, the Hospital Inpatient Quality Reporting (Hospital IQR) 
program was mandated by Section 501(b) of the Medicare Prescription Drug, 
Improvement, and Modernization Act (MMA) of 2003. This section of the MMA 
authorized CMS to pay hospitals that successfully report designated quality measures a 
higher annual update to their payment rates; it did not, however require hospitals to 
submit their outcomes data. From a surgical perspective, participation in a database for 
cardiac surgery is one of the participation measures added in 2011; however, these 
measures do not require the hospital to participate in a registry. Hospitals will not be 
penalized for not participating in a registry for FY 2011.  A hospital’s annual payment 
update (APU) will only be affected if the hospital does not answer all three structural 
measures” – the data do not have to be submitted, only a response that acknowledges 
the questions (QualityNet, 2011).  
In the absence of better more substantive and understandable outcome 
measures and effective policy measures, consumers must understand the importance of 
volume in their selection of surgical providers and hospitals and make informed 
decisions, not only about whether they consent to a specific procedure but where they 
will have the procedure and who will perform it. Decisions based on the value of a 
service rather than its price is the difference between what is paid and what is received. 
As the recipient of the care, the consumer has to be a judge of the value of the service 
and the outcome. Information is essential to economic choice. 
The debate about whether or not these procedures should be regionalized to 
assure that minimum volume criteria are met has not been successfully addressed by 
policy makers, but could potentially become irrelevant if consumers select high volume 
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providers to the exclusion of lower quality options. Should patients appreciate a benefit 
or ‘value’ from traveling further to have a better result, and the means to travel to that 
location were provided as needed, it is much more likely they would be willing to utilize 
the highest quality hospital. Recent data produced by the Healthcare Market Guide 
(HCMG) signals that consumers may be more amenable to travel than had been 
observed in prior studies (Baker, 2001; Bamezai, Melnick, Mann, & Zwanziger, 2003). 
The HCMG study found that 17.4 % of respondents had left the area in which they 
reside to seek care in 2010 (Healthcare Market Guide, 2010), with most of these willing 
to travel up to 100 miles (2010). The clinical expertise of a provider was the strongest 
motivation to seek care at a distance (46 %), while services not offered in area (39 %) 
and good reputation of provider outside of the area (37 %) being important factors as 
well.  The group most likely to out migrate were those in the lowest income bracket 
earning less than $25,000 while the income earners greater than $100,000 were least 
likely to seek care elsewhere. The report did not identify the basis on which these 
decisions were made or how patients reached the conclusion that a particular provider 
was clinically superior which is important to understand (Healthcare Market Guide, 
2011).  
Data about physician providers remains even more limited than the data 
available about hospitals. The American Board of Orthopaedic Surgery (ABOS) for 
example is one of the twenty four separate boards that make up the American Board of 
Medical Specialties. Of the twenty-four boards, fourteen require an oral examination and 
as of 2006, the ABOS is the only board with a computerized data collection system that 
allows for the analysis of the collected information in the database which include the 
number of cases and number of complications for each of the physicians sitting for the 
Board examination (Garrett, Swiontkowski, Weinstein, Callaghan & Rosier et al., 2006). 
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Even these data are accessible only for groups or sub-groups and not individual 
physicians. Board certification has been utilized as a proxy for quality among surgeons, 
irrespective of the volume of procedures performed or the outcomes achieved. 
Reid and colleagues evaluated the association between these structural proxies 
(education, board certification’ gender and years of experience) with the prediction of 
quality of care. Using claims data from 1.13 million adults to calculate overall 
performance scores on 124 quality measures for each of 10,408 Massachusetts 
physicians enrolled in four health plans. They found the mean overall performance score 
was 62.5% on the 124 quality measures, with a range of 48.2% to 74.9% between the 
fifth and 95th percentile (Reid, Friedberg, Adams, McGlynn & Mehrotra, 2010). Volume 
of procedures or episodes of care were not considered. Even if volume were not the 
singular most efficacious measure of quality, for procedurally based subspecialties it 
would likely be at least as predictive as other forms of publically available data that 
serves as a proxy for quality, especially for those procedures which are demonstrated to 
be volume sensitive.  
The use of volume as a proxy for quality at the patient level must be approached 
with three significant caveats. First, the Florida data developed here demonstrates that 
for all procedures other than CABG, the number of low volume hospital providers 
increased over the study period; however, the reduction in the number of low volume 
hospitals for CABG serves as an example of the potential problem.  A hospital may be 
designated as a high volume provider because they are able to increase the number of 
procedures performed, thus meeting the number of cases to meet the empirically based 
quality/outcome cut points; however, in this situation, hospitals were able to meet the 
volume criteria solely by increasing the number of procedures performed in the 
population, not by increasing their market share of the demand for CABG procedures. 
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These procedures may, or may not have been indicated when established evidence 
based guidelines are applied given the rate of CABG procedures nationally was 
decreasing over the same period of time.  
A second caveat in the use of volume data for public policy decisions is their 
relationship to procedure indications.  Procedures performed for patients who do not 
exhibit evidence based indications for surgical intervention (i.e. small degrees of 
stenosis in a carotid artery or small asymptomatic abdominal aneurysms that does not 
meet criteria established for surgery)  tend to have  better than typical morbidity and 
mortality rates. Performance of the procedure before it is necessary, or is entirely 
unnecessary for an otherwise healthy patient may actually produce low levels of 
mortality or morbidity which are then reported to the required agencies and made 
available to the public.   
Managed care organizations have an advantage in the control of physician 
practice patterns as a result of their selective contracting relationships and the data 
collected for utilization management. Each of the professional medical societies 
associated with the procedures in this study have well defined guidelines established by 
physician peers and experts. In addition, the agency for Healthcare Research and 
Quality operates a national clearing house for practice guidelines. Meta-analysis by 
Timmermans and Mauck demonstrated that these evidenced based guidelines are 
employed less than 50% of the time. They speculate that low levels of compliance are 
rooted in the culture and belief system of physicians as the sole decision maker.  The 
small area variations in surgical procedure rates, as observed in this study and reported 
publically through the Surgical Care Improvement Project provide the strongest evidence 
that those guidelines have not been adopted in clinical practice (Timmermans & Mauck, 
2005).  
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Finally, volume must be considered in concert with other important measures of 
quality. Public sites developed to provide quality data for hospitals have not included 
volume as a consideration either by ranking providers on the basis of volume or utilizing 
to adjust for the reported mortality rates. Two of the most widely distributed lists of ‘best’ 
hospitals for major surgical procedures are US News & World Report and HealthGrades.  
Osborne, Ghaferi, Nicholas and Dimick (2011) used a cross sectional survey design to 
ascertain whether ‘best hospitals’, as defined by these publications have lower mortality 
rates than other American hospitals specifically for cancer surgery.  Examining 
colectomy in addition to the cancer resection procedures examined in this research and 
after adjusting for differences in patient factors and surgical acuity, risk-adjusted mortality 
rates between best hospitals and all other hospitals was compared. After controlling for 
differences in hospital volume, risk-adjusted mortality was significantly lower at the US 
News & World Report best hospitals for only for colectomy and was not significantly 
lower in the HealthGrades best hospital list for any of the three oncologic procedures. 
Hospitals pay to participate in the HealthGrades database. The evidence demonstrates 
the importance of volume when assessing surgical outcomes, but also the importance of 
the interaction between volume and other outcomes.  
The role of the managed care plan in a consumer driven paradigm would be to 
assure that evidence based surgical guidelines are consistently utilized. Managed care 
plans are in a unique position to assure that the best evidence is used when referring 
patients for these high risk procedures.  Managed care organizations are in a unique 
position to influence the adoption of evidence given the increased control of physician 
practice inherent in the business model. The primary care provider relationships in which 
the physician has a comprehensive knowledge of the patient’s clinical situation 
combined with pre-certification for procedures by contracted surgeons could provide the 
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level of assurance that patients would be referred for appropriate indications to a high 
volume provider. 
Clinical data improvements  
It is essential that we know whether the decisions of providers are efficacious 
and appropriate.  Despite efforts to improve secondary data sets like the AHCA inpatient 
discharge data set used here, and the national databases, secondary data has not 
proved sufficient to answer that question with any degree of certainty.  The patient 
clinical record remains the only definitive source of definitive data to judge the 
consistency of clinical decisions and the long term patient outcomes. The healthcare 
environment has lagged in the development of these records with less than 3% of 
hospitals achieving the fourth of seven levels of the Healthcare Information and 
Management Systems Society model of electronic medical record adoption (Dorenfest 
Institute, 2009). The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's National Center for 
Health Statistics reported that EMR use in physician offices increased to 50.7% in 
Cook, 2011). For purposes of patient safety, informed choice and evidence based 
decision making it is essential that investment be made in the universal adoption of 
the electronic record where privacy protected data can be warehoused and mined to 
understand the outcomes from both episodic and distributive health care services.  
Both volume and appropriateness data are required for selective contracting 
decisions and not volume alone if a reduction in excess deaths and complications 
associated with the use of low volume providers is to be realized. It is unlikely that the 
persistent inability of policy makers to make population based evidence based decisions 
will result in second order change, making the informed choices of consumers more 
likely to be successful.   
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Managed care consolidation 
The underlying premise of market economics in the United States is the 
protection of competition and anti-trust legislation has been the mechanism by which 
consumers have been protected from undue market influence over price.  States have 
attempted to mitigate the consolidation and mergers of managed care plans and the 
Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission have recently proposed revisions 
to the horizontal merger guidelines which include changes in the manner in which 
markets are defined. Prior definitions of market established in case law placed managed 
care plans in the market for insurance rather than identifying it as its own unique market, 
allowing for the level of consolidation observed to date.    
 Whether managed care consolidation influences increased premiums has not 
been consistently demonstrated. Feldman, Wholey and Christianson’s analysis of the 
impact consolidation on premiums demonstrated that mergers did not, on average, raise 
premiums and that state efforts to make mergers more difficult may have a 
counterproductive effect of increasing HMO failures which reduces both the number of 
competitors in the market and access to those plans (1996). Legislative barriers to 
managed care consolidation require more analysis prior to the implementation of 
additional anti-trust regulation. The window of opportunity for intervention in the 
concentration of the managed care markets was during the 1990 to 2000 period of time 
when the most aggressive market consolidation was taking place. The horse may be so 
far out of the barn at this stage of market development that it may no longer be possible 
to intervene on that basis and intervention may prohibit the realization of the access and 
cost advantages in the managed care model. The exception may be in the government 
managed care arena. 
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 The Congressional Budget Office estimates that Medicare Advantage plans were 
paid 13% or $1,000 per enrollee more in 2009 than would have been paid to cover the 
beneficiaries in regular fee-for service Medicare. The recommendation of the CBO is to 
increase competitiveness in Medicare Advantage through a process of bidding based on 
weighted enrollment. Given the managed care behaviors observed in this study, these 
bids would simply be won by the dominant plan in the market rather than promoting the 
competition that would require market entry by other firms and the risk is that managed 
care plans would exit markets where they had small numbers of enrollment, reducing 
access to managed care rather than increasing competition.  
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act is expected to deliver 
between 15 million and 20 million new enrollees to Medicaid starting in 2014 and for 
the first time the competition for the Medicaid market will include both Medicaid-
dominated MCOs and larger managed care companies for whom Medicaid is one of 
many lines of business (Herring & Adams, 2011). If this prediction is realized, it 
would be the greatest increase in managed care enrollment since the ‘golden era’ of 
managed care studied in this research. For the first time in what has been a very 
consolidated and captured market, managed care plans may be incentivized to 
participate in the Medicaid program despite the traditionally lower levels of 
reimbursement and financial risk associated with higher medical loss ratios. New 
managed care entrants to the Medicaid market are likely because the managed care 
plans will need to participate in the proposed insurance exchanges and the law now 
requires states pay managed care plans ‘actuarially sound’ rates. (Herring & Admas, 
2011) No such protections are specified for hospitals or physicians, although the 
definition of ‘actuarially sound’ is open to differences of opinion and should the 
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implementation of the program changes create barriers to participation, the sub-
optimal market behaviors observed in the 1995 to 1999 period will be replicated.  
 The recent observations about the influence of managed care and hospital 
market consolidation provide another perspective. Berenson, Ginsberg and Kemper 
determined that the leverage of many hospital systems and large medical groups in 
California has actually been increasing and concluded that the growth in their leverage is 
a more significant issue for insurance purchasers than increasing insurer consolidation 
(Berenson, Ginsburg & Kemper, 2010). Consumer demands for broad provider 
networks, tightening capacity and the regulation of HMOs were all contributing to the 
increased market power of hospitals and physician networks, overshadowing the 
influence of managed care organizations. The investigators recommended as the best 
mechanism to assure increased insurer consolidation does not harm purchasers is the 
creation of insurance exchanges so that none of the players in the healthcare market 
achieve disproportionate market power. In reality, hospitals and health plans are both 
low margin operations and neither can afford to do without the other, or without 
physician partners. Their reputations and customer satisfaction are interdependent and 
goals must be aligned for their ultimate success. Consequently, the evolution of the 
managed care market may ultimately reach Coile’s stage 5 in which the players share 
goals, income, risk and responsibility for shared clinical outcomes.    
The results of this study and the ongoing analysis of research in managed care 
continue to support the premise that the observations about managed care depend to a 
great extent on the stage of managed care development within each market, and that 
market is a small area and not at the state  or national level. This study demonstrates 
the uniqueness of each of the MSAs in Florida. Each of these MSAs had differing local 
issues that influenced their healthcare markets and are unique. The differences vary 
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from the exit of large numbers of surgeons in the southwest portion of the state to 
funding changes affecting the primary medical school teaching hospital in Gainesville. 
These differences facilitate and support the use of comparative measures of change 
over time within each unique market as is performed in this study; however, these 
differences also suggest that statewide aggregate data may not be appropriate when 
applied to decision making that will affect local communities. Hence, population health 
and policy planning must consider these differences. Data unique to a given community 
or MSA cannot be generalized to the state level of policy planning (and vice versa) 
without potentially missing the intended target.  Whether reduction of the consumption of 
surgical procedures associated with managed care consolidation is a favorable or 
unfavorable public policy trend is dependent on the clinical and epidemiologic reasons 
for those reductions. If access to health care coverage is improved for the uninsured, 
surgical procedures are only performed when indicated and prevention practices serve 
to reduce the demand for surgical procedures the population health impact will be 
favorable. Conversely, as the American Medical Association contends, that the 
reductions are based on favorable selection, denial of surgical referrals and profit 
motivation then excess morbidity, mortality and avoidable hospitalization should result 
(Carroll, J. 2007).  
Organization of health services  
 Major policy and regulatory changes passed in the 2010 Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (PPACA) require insurance reform and are being litigated. On 
review, it is evident that although the nomenclature has changed, the key components of 
the Act serve to restore many of the core aspects of the original managed care concepts 
diluted over time by healthcare executives and government leaders operating  with little 
or insufficient data generated by competing stakeholders. The primary care practitioner 
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focused on wellness, prevention and early detection in the managed care world has 
been replaced in the dialog with the concept of the ‘medical home’ where the same 
important functions are performed. The requirement for preventative care in the form of 
free health screening are targeted for implementation this year and a $15 billion 
Prevention and Public Health Fund will invest in prevention and public health programs 
that can help keep Americans healthy These programs specifically target  behavior 
modification from smoking cessation to combating obesity. A review of the original 1973 
HMO Act reveals the language and objectives to be the same.  The PPACA encourages 
the formation of ‘Accountable Care Organizations: 
“ …providing incentives for physicians to join together to better  
coordinate care and improve quality, help reduce disease and illness  
and reduce unnecessary admissions. If these If Accountable Care   
Organizations provide high quality care and reduce costs to the health  
care system, they can keep some of the money that they have helped  
save” (Heathcare.gov, 2010). 
Each of these provisions effectively replicates the intent of the previous managed 
care legislation and it would be difficult to differentiate this “new” concept from the IPA 
managed care model and the relationships with the fully integrated health care system; 
yet, the idea that physicians could benefit financially from the savings they achieved by 
improved care management was demonized and successfully promulgated the backlash 
that dramatically modified the original managed care concept. Finally, the law 
establishes a pilot payment scheme which bundles hospital, provider and ancillary fees 
resulting in one claim, as was the case in the design of the original financial schema for 
the managed care organization.    
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 The significant similarities between past efforts at health care reform and future 
efforts being currently debated make it essential that policy makers be supported by the 
evidence and methods generated by population based  research rather than self interest 
or conventional wisdom not supported by empirical evidence.  Stage 5 in Coile’s staging 
proposal looks very much like the changes under consideration as he described multi-
year contracts with locked-in prices, exclusive regional networks of hospitals and 
physicians, global capitation within integrated health systems and provider networks, 
shared data about patients and the adoption of ‘”shared practices and quality metrics”. 
(Coile, 1997).  
Based on the results of this study, volume should be a consideration as one of 
those quality metrics as an easily measured, easily understood parameter of 
performance that can be provided to an informed public. The quality and compliance 
data for physicians and hospitals should be made available and explained to consumers 
at the time surgery is contemplated and the future research focused on the most 
effective manner to translate the information into consumer choice and health system 
compliance with evidence based practice. Second order change will require a focus on 
value rather than a consistent and unsuccessful approach to managing price.  
 An argument can be made that consideration of both cost and quality is the 
appropriate measure of value in hospital based procedures. Birkmeyer Wennberg and 
Skinner have studied the issue of small area variation and the potential impact of 
regionalizing surgical procedures. In a seminal paper they ask the question:  “will 
volume-based referral strategies reduce costs or just save lives?” They cite the Leapfrog 
Group estimates that the lives saved by concentrating five procedures in high-volume 
hospitals could be worth $1 billion annually in the United States (2002) but make the 
case that the strongest support for volume based surgical patient referral should be 
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improving quality rather than reducing costs (Birkmeyer, Skinner & Wennberg, 2002).  In 
reality, minimal progress has been made in this arena since their work on health care 
reform and future efforts being currently debated make it essential that policy makers be 
supported by the evidence and methods generated by population based research rather 
than self interest or conventional wisdom not supported by empirical evidence.  
Future Research 
Additional research questions result from the data developed in this study. 
Although there are numerous implications for further research referenced throughout the 
document, the most feasible near term priorities are summarized in Figure 27.  
 
 
 
Figure 27. Summary of Future Research Priorities  
 
The development of new datasets which are more representative of the overall 
healthcare markets and managed care, improvements in risk adjustment of hospital data 
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and the implementation of health information exchanges will permit the conduct of 
research that was previously not possible or had the serious constraints.   
Efficacy of managed care surgical decisions 
First, it is important to understand the efficacy of the decisions managed care 
plans have made in referring enrollees to surgery for volume sensitive high cost 
procedures.  Given the substantial number of managed care enrollees now exceeding 
50% in the most populous Florida markets, and the concurrent managed care 
consolidation, the impact of managed care practice patterns will have a measurable 
impact on health outcomes. Florida may be an important precursor to the trends that will 
be observed nationally with the aging of the baby boom generation.    
The National Committee of Quality Assurance collects quality metrics in the 
Healthcare Effectiveness Data and Information Set (HEDIS), a tool used by more than 
90 % of America's health plans to measure performance on important dimensions of 
care and service (National Committee for Quality Assurance, 2011).  Data available for 
the first time in 2010 incorporate measures that capture the resources used by health 
plans to treat patients with select chronic conditions and aligns their utilization with their 
HEDIS quality results. Many of these conditions offer a trade-off between medical 
management and surgical interventions for which criteria have been established. The 
data can be used in this context to translate decisions into a measure of the ‘value’ 
enrollees achieve from their plans, which can then be compared with other methods of 
coverage. In addition, the HEDIS 2011 Plan provides investigators and plans with All-
Cause Readmissions (PCR) Risk-Adjustment Weights and Coding Tables. The data 
serve to identify and calculate risk adjustment weights for each Index Hospital Stay 
(IHS), based on presence of surgery, discharge condition, co-morbidity, age and gender 
(Pope et al., 2004)  
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 The ability to risk adjust the enrollee data will permit the comparison of Florida 
hospital utilization for surgery and appropriateness within the region and the county for 
the managed care population; in addition, the readmission rates would permit the 
economic valuation of surgery compared with the medical management of volume 
sensitive conditions and the hospitals use patterns to test the relationships between 
costs and outcomes associated with  repeated re-admissions for volume sensitive 
procedures. The comparison data for patients not enrolled in managed care plans can 
be obtained from the Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP) databases which 
contain a core set of clinical and nonclinical information found in a typical discharge 
abstract including all-listed diagnoses and procedures, discharge status, patient 
demographics, and charges for all patients, regardless of payer. Specifically, the State 
Inpatient Database contains the universe of inpatient discharge abstracts from 44 States 
including Florida and accounts for 95 % of all U.S. community hospital discharges. (U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services, Agency for Healthcare Research and 
Quality, 2011). Understanding whether surgical volume and rates are compressed by 
managed care consolidation or are in the public interest requires analysis of the clinical 
data. Analysis of the clinical efficacy of the practice patterns of managed care plans will 
expand on the findings of this study. 
Procedure Volume as a Consumer Proxy for Quality 
Continuing to identify those procedures for which volume is endogenous with 
outcomes is important, but perhaps more important is the appropriate use of the volume 
information in decision making and health planning.  Some quality data is becoming 
available to the internet savvy consumer but volume data has not typically been 
reported. Efforts to understand the current knowledge and attitudes of the health care 
consumer about using volume data in their decision making process is important to 
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designing the best mechanisms to provide the information. The optimal mechanism to 
communicate volume information to the purchaser is essential, especially since some 
prior efforts at consumer education have not produced a change in the selection of 
providers (Baker, 2001). The data available at the Hospital Compare website allows 
consumers who can find it the ability to compare hospitals on the basis of patient 
satisfaction with the care as well as Surgical Care Improvement Project Process of Care 
Measures for some surgical procedures, but not all of the volume sensitive operations. 
Many of the hospitals report results with the caveat that they represent a sample of 
observations without a description of the manner in which the sample was selected, and 
the reading level required to understand the information is at the high school graduate 
level. Again, volume for those procedures for which it is predictive could potentially 
provide a simpler metric. For example, one measure in the dataset is the “Heart Attack 
Patients Given ACE Inhibitor or ARB for Left Ventricular Systolic Dysfunction (LVSD)”. It 
is unlikely that patients will be able to utilize this information in the manner in which it 
was intended to make informed choices about the selection of providers (United States 
Department of Health and Human Services, 2011). The research to be undertaken 
would be directed toward determining whether volume as a construct is predictive of the 
same outcomes, as these more complex measures for volume sensitive procedures.  
Avoidable surgical deaths  
 The data in this study demonstrates that abdominal aortic aneurysm, which is 
detectable in the primary care setting has a high rate of pre-hospital rupture in Florida.  
Improved pre-rupture treatments of aneurysms by elective operations are essential for 
reducing fatal outcomes. Medicare's coverage of ultrasound screening for abdominal 
aortic aneurysm was designated in section 5112 of the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 and 
effective for services furnished after January 1, 2007. Screening is available only once 
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under the following conditions: 1.The beneficiary has taken advantage of the initial 
preventive physical examination, also known as the "Welcome to Medicare" visit.  2. 
have one of three risk factors (family history, male 100 pack year smoker or 
recommended for screening by the United States Preventive Services Task Force 
(USPSTF) regarding AAA Have not been previously provided an ultrasound screening 
under the Medicare program (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2011: 
Screening, 2005).   
The intent of research in this area would be to identify the sub-groups 
experiencing pre-hospital rupture and compare risk adjusted survival with the national 
data and to ascertain whether those eligible for screening had been screened and 
appropriately referred; and, whether the current screening criteria disadvantage women 
who comprise 30% of AAA patients and black men who tend to have AAA detectable by 
ultrasound at a younger age than Medicare eligibility.  On review of randomized clinical 
controlled trials of population screening for AAA only one included women; however, 
some observational studies show that the risk of rupture and the likelihood of a poor 
outcome are greater in women than in men (Cosford & Leng, 2007). 
Screening, surgical referral rates and rates of emergency surgery for 
volume sensitive procedures in vulnerable populations 
 The data in this study raise a question about the number of emergency surgeries 
performed as a percentage of elective cases for the same diagnoses. Surgery performed 
under emergency conditions typically has higher morbidity, mortality and cost associated 
with it. In addition, within the context of referral to high volume centers: emergency 
surgery frequently requires the patient to be taken to the nearest hospital which may not 
be the highest quality available for the required procedure based on volume or 
outcomes. The appropriate surgical team may have to be assembled urgently, specialty 
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consultants may not be readily available and the overwhelming majority of the team’s 
experience in the community hospital will be in the conduct of elective procedures in 
which time is not a factor.  This is particularly problematic for time and volume sensitive 
situations in the face of coronary artery occlusion, bowel obstruction from cancer or 
hemorrhagic conditions like AAA. The resources and personnel required for emergency 
surgery differ sufficiently from the elective operation that the Royal College of Surgeons 
produce a set of recommendations for the British Health Service in 2011 entitled 
Emergency Surgery: Standards for Unscheduled Care (Royal College of Surgeons, 
2011).  
Many of these diagnoses are detectable in the primary care setting, and several 
are amenable to screening as the standard of care. For example, colonoscopy has been 
a standard screening recommendation for a decade, as early detection may result in 
cure through relatively simple non-invasive means; however, one of the largest studies 
comparing elective with emergency resection for colon cancer demonstrated that 
emergency surgery for colon cancer is associated with a stage-specific increase in 
mortality rate, a longer hospital stay and higher costs at  one and a half times that of 
elective colon resection (Jestin, Nilsson,  Heurgren, Påhlman, Glimelius & Gunnarsson, 
2005).  However, population based screening is not appropriate or cost effective for all 
surgical interventions. The focus of the managed care model is prevention through 
screening and one of the most effective screening tools available is the health history 
taken by a qualified provider who develops an index of suspicion and applies the 
empirical evidence and recommendations to the risk factors. The focus of the research 
in this domain would be to answer the questions:  
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1. What percent of volume sensitive surgical procedures are performed on an 
emergency basis and does that rate differ on the basis of the patient’s primary 
payer? 
2. For which procedures amenable to population based screening could the rate of 
emergency surgery potentially be reduced? 
3. Are there differences in surgical referral rates for subgroups of patients who have 
been screened in the managed care setting compared with those who were 
screened using commercial insurance?     
The use of volume as a quality metric provides substantial opportunity and 
requirement for further research to understand the interface between physician skill, 
hospital competency and patient outcomes. The procedures selected for inclusion in this 
study are both life limiting for patients and costly for the healthcare system should 
patients not have access to medical services, be selected for surgery carefully and 
referred to high quality surgeons and hospitals; however, there are additional procedures 
which are volume sensitive and exhibit substantial small area variation in their 
performance that require additional study. 
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Appendix 1 
Map of Florida Metropolitan Statistical Areas 
 
  US Census Bureau (2001) 
http://www.census.gov/mso/www/pres_lib/index2.html 
Orlando, FL
Naples, FL
Jacksonville, FL
Ocala, FL 
Pensacola, FL
Daytona Beach, FL 
Tallahassee, FL
Lakeland--Winter Haven, FL 
Tampa--St. Petersburg 
--Clearwater, FL
Gainesville, FL
West Palm Beach
--Boca Raton, FL
Sarasota 
--Bradenton, FL
Panama City, FL
Fort Walton Beach, FL
Punta Gorda, FL
Fort Myers
--Cape Coral, FL
Melbourne--Titusville
--Palm Bay, FL
Fort Pierce
--Port St. Lucie, FL
Miami-
Fort  Lauderdale
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Appendix 2 
ICD-9-CM Codes for Study Procedures  
 
36.0  Coronary artery bypass 
36.10 Bypass anastamosis for heart revascularization 
36.11 Aortocoronary bypass of one coronary artery 
36.12 Aortocoronary bypass of two coronary arteries 
36.13 Aortocoronary bypass of three coronary arteries 
36.14 Aortocoronary bypass of four or more coronary arteries 
36.15 Single internal mammary –coronary artery bypass 
36.16 Double internal mammary-coronary bypass graft 
36.17 Double internal mammary-coronary artery bypass 
36.18 Abdominal-coronary bypass  
36.19 Other bypass anastamosis for heart revascularization 
38.0    Incision, excision and occlusion of vessels 
         38.12    Carotid endarterectomy   
         38.31    Cerebral aneurysm repair with anastamosis          
         38.41    Cerebral aneurysm repair with replacement 
38.34 Resection of abdominal aorta with anastamosis    
38.35 Resection of abdominal aorta with replacement     
39.0    Lower extremity arterial bypass procedures  
39.25 Aorta-iliac-femoral bypass 
         39.29 Other peripheral vascular 
42.0    Operations on the esophagus  
         42.30    Local excision or destruction of lesion 
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Appendix 2: (continued) 
         
42.32    Local excision of other tissue or lesion from esophagus 
42.39    Other destruction of lesion or tissue of esophagus 
42.4    Excision of esophagus 
42.40    Esophogectomy 
42.41    Partial esophagectomy 
42.42    Total esophagectomy 
42.5     Intrathroacic anastamosis of the esophagus 
      42.51    Intrathoracic esophagoesophagostomy 
42.52    Intrathoracic esophagogastrostomy 
42.53    Intrathoracic esophageal anastamosis with interposition of small bowel 
42.54    Other intrathoracic esophagoenterotomy 
42.55    Intrathoracic esophageal anastamosis with interposition of the colon 
42.56    Other intrathoracic esophagocolostomy 
42.58    Intrathoracic esophageal anastamosis with other interposition 
42.59    Other intrathoracic anastamosis of the esophagus 
42.6  Antesternal anastamosis of the esophagus 
42.61    Antesternal esophagoesophagostomy 
42.62    Antesternal esophagogastrostomy 
42.63    Antesternal esophageal anastamosis with interposition of the small  
                 bowel 
42.64   Other antesternal esophagoenterotomy 
42.65  Antesternal esophageal anastamosis with interposition of the colon 
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Appendix 2: (continued) 
42.66    Other antesternal esophhagocolostomy 
42.68        Other antesternal esophageal anastamosis with interposition 
         42.69       Other antesternal anastamosis of the esophagus 
52.0     Operations on the Pancreas 
52.22    Other excision or destruction of lesion or tissue of the pancreas or duct 
52.5    Partial pancreatectomy 
52.51     Distal pancreatectomy 
52.53     Radical subtotal pancreatectomy 
52.59    Other partial pancreatectomy 
52.60     Total pancreatectomy 
52.7        Radical pancreaticoduodendectomy   
The ICD 9-CM code is the International Classification of Diseases, Ninth Edition. It is 
updated annually with minor revisions and every three years with major revisions, and it 
is republished in a fully revised version every ten years. The Department of Health and 
Human Services publishes a further indexed version of the ICD to include diagnostic and 
operative procedures, labeling the data as CM or clinically modified. In addition to 
statistics and mortality rates, the ICD9-CM code is used for health records, 
reimbursement systems, and catalog of data. 
United States. Health Care Financing Administration. (1998). The International 
classification of disease, clinical modification, ICD-CM. 9th ed. Superintendent of 
Documents, GPO. 
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Appendix 3 
Summary of Study Variables, Types, Definitions and Data Sources 
 
Model Variable/ 
(Abbreviation 
in the Model) 
 
Variable 
Type/Level 
of Analysis 
 
Variable Definition 
 
Data Source 
 
Surgical 
Procedure 
Volume 
(totproc) 
 
Count 
Outcome 
Variable/MSA 
Level  
 
The number of each of the 
seven individual study 
procedures performed in 
each study year within each 
MSA is counted and 
summed to create the total 
procedure volume metric for 
the MSA.   
 
 
Procedures are extracted 
from the AHCA Hospital 
Discharge Data Set using 
CPT codes listed in Appendix 
2.  
 
Surgical 
Procedure Rate  
(proc_rate) 
 
Continuous  
Outcome 
Variable/MSA 
Level 
 
The annual number of study 
procedures is counted and 
summed for each study year 
within each MSA; the rate is 
calculated as the total 
number of study surgical 
procedures/1,000 population 
within the MSA.  
 
AHCA Hospital Discharge 
Data Set using CPT codes 
listed in Appendix 3. 
Population for each MSA is 
extracted from the U.S. 
Census Bureau data sets 
retrieved for each study year 
from 
http://www.census.gov/popula
tion/estimates/metro-
city/ma/99-03a.txt.  
 
 
 
Procedure Rate 
in Population 
older than 65 
years of age  
(proc_rate_65) 
 
Continuous 
Control 
Variable/MSA 
Level 
 
The annual number of study 
procedures  for population 
over the age of 65 is 
counted and summed for 
each study year within each 
MSA; the rate is calculated 
as the total number of study 
surgical procedures/1,000 
population over the age of 
65 
 
AHCA Hospital Discharge 
Data Set using CPT codes 
listed in Appendix 2. 
Population for each MSA is 
extracted from the U.S. 
Census Bureau data sets 
retrieved for each study year 
from 
http://www.census.gov/popula
tion/estimates/metro-
city/ma/99-03a.txt.  
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Model Variable/ 
Abbreviation in 
the Model 
 
Variable 
Type/Level 
of Analysis 
 
Variable Definition 
 
Data Source 
 
Hospital 
Procedure 
Volume 
(totproc_hosp) 
 
Count 
Outcome 
Variable/ 
Hospital 
Level 
 
The number of each of the 
seven individual study 
procedures performed in 
each study year within each 
hospital is counted and 
summed to create the total 
procedure volume metric for 
the hospital.   
 
AHCA Hospital Discharge 
Data Set using CPT codes 
listed in Appendix 2 and the 
unique hospital identifier. 
 
Hospital Market 
Share 
(proc_mc) 
 
Continuous 
(%) 
Outcome 
Variable/ 
Hospital 
Level 
 
The individual hospital 
proportion of the study 
surgical procedures 
performed in each study 
year. Study procedures 
performed within each of the 
161 Florida acute general 
hospitals are extracted.  
Each hospital's total annual 
number of study procedures 
is divided by the total 
number of these procedures 
performed in the same year 
within the hospital's MSA. 
 
  
AHCA Hospital Discharge 
Data Set using CPT codes 
listed in Appendix 2 and the 
unique hospital identifier 
assigned to each hospital. 
 
Managed Care 
Penetration 
(pen) 
 
Continuous 
(%) 
Predictor 
Variable/MSA 
Level 
 
The proportion of the total 
population enrolled in 
managed care plans each 
study year at the MSA level 
of analysis. Total enrollment 
in licensed managed care 
plans is calculated by adding 
the enrollment in each plan 
within each MSA. The 
enrollment is divided by the 
total population within the 
MSA.   
 
Managed care enrollment 
data from the Florida Hospital 
Association Managed Care 
Market Reports cross 
referenced with the Florida 
Department of Insurance 
Managed Care Database 
where data was incomplete. 
Population estimates from the 
U.S. Bureau of the Census 
data sets were retrieved for 
each study year from 
http://www.census.gov/popula
tion/estimates/metro-
city/ma/99-03a.txt.  
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Model Variable/ 
Abbreviation in 
the Model 
 
Variable 
Type/Level 
of Analysis 
 
Variable Definition 
 
Data Source 
 
Managed Care 
Index of 
Competition  
(IOC) 
 
Continuous 
Predictor 
Variable/MSA 
Level 
 
A measure of competition 
within managed care 
markets is calculated as (1 
minus the HHI for managed 
care) within each MSA. The 
HHI for managed care is the 
sum of squares of the 
market share of the 
managed care plans 
operating in a MSA during 
each study year. MCO 
market share is its 
proportion of the total 
managed care enrollment in 
an MSA. IOC values range 
from zero (monopoly) to one 
(competition among 
numerous MCOs with similar 
market shares.) 
 
 
 
Managed care enrollment 
data from the Florida Hospital 
Association Managed Care 
Market Trend Report cross 
referenced with the Florida 
Department of Insurance 
Managed Care Database 
where data was incomplete. 
 
Managed Care 
Concentration 
(Con) 
 
Continuous 
(%) Predictor 
Variable/MSA 
Level 
 
The proportion of managed 
care enrollment held by the 
three largest plans as 
measured by enrollment 
numbers during each study 
year at the MSA level of 
analysis.  
 
 
Managed care enrollment 
data from the Florida Hospital 
Association Managed Care 
Market Report cross 
referenced with the Florida 
Department of Insurance 
Managed Care Database 
where data was incomplete. 
Proprietary data purchased 
for study use 
 
 
Medicare 
Managed Care 
Penetration 
(care) 
 
Continuous 
(%) Predictor 
Variable/MSA 
Level 
 
The proportion of Medicare 
eligible individuals enrolled 
in a Medicare managed care 
plan during each study year 
at the MSA level of analysis. 
Medicare eligibility is 
determined by the Centers 
for Medicare and Medicaid 
based on age and 
citizenship.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Florida Hospital 
Association Managed Care 
Market Report for the study 
period. Proprietary data 
purchased for study use.  
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Model Variable/ 
Abbreviation in 
the Model 
 
Variable 
Type/Level 
of Analysis 
 
Variable Definition 
 
Data Source 
 
Medicaid 
Managed Care 
Penetration 
(caid) 
 
Continuous 
(%) Predictor 
Variable/MSA 
Level 
 
The proportion of Medicaid 
eligible individuals enrolled 
in a Medicaid managed care 
plan during each study year 
at the MSA level of analysis. 
Medicaid eligibility is 
determined by the State of 
Florida Medicaid Program 
based on income criteria.  
 
 
The Florida Hospital 
Association Managed Care 
Market Reports for the study 
period. Proprietary data 
purchased for study use 
 
Total Population 
(totpop) 
 
Count 
Control 
Variable/MSA 
Level 
 
The population estimates for 
each MSA for each study 
year. 
 
 
Population estimates from 
the U.S. Bureau of the 
Census data sets were 
retrieved for each study year 
from 
http://www.census.gov/popula
tion/estimates/metro-
city/ma/99-03a.txt.  
 
 
 
Population over 
the Age of 65 
(pop65) 
 
Count 
Control 
Variable/MSA 
Level 
 
The population estimates for 
individuals aged 65 years or 
older within each MSA for 
each study year. 
 
Population estimates from 
the U.S. Bureau of the 
Census data sets were 
retrieved for each study year 
from 
http://www.census.gov/popula
tion/estimates/metro-
city/ma/99-03a.txt.  
 
 
Hospital Market 
Concentration 
(HHI) 
 
Continuous 
Control 
Variable/ 
Hospital 
Market Level 
 
A measure of competition 
within hospital markets is 
calculated as the sum of the 
squared market shares of all 
general acute care non-
federal general hospitals 
within a given MSA. The 
market share is a calculated 
variable measuring hospital 
specific inpatient admissions 
in each study year as a 
proportion of all inpatient 
admissions within its MSA. 
 
 
 
 
 
Admission counts are 
extracted from   the Florida 
Hospital Inpatient Discharge 
Data Set for hospitals meeting 
study criteria from the AHCA 
Hospital Master List.   
 
306 
 
 
Model Variable/ 
Abbreviation in 
the Model 
 
Variable 
Type/Level 
of Analysis 
 
Variable Definition 
 
Data Source 
 
Hospital Use 
Rate 
(use) 
 
Continuous 
(%) Control 
Variable/ 
Hospital 
Market Level 
 
The total annual inpatient 
admissions per 100,000 
population for each study 
year within each MSA. 
 
Hospital admission counts are 
extracted from the Florida 
Hospital Inpatient Discharge 
Data Set divided by the 
population estimates from the 
U.S. Census Bureau 
www.census.gov/population/w
ww/estimates/aboutmetro.htm
) 
.  
 
Managed Care 
Share 
(mc_share) 
 
Continuous 
(%) Control 
Variable/ 
Hospital 
Market Level 
 
The proportion of annual 
inpatient admissions for 
which managed care plans 
are the primary payer. Total 
managed care inpatient 
admissions are divided by 
the total number of inpatient 
admissions within the MSA 
for each study year. 
 
 
Hospital admission counts are 
extracted from the Florida 
Hospital Inpatient Discharge 
Data Set segmented by payer 
class.  
 
Total Surgeons 
(totsurg) 
 
Count/ 
Control 
Variable/ 
Hospital 
Market Level 
 
The number of unique 
surgeons performing any of 
the seven study procedures 
is counted without 
duplication, to obtain the 
total number of surgeons 
performing the study 
procedures within each MSA 
within each study year.  
 
 
The Florida Hospital Inpatient 
Discharge Data Set.  
 
Hospital 
(hosp) 
 
Nominal 
Variable/MSA 
and Hospital 
Level 
  
 
The hospital is defined as an 
acute care, short stay 
general hospital licensed in 
the state of Florida and 
operating throughout the 
period 1995-1999. Military, 
veteran's administration and 
pediatric acute care and 
specialty hospitals are 
excluded. Each hospital is 
extracted by unique identifier 
which remains constant 
throughout the hospital’s 
history, irrespective of 
ownership or name change. 
  
 
Florida Agency for Health 
Care Administration Hospital 
Master Lists 1995-1999.  
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Model Variable/ 
Abbreviation in 
the Model 
 
Variable 
Type/Level 
of Analysis 
 
Variable Definition 
 
Data Source 
 
Hospital Control 
(cont) 
 
Nominal 
Variable/ 
Hospital 
Level  
 
The responsible party listed 
in the articles of 
incorporation or charter of 
the hospital as owners. 
Designations for hospital 
control utilized include: 
investor-owned (including 
individual, partnership of 
corporate structures) 
government (including city, 
county, hospital authority, or 
hospital district structures) or 
not for profit (including the 
religiously affiliated 
hospitals). A change in 
hospital ownership during 
the study period was 
identified and entered into 
models as dummy variables 
where 0= no change in 
ownership/control occurred 
during the study period and 
1 = a change in corporate 
ownership occurred during 
the study period.  
 
 
Florida Agency for Health 
Care Administration Hospital 
Master Lists 1995-1999. 
Hospital ownership was 
validated by using the 
American Hospital 
Association Guide to the 
Health Care Field 1995-2002.  
 
Hospital Type 
(type) 
 
Nominal/ 
Hospital 
Level 
 
Short term, acute care 
hospitals are further 
designated by type, either 
"teaching" or "general". A 
teaching hospital is defined 
as a hospital with a 
residency-training program 
approved by the 
Accreditation Council for 
Graduate Medical Education 
or the American Osteopathic 
Association. Any change in 
hospital ownership during 
the study period was 
identified and entered into 
models as dummy variables 
0= no change in type 
occurred during the study 
period and 1 = a change in 
type occurred during the 
period. 
 
 
Florida Agency for Health 
Care Administration Hospital 
Master List with teaching 
status validated using the 
American Hospital 
Association Guide to the 
Health Care Field 1995-2002  
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Model Variable/ 
Abbreviation in 
the Model 
 
Variable 
Type/Level 
of Analysis 
 
Variable Definition 
 
Data Source 
 
Licensed Beds 
(beds) 
 
Count 
Control 
Variable/ 
Hospital 
Level 
 
The number of beds for 
which a hospital is licensed 
excluding nursery 
bassinettes in study year 
1999. Licensed beds 
experienced no material 
change from 1995 to 1999 
and therefore change scores 
are not beneficial for control 
in the model. Staffed beds 
would likely change, but the 
data was not collected by 
ACHA or available.    
 
 
ACHA Hospital Master Lists 
from FUHRS 1995-1999. 
 
All outcome measures are calculated for each surgical procedure individually for analytic purposes and trends, but used in 
aggregate to calculate the difference scores for inclusion in the final model.  
Count and continuous variables are entered into the final model as difference scores which are the 1999 level minus the 
1995 level of the variable. All variables entered into statistical models as difference scores with ‘_score’ added to the 
variable name. 
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Hospital Beds  
Bed 
Change Control 
 
Type                         
 
Surg 
∆ 
 
 
MC 
Share   ∆ 
 
Miami Aventura Hospital  
407 0 I G 11 -2 0.009 -0.004 
Pensacola Baptist Hospital 552 -60 NFP G 30 7 0.077 0.136 
Miami Baptist  
551 2 NFP G 72 12 0.170 0.029 
Pensacola 
Baptist Hospital/Gulf 
Breeze 60 0 NFP G 0 0 0.000 0.000 
Jacksonville 
Baptist Medical 
Center - Beaches 90 -8 NFP G 3 1 0.007 0.003 
Jacksonville 
Baptist Medical 
Center - Nassau 54 0 NFP G 0 0 0.000 0.000 
Lakeland 
Bartow Memorial 
Hospital 56 0 I G 2 -2 0.001 -0.001 
Panama City Bay Medical Center 433 -80 G G 21 16 0.973 0.001 
Tampa 
Bayfront Medical 
Center 502 0 NFP G 36 2 0.053 -0.018 
Daytona 
Bert Fish Medical 
Center 116 0 G G 3 1 0.010 0.010 
Palm Beach 
Bethesda Memorial 
Hospital 362 0 NFP G 15 -7 0.044 -0.011 
Sarasota Blake Medical Center 383 0 I G 31 19 0.140 0.006 
Palm Beach 
Boca Raton 
Community Hospital 394 0 NFP G 13 -2 0.055 -0.019 
Punta Gorda 
Bon Secours - St. 
Joseph Hospital 212 0 NFP G 12 8 0.039 0.009 
Sarasota 
Bon Secours-Venice 
Hospital 312 -30 NFP G 7 2 0.049 -0.015 
Tampa 
Brandon Regional 
Hospital 277 -22 I G 14 1 0.008 0.002 
Tampa 
Brooksville Regional 
Hospital 91 0 I G 4 0 0.002 -0.001 
 Lauderdale 
Broward General 
Medical Center 716 28 G G 43 11 0.150 -0.041 
Melbourne 
Cape Canaveral 
Hospital 150 0 NFP G 5 -1 0.028 -0.010 
Ft. Myers Cape Coral Hospital 281 0 NFP G 10 4 0.040 0.022 
Miami-Dade 
Cedars Medical 
Center 560 -8 I G 67 -3 0.081 0.068 
Orlando 
Central Florida 
Regional Hospital 226 0 I G 27 -3 0.062 0.010 
Punta Gorda 
Charlotte Regional 
Medical Center 208 0 I G 24 24 0.862 -0.018 
Lauderdale 
Cleveland Clinic 
Hospital* 150 0 I G 9 -1 0.022 -0.006 
Palm Beach Columbia Hospital 250 0 I G 11 -4 0.016 -0.007 
Tampa Community Hospital 401 -13 I G 16 -1 0.019 -0.007 
Lauderdale 
Coral Springs Medical 
Center 200 0 G G 0 0 0.007 -0.002 
Palm Beach Delray Medical Center 372 -29 I G 33 20 0.248 -0.018 
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Sarasota 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Doctors Hospital Of 
Sarasota 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
168 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-21 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
G 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.042 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.001 
Tampa 
Edward White 
Hospital 167 0 I G 14 -2 0.005 -0.003 
Sarasota 
Englewood 
Community Hospital 100 0 I G 0 0 0.009 0.007 
Punta Gorda 
Fawcett Memorial 
Hospital 238 -3 I G 7 7 0.099 0.009 
Orlando Florida Hospital 1768 -316 NFP G 132 24 0.570 -0.110 
Daytona 
Florida Hospital - 
Oceanside 119 0 NFP G 3 -2 0.010 -0.006 
Daytona 
Florida Hospital - 
Ormond Memorial 324 0 NFP G 24 9 0.785 -0.349 
Daytona 
Florida Hospital 
Deland 156 0 NFP G 6 -1 0.041 -0.015 
Daytona 
Florida Hospital Fish 
Memorial 97 0 NFP G 4 4 0.020 0.003 
Daytona 
Florida Hospital 
Flagler 81 0 NFP G 0 1 0.000 0.000 
Orlando 
Florida Hospital 
Waterman 182 0 NFP G 3 1 0.007 -0.001 
Orlando 
Florida Hospital-
Altamonte 258 -20 NFP G 0 12 0.000 0.010 
Orlando 
Florida Hospital-
Apopka 50 0 NFP G 0 0 0.000 0.000 
Orlando 
Florida Hospital-
Celebration Health 100 -40 NFP G 0 3 0.000 0.000 
Orlando 
Florida Hospital-East 
Orlando 131 22 NFP G 0 6 0.000 0.003 
Orlando 
Florida Hospital-
Kissimmee 50 10 NFP G 0 3 0.000 0.002 
Lauderdale 
Florida Medical 
Center 459 0 I G 56 -6 0.213 -0.016 
Ft. Walton 
Fort Walton Beach 
Medical Center 247 0 I G 16 -3 0.994 -0.012 
Tallahassee 
Gadsden Community 
Hospital 25 -26 I G 0 0 0.000 0.000 
Palm Beach 
Glades General 
Hospital 73 0 I G 1 1 0.000 0.000 
Palm Beach 
Good Samaritan 
Medical Center 341 0 NFP G 0 0 0.000 0.000 
Ft. Myers Gulf Coast Hospital 120 0 I G 0 0 0.007 -0.006 
Panama City 
Gulf Coast Medical 
Center 176 0 I G 11 1 0.027 -0.001 
Daytona 
Halifax Medical 
Center 764 -174 G G 26 9 0.134 0.357 
Orlando Health Central 171 30 G G 4 1 0.002 -0.001 
Ft. Myers 
Healthpark Medical 
Center  238 -18 G G 0 47 0.000 0.436 
Miami-Dade 
Healthsouth Doctors' 
Hospital 281 4 I G 12 1 0.004 0.000 
Lakeland 
Heart Of Florida 
Regional Medical 
Center 115 -30 I G 2 1 0.001 0.021 
Tampa 
Helen Ellis Memorial 
Hospital 168 0 NFP G 13 -7 0.007 -0.004 
Miami-Dade Hialeah Hospital 378 0 I G 11 -1 0.004 -0.001 
Lauderdale 
Hollywood Medical 
Center 324 0 I G 7 -1 0.003 0.002 
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Melbourne 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Holmes Regional 
Medical Center 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
569 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-101 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NFP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
G 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
46 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.726 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.009 
Lauderdale 
Holy Cross Hospital, 
Inc. 577 0 NFP G 100 -50 0.137 0.007 
Miami-Dade Homestead Hospital 120 0 NFP G 2 0 0.000 0.000 
Lauderdale 
Imperial Point Medical 
Center 204 0 NFP G 12 -5 0.005 -0.002 
Miami-Dade 
Jackson Memorial 
Hospital 1757 -259 G T 53 51 0.104 0.000 
Miami-Dade 
Jackson South 
Community Hospital 199 61 G G 12 -4 0.005 0.000 
Pensacola Jay Hospital 55 0 NFP G 0 0 0.000 0.000 
Palm Beach JFK Medical Center 387 24 I G 25 15 0.287 0.008 
Palm Beach Jupiter Medical Center 156 0 NFP G 15 -1 0.016 -0.009 
Miami-Dade 
Kendall Regional 
Medical Center 412 0 NFP G 30 7 0.065 0.002 
Lakeland 
Lake Wales Medical  
154 0 I G 1 0 0.000 0.000 
Lakeland 
Lakeland Regional 
Medical Center 851 0 NFP G 34 8 0.911 -0.028 
Tampa Largo Medical Center 256 0 I G 61 -3 0.104 -0.044 
Miami-Dade 
Larkin Community 
Hospital 130 18 I G 1 0 0.000 0.000 
Ft. Pierce 
Lawnwood Regional 
Medical Center 345 20 I G 7 16 0.308 0.301 
Ft. Myers Lee Memorial Hospital 665 14 G G 62 -33 0.404 -0.298 
Orlando 
Leesburg Regional 
Medical Center 294 0 NFP G 12 17 0.025 0.097 
Sarasota 
Manatee Memorial 
Hospital 491 21 I G 42 12 0.164 0.012 
Ft. Pierce 
Martin Memorial 
Hospital South 100 0 NFP G 0 4 0.000 0.009 
Ft. Pierce 
Martin Memorial 
Medical Center 336 100 NFP G 19 -2 0.429 -0.121 
Tampa 
Mease Hospital - 
Countryside 144 0 NFP G 0 16 0.000 0.011 
Tampa 
Mease Hospital - 
Dunedin 378 -94 NFP G 23 -7 0.017 -0.014 
Tampa 
Memorial Hospital Of 
Tampa 174 0 I G 5 0 0.004 0.000 
Lauderdale 
Memorial Hospital 
Pembroke 301 0 G G 10 -1 0.012 0.001 
 Lauderdale 
Memorial Hospital 
West 174 10 G G 0 0 0.008 -0.001 
Lauderdale 
Memorial Regional 
Hospital 684 12 G G 36 52 0.160 0.073 
Miami-Dade Mercy Hospital Inc. 512 0 NFP G 67 -4 0.091 0.010 
Tampa Morton Plant Hospital 687 0 NFP G 62 9 0.162 0.020 
Tampa 
Morton Plant North 
Bay Hospital 122 0 NFP G 8 -3 0.001 0.000 
Miami-Dade 
Mount Sinai Medical 
Center 935 24 NFP T 56 -14 0.313 -0.085 
Ocala 
Munroe Regional 
Medical Center 323 0 NFP G 33 15 0.571 0.096 
Naples 
Naples Community 
Hospital 537 -129 NFP G 19 19 0.600 0.325 
Lauderdale 
North Broward 
Medical Center 409 0 G G 14 -1 0.013 0.009 
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Naples North Collier Hospital 117 -67 NFP G 0 0 0.000 0.000 
Gainesville 
North Florida Regional 
Medical Center 278 0 I G 21 4 0.393 0.009 
Ft. Walton 
North Okaloosa 
Medical Center 110 0 I G 1 1 0.006 0.012 
 Lauderdale 
North Ridge Medical 
Center 332 63 I G 39 7 0.241 -0.024 
Miami-Dade 
North Shore Medical 
Center 357 0 I G 9 0 0.006 -0.002 
Tampa Northside Hospital 288 0 I G 28 33 0.017 0.040 
Lauderdale 
Northwest Medical 
Center 175 -94 G G 9 3 0.006 0.001 
Tampa Oak Hill Hospital 204 0 I G 16 -1 0.024 -0.004 
Ocala 
Ocala Regional 
Medical Center 270 -40 I G 24 12 0.429 -0.096 
Jacksonville 
Orange Park Medical 
Center 219 0 I G 9 -4 0.032 -0.011 
Orlando 
Orlando Regional 
Medical Center 517 0 NFP T 101 41 0.215 0.044 
Orlando 
Osceola Regional 
Medical Center 171 0 I G 6 1 0.011 -0.006 
Melbourne 
Palm Bay Community 
Hospital 60 0 NFP G 0 4 0.000 0.001 
Palm Beach 
Palm Beach Gardens 
Medical Center 204 0 I G 34 3 0.317 0.064 
Miami-Dade 
Palm Springs General 
Hospital 247 0 I G 7 -1 0.002 0.001 
Palm Beach Palm West Hospital 117 0 I G 0 0 0.000 0.000 
Miami-Dade 
Palmetto General 
Hospital 360 0 I G 24 -15 0.010 -0.002 
Tampa 
Palms Of Pasadena 
Hospital 307 0 I G 20 -7 0.016 -0.007 
Miami-Dade 
Pan American 
Hospital 146 0 NFP G 10 -1 0.007 -0.002 
Miami-Dade 
Parkway Regional 
Medical Center 382 0 I G 12 -2 0.008 -0.003 
Melbourne 
Parrish Medical 
Center 210 0 G G 4 1 0.030 -0.002 
Tampa 
Pasco Regional 
Medical Center 120 0 I G 6 -1 0.005 0.000 
Lauderdale 
Plantation General 
Hospital 264 0 I G 17 -8 0.006 -0.004 
Tampa 
Regional Medical 
Center Bayonet Point 290 -44 I G 45 16 0.159 0.036 
Pensacola Sacred Heart Hospital 431 0 NFP G 38 -3 0.512 -0.122 
Tampa 
Saint Anthony's 
Hospital 405 0 NFP G 29 -7 0.026 -0.004 
Ft. Pierce 
Saint Lucie Medical 
Center 194 -44 I G 11 -3 0.263 -0.189 
Jacksonville Saint Luke's Hospital 289 0 NFP G 42 13 0.216 -0.017 
Palm Beach 
Saint Mary's Medical 
Center 460 0 NFP G 22 0 0.018 -0.007 
Jacksonville 
Saint Vincent's 
Medical Center 528 0 NFP G 35 4 0.524 0.044 
Pensacola 
Santa Rosa Medical 
Center 129 0 I G 2 0 0.002 0.000 
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Sarasota 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sarasota Memorial 
Hospital 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
828 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
G 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
G 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
51 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
40 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.596 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.011 
Gainesville Shands At AGH 367 0 NFP G 24 -2 0.261 0.020 
Gainesville 
Shands Hospital At 
The Univ. Of Florida 1082 -512 NFP T 40 3 0.345 -0.030 
Tampa South Bay Hospital 112 0 I G 6 1 0.006 -0.002 
Tampa 
South Florida Baptist 
Hospital 147 0 NFP G 5 -2 0.004 -0.002 
Orlando South Lake Hospital 68 0 NFP G 0 3 0.000 0.001 
Miami-Dade South Miami Hospital 445 55 NFP G 63 27 0.118 -0.011 
Orlando 
South Seminole 
Hospital 206 0 NFP G 13 -8 0.004 -0.004 
Miami-Dade 
South Shore Hospital 
And Medical Center 196 0 NFP G 0 2 0.000 0.001 
Ft. Myers 
Southwest Florida 
Regional Medical 
Center 400 0 I G 59 -6 0.547 -0.155 
Jacksonville 
Specialty Hospital 
Jacksonville 107 0 I G 0 2 0.000 0.001 
Tampa 
Springhill Regional 
Hospital 75 0 I G 0 0 0.006 0.000 
Orlando St Cloud Hospital 84 0 NFP G 0 5 0.000 0.001 
Tampa 
St Joseph's Hospital 
Inc. 883 0 NFP G 48 58 0.089 0.016 
Tampa 
St Petersburg General 
Hospital 219 0 I G 20 -3 0.016 -0.011 
Tampa Sun Coast Hospital 300 0 NFP G 8 -4 0.004 0.002 
Tallahassee 
Tallahassee 
Community Hospital 180 0 I G 13 6 0.246 0.091 
Tallahassee 
Tallahassee Memorial 
Hospital 770 0 NFP G 33 0 0.754 -0.091 
Tampa 
Tampa General 
Hospital 877 0 NFP T 82 9 0.135 -0.041 
Tampa 
Town & Country 
Hospital 201 0 I G 7 -3 0.001 0.001 
Tampa 
University Community 
Hospital 431 0 NFP G 55 5 0.095 0.032 
Tampa 
University Carrollwood  
120 0 NFP G 3 -1 0.003 0.000 
Ft. 
Lauderdale 
University Hospital 
And Medical Center 317 0 I G 8 0 0.010 -0.001 
Miami-Dade 
University Of Miami 
Hospital And Clinics 40 0 NFP G 1 0 0.000 0.000 
Palm Beach 
Wellington Regional 
Medical Center 120 0 I G 0 0 0.000 0.000 
Palm Beach 
West Boca Medical 
Center 185 0 I G 0 0 0.000 0.000 
Pensacola West Florida Hospital 531 0 I G 19 5 0.410 -0.015 
Miami-Dade 
Westchester General 
Hospital 172 0 I G 1 1 0.000 0.000 
Ft. 
Lauderdale 
Westside Regional 
Medical Center 204 0 I G 20 0 0.007 0.004 
Lakeland Winter Haven Hospital 527 -31 NFP G 10 3 0.087 0.008 
Orlando 
Winter Park Memorial 
Hospital 297 0 NFP G 10 1 0.008 0.000 
Melbourne 
Wuesthoff Medical 
Center-Rockledge 245 50 NFP G 33 -11 0.216 0.001 
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Hospital = Acute care short term hospitals meeting study criteria for inclusion  
Beds = the number of beds for which the study hospital is licensed in the FUHRS dataset in 1995 
Bed change = the change in the number of licensed beds dedicated to acute inpatient care from 1995 levels to 1999 
levels 
Ownership control = Designation of the controlling entity as specified in the AHCA FUHRS database in 1999 such that 
NFP = ‘not-for-profit’ including religious 
Control; I = ‘investor owned including private ownership, partnerships and corporations’; G = ‘government control including 
all city, county, health district and hospital authority controlled organizations 
Type = the mission designation as specified in the ACHA FUHRS database such that G = general acute care hospital; T = 
teaching hospital defined by the presence of an accredited medical residency program 
Surg = the number of specialty surgeons performing the study procedures in the specific hospital 
MC Share = the percent of study procedures for which managed care is the primary payer     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary Measures 
Mean 311 20 3 0.122 0.002 
Median 247 11 0 0.016 0.000 
STD Dev 263 23 13 0.214 0.076 
p  = |t|  0.001 0.738 
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Appendix 5 
 
Correlation Matrix  
 
 
 
 
                                              Spearman Correlation Coefficients, N = 20 
                                                      Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0 
                                                      totproc_ 
                                tot_     totsurg_     nocangio_ 
                            proc_all         all        score    con_score    ioc_score    pen_score    hhi_score 
 
  tot_proc_all               1.00000     0.93043      0.30075     -0.02406     -0.30376      0.21353     -0.08722 
                                          <.0001       0.1976       0.9198       0.1929       0.3660       0.7146 
 
  totsurg_all                0.93043     1.00000      0.15645      0.08800     -0.22866      0.25197     -0.13915 
                              <.0001                   0.5101       0.7122       0.3322       0.2838       0.5585 
   
totproc_nocangio_score       0.30075     0.15645      1.00000     -0.48571      0.19248      0.01353     -0.18947 
                              0.1976      0.5101                    0.0299       0.4162       0.9548       0.4237 
 
  con_score                 -0.02406     0.08800     -0.48571      1.00000     -0.34135     -0.17895     -0.12180 
                              0.9198      0.7122       0.0299                    0.1408       0.4503       0.6090 
 
  ioc_score                 -0.30376    -0.22866      0.19248     -0.34135      1.00000      0.07218     -0.19248 
                              0.1929      0.3322       0.4162       0.1408                    0.7623       0.4162 
 
  pen_score                  0.21353     0.25197      0.01353     -0.17895      0.07218      1.00000     -0.22857 
                              0.3660      0.2838       0.9548       0.4503       0.7623                    0.3324 
  
  hhi_score                 -0.08722    -0.13915     -0.18947     -0.12180     -0.19248     -0.22857      1.00000 
                              0.7146      0.5585       0.4237       0.6090       0.4162       0.3324 
 
  mc_share_score             0.08421     0.08650      0.17594      0.02105      0.42857      0.36692     -0.57744 
                              0.7241      0.7169       0.4581       0.9298       0.0594       0.1115       0.0077 
 
  use_score                 -0.07820    -0.26175      0.32331     -0.34436      0.07970     -0.09774      0.18947 
                              0.7431      0.2649       0.1644       0.1371       0.7384       0.6818       0.4237 
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Correlation Matrix (Continued)  
 
 
 
 
                               mc_share_                      totpop_        pop65_       inflat_      totsurg_ 
                                  score      use_score         score         score         score         score 
 
    tot_proc_all                0.08421       -0.07820       0.84211       0.20301      -0.28421      -0.13354 
                                 0.7241         0.7431        <.0001        0.3907        0.2246        0.5746 
 
    totsurg_all                 0.08650       -0.26175       0.77698       0.07146      -0.28357      -0.19245 
                                 0.7169         0.2649        <.0001        0.7647        0.2257        0.4163 
 
    totproc_nocangio_score      0.17594        0.32331       0.43609       0.48271       0.33835       0.38250 
                                 0.4581         0.1644        0.0546        0.0311        0.1445        0.0960 
 
    con_score                   0.02105       -0.34436      -0.01353      -0.05564       0.08421      -0.15315 
                                 0.9298         0.1371        0.9548        0.8158        0.7241        0.5192 
 
    ioc_score                   0.42857        0.07970      -0.22707       0.02105       0.16241       0.22407 
                                 0.0594         0.7384        0.3357        0.9298        0.4939        0.3423 
 
    pen_score                   0.36692       -0.09774       0.13383      -0.11729      -0.28120       0.00528 
                                 0.1115         0.6818        0.5738        0.6224        0.2297        0.9824 
 
    hhi_score                  -0.57744        0.18947      -0.25564      -0.15489      -0.18496      -0.10638 
                                 0.0077         0.4237        0.2767        0.5144        0.4350        0.6553 
 
    mc_share_score              1.00000       -0.06316       0.17444       0.03759       0.11729       0.03923 
                                                0.7914        0.4620        0.8750        0.6224        0.8696 
 
    
     use_score                  -0.06316        1.00000      -0.12030       0.07068       0.06316       0.48209 
                                  0.7914                       0.6134        0.7672        0.7914        0.0314 
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                    Correlation Matrix (Continued) 
 
                                                     totproc_ 
                              tot_      totsurg_     nocangio_ 
                            proc_all      all        score      con_score    ioc_score    pen_score    hhi_score 
 
  totpop_score               0.84211     0.77698      0.43609     -0.01353     -0.22707      0.13383     -0.25564 
                              <.0001      <.0001       0.0546       0.9548       0.3357       0.5738       0.2767 
 
  pop65_score                0.20301     0.07146      0.48271     -0.05564      0.02105     -0.11729     -0.15489 
                              0.3907      0.7647       0.0311       0.8158       0.9298       0.6224       0.5144 
 
  inflat_score              -0.28421    -0.28357      0.33835      0.08421      0.16241     -0.28120     -0.18496 
                              0.2246      0.2257       0.1445       0.7241       0.4939       0.2297       0.4350 
 
  totsurg_score             -0.13354    -0.19245      0.38250     -0.15315      0.22407      0.00528     -0.10638 
                              0.5746      0.4163       0.0960       0.5192       0.3423       0.9824       0.6553 
 
                            mc_share_                     totpop_       pop65_        inflat_      totsurg_ 
                              score      use_score         score         score         score         score 
 
    totpop_score            0.17444       -0.12030       1.00000       0.27368      -0.16842      -0.12750 
                             0.4620         0.6134                      0.2430        0.4778        0.5922 
 
    pop65_score             0.03759        0.07068       0.27368       1.00000      -0.04511      -0.10713 
                             0.8750         0.7672        0.2430                      0.8502        0.6530 
 
    inflat_score            0.11729        0.06316      -0.16842      -0.04511       1.00000       0.42927 
                             0.6224         0.7914        0.4778        0.8502                      0.0589 
 
 
 
    Note: totproc_all includes angioplasty volume 
          tot_proc_nocangio = procedure volume exclusive of angioplasty 
          totsurg_all includes all discrete surgeons, exclusive of angioplasties performed by non-surgeons    
          Matrix imported from the SAS proc reg procedure output   
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